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RACE AS PROXY: SITUATIONAL RACISM AND
SELF-FULFILLING STEREOTYPES
Lu-in Wang*

INTRODUCTION:

RACE AS PROXY

In our society, race can act as a proxy for a long list of characteris-

tics, qualities, and statuses. For people of color, 1 the most powerful of
these associations have too often been negative, and have carried with
them correspondingly negative consequences. 2 We often link color
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh School of Law. I thank the members
of the DePaul Law Review, and especially Mark Bradford, for organizing and inviting me to
participate in this wonderful Symposium. I also thank Deborah Brake, Martha Chamallas, Richard Delgado, David Herring, Thomas Ross, Jean Stefancic, George Taylor, and Welsh White for
their thoughtful comments on earlier drafts and Kay Marryshow, Maraleen Shields, Jessica Sommer, James Weaver, and Arthur Wolfson for their excellent research assistance. I also am thankful for the support this project received from the Dean's Scholarship program at the University
of Pittsburgh School of Law.
1. This Article focuses on the ways in which people of color are affected when their race acts
as a proxy for other, often negative, characteristics. It should not go unremarked, however, that
race also can act as a proxy for whites-albeit generally with much different effect. Scholars
have demonstrated, for example, that whiteness tends to be associated with positive qualities and
privileged statuses, such as innocence (in cultural, religious, and sexual terms, as well as innocence of racism), see Thomas Ross, The Rhetorical Tapestry of Race: White Innocence and Black
Abstraction, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1 (1990); privilege, power, and the expectation of entitlement, see Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1707 (1993); STEPHANIE M.
WILDMAN, PRIVILEGE REVEALED:
How INVISIBLE PREFERENCE UNDERMINES AMERICA
(1996); and even specific traits such as "discipline, restraint, quiet competence, and industry,"
ROBERT M. ENTMAN & ANDREW ROJECKI, THE BLACK IMAGE IN THE WHITE MIND: MEDIA
AND RACE IN AMERICA 159 (2001) (describing "prototypically White traits"). On the other
hand, while whiteness tends to have these positive associations, whites generally are less apt to
be stereotyped than members of other racial groups. See, e.g., Gregory M. Walton & Geoffrey
L. Cohen, Stereotype Lift, 39 J. EXPER. SoC. PSYCHOL. 456, 464 (2003) ("Whites, men, and other
majority groups are considered normal and typical in most sectors of society. They are thus less
likely to be targets of either negative stereotypes or positive ones.") (citations omitted).
2. Some have argued that race is used as a proxy that advantages blacks and other racial
minorities in the context of affirmative action. Judge Richard A. Posner, for example, has written that, in law school admissions processes that take account of race, "blackness ... is a proxy
for characteristics relevant to the educational process or to performance in the legal professioncharacteristics such as a background of deprivation, empathy for the disadvantaged, etc." RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 690 (6th ed. 2002). However, affirmative action
policies are justified without using race as a proxy in the manner described by Judge Posner. In
the recent United States Supreme Court decision upholding the use of race as a factor in admissions at the University of Michigan Law School, for example, the Court held that the law school
"has a compelling interest in attaining a diverse student body," Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct.
2325, 2339 (2003), and went on to note that "[t]he Law School [did] not premise its need for
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with undesirable personal qualities such as laziness, incompetence,
and hostility, 3 as well as disfavored political viewpoints such as lack of
patriotism or disloyalty to the United States. 4 Race even acts as a

proxy for susceptibility to some diseases. 5 Medical professionals so
often diagnose schizophrenia in blacks, 6 for example, that the associa-

tion has come full circle, and the diagnosis now acts as a proxy for
race. 7 The association with perhaps the most far-reaching effects is
that of race as a proxy for criminality and deviance, 8 an association
critical mass [of minority students] on 'any belief that minority students always (or even consistently) express some characteristic minority viewpoint on any issue.' To the contrary, diminishing
the force of such stereotypes is both a crucial part of the Law School's mission, and one that it
cannot accomplish with only token numbers of minority students." Id. at 2341 (citation
omitted).
3. See, e.g., ENTMAN & ROJECKI, supra note 1, at 28-31, 33-45 (describing views of blacks
revealed through telephone surveys and interviews with white subjects from Indianapolis who
were categorized as either "high" in their denial of continuing discrimination against blacks or as
part of "the ambivalent majority," the "largest and most politically important" group); Tom
Smith, Ethnic Images, National Opinion Research Center, GSS Topical Report No. 19 (1990), at
http://cloud9.norc.uchicago.edu/dlib/t-19.htm (last visited Sept. 29, 2003) (reporting results of extensive survey of Americans' ratings of six ethnic groups-Whites, Jews, Blacks, Asian Americans, Hispanic Americans, and Southern Whites-on six characteristics: wealth, work ethic,
violence, intelligence, dependency, and patriotism).
4. See, e.g., Victor C. Romero, Proxies for Loyalty in ConstitutionalImmigration Law: Citizenship and Race After September 11, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 871 (2003); Smith, supra note 3.
5. See, e.g., Ren Bowser, Racial Profilingin Health Care: An InstitutionalAnalysis of Medical Treatment Disparities,7 MICH. J. RACE & L. 79, 109, 115-22 (2001) (describing assumptions
that link race to a greater susceptibility to certain diseases and influence doctors' diagnosis and
treatment decisions).
6. The degree to which blacks are diagnosed as schizophrenic "is generally thought to be the
result of misdiagnosis rather than any racial difference in prevalence." William B. Lawson et al.,
Race as a Factor in Inpatientand OutpatientAdmissions and Diagnosis, 45 Hosp. & COMMUNITY
PSYCHIATRY 72, 72 (1994). See also Thomas W. Pavkov et al., Psychiatric Diagnoses and Racial
Bias: An Empirical Investigation, 20 PROF. PSYCHOL.: RES. & PRAC. 364 (1989) (reporting on

study finding that being black was predictive of a diagnosis of schizophrenia).
7. See Arthur L. Whaley, Racism in the Provision of Mental Health Services: A Social Cognitive Analysis, 68 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 47, 52 (1998) (noting a 1977 study that "found that

being black was associated with . . . inadequacies in service delivery independent of diagnosis,"
and pointing out that today, given that more severe diagnoses and more restrictive interventions
are assigned to blacks, "[t]he diagnoses of schizophrenia or psychotic disorders ... serve the
function that race alone served nearly two decades ago").
8. See, e.g., Regina Austin, "A Nation of Thieves": Securing Black People's Right To Shop and
To Sell in White America, 1994 UTAH L. REV. 147, 148 (1994) (noting that mundane activities
such as engaging in consumption and commerce are construed as deviant when black people
undertake them); David A. Harris, The Stories, the Statistics, and the Law: Why "Driving While
Black" Matters, 84 MINN. L. REV. 265, 319 (1999) (noting that Supreme Court decisions concerning racial profiling in law enforcement have freed police to "use blackness as a proxy for criminal
propensity") (citation omitted); RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW 136 (1997)
(describing the use of "color as a proxy for dangerousness"); Dorothy E. Roberts, Race, Vagueness, and the Social Meaning of Order-MaintenancePolicing,89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 775,
806 (1999) ("Police officers are particularly notorious for using race as a proxy for criminal
propensity.").
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that carries into not just the criminal justice system through practices
such as racial profiling in law enforcement, 9 but also has implications

for how people of color are treated in contexts as mundane as retail
transactions

°

and as consequential as health care."' The use of race

as a proxy for criminality even supports the converse notion that peo-

12
ple of color are suitable targets for crime.
The DePaul Law Review chose an apt phrase in titling this Sympo-

sium "Race as Proxy," for the word "proxy" captures the offhand,
unthinking, "default" manner in which race often influences decision
making. Accordingly, the term also highlights a basic problem with

which legal standards have, so far, not come to terms. Despite the
wealth of antidiscrimination laws that would seem to prohibit the use
of race as a proxy 13 in a wide range of contexts, 14 much race-based
9. See generally

DAVID COLE,

No

EQUAL JUSTICE:

RACE AND CLASS IN THE AMERICAN

CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (1999); Harris, supra note 8; Roberts, supra note 8; KATHERYN K.

PO(1998).
10. See generally Austin, supra note 8; Deseriee A. Kennedy, Consumer Discrimination: The
Limitations of Federal Civil Rights Protection,66 Mo. L. REV. 275, 287-302 (2001) (noting similarities between consumer discrimination and racial profiling in law enforcement, and providing
examples).
11. See, e.g., Michael S. Shin, Note, Redressing Wounds: Finding a Legal Framework To Remedy Racial Disparitiesin Medical Care, 90 CAL. L. REV. 2047, 2072-76 (2002) (describing ways in
which racial stereotypes, including stereotypes of African American patients as "more likely to
engage in unhealthy behaviors (such as drug use)" or as criminal, can affect medical professionals' decision making); Whaley, supra note 7, at 51-52 (discussing ways in which stereotypes of
black patients as aggressive or violent affect mental health diagnosis and treatment decisions).
Cf.Wendy G. Lane et al., Racial Differences in the Evaluation of PediatricFracturesfor Physical
Abuse, 288 JAMA 1603, 1605, 1607 (2002) (reporting on study that found "a significant difference in the evaluation of skull and long-bone fractures for abusive injury between minority and
nonminority children," which, if a result of racial bias, "may lead to abuse being overlooked in
nonminority children and/or overidentified in minority children"). For fuller discussion of the
use of race as a proxy in medical care, see infra Part IV.
12. See, e.g., Lu-in Wang, Suitable Targets? Parallelsand Connections Between "Hate" Crimes
and "Driving While Black," 6 MICH. J.RACE & L. 209, 226-27 (2001) ("[T]he myth that certain
groups are prone to criminality or deviance promotes the practice of hate crimes as well as racial
profiling, for.., it... justifies the perpetration of violence against those groups, then providing
example of anti-black lynching.").
13. Deborah Hellman has pointed out that discrimination can take two broad forms: "proxy
discrimination," under which one identifying characteristic is used as a proxy for another, and
"non-proxy discrimination," under which "the classification is its own end." Deborah Hellman,
Two Types of Discrimination: The Familiarand the Forgotten, 86 CAL. L. REV. 315, 318 (1998)
(illustrating "proxy" discrimination through example of a law firm's using sex as a "screening
device [in hiring] on the theory that women are less assertive than men and consequently make
less effective lawyers," and "non-proxy" discrimination through the example of "the admissions
practice of a women's college"). Hellman argues that the two types of discrimination use classifications differently and for different purposes-thereby necessitating different types of "moral
inquiry"-but that the law (specifically, the Supreme Court's Equal Protection doctrine) has
developed around the former and, consequently, "lacks the appropriate analytical tools to adRUSSELL, THE COLOR OF CRIME: RACIAL HOAXES, WHITE FEAR, BLACK PROTECTIONISM,
LICE HARASSMENT, AND OTHER MACROAGGRESSIONS
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decision making escapes legal sanction. Recent legal scholarship has
been particularly critical of the prevailing model of intentional dis-

crimination. 15 Scholars have pointed out the inadequacy of individual
adjudication under that model to account for the largest share of modern-day discrimination by illuminating the complex and subtle means
by which race has come to carry its significant and pernicious
associations.

16

dress" the latter. Id. at 316. As might be obvious from its title, this Article focuses on what
Heilman would call "proxy discrimination." Id.
14. An incomplete list of such protections would include constitutional and statutory provisions prohibiting racial and other forms of discrimination in government action, U.S. CoNsT.
amends. V, XIV; employment, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) (2000); housing-related activities, 42 U.S.C.
§ 3601 (2000); the making and enforcement of contracts, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2000); programs or
activities receiving federal financial assistance, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d); and public accommodations,
42 U.S.C. § 2000(a).
15. Although the letter of the constitutional or statutory provision in question might be read
more broadly, see, e.g., Martha Chamallas, Deepening the Legal Understandingof Bias: On Devaluation and Biased Prototypes, 74 S.CAL. L. REV. 747, 748-53 (2001) (pointing out the potential for legal recognition of theories such as stereotyping and disparate impact in
antidiscrimination law), judicial interpretations of antidiscrimination law and the practical difficulties of pursuing an alternative cause of action have made the intentional model of discrimination the sole or predominant model for individual adjudication of claims of discrimination in
many contexts. See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 237 (1976) (holding disparate impact not actionable under Equal Protection clause; requiring proof of "discriminatory purpose");
Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996) (holding Fourth Amendment inapplicable to claims
of racial discrimination in law enforcement; relegating such claims to Equal Protection analysis);
Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582 (1983) (holding disparate impact not actionable under Title VI of Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d), which requires a showing of intentional discrimination); Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001) (holding disparate
impact not actionable under Title VI regulations); Gen. Bldg. Contractors Ass'n v. Pennsylvania,
458 U.S. 375 (1982) (holding that liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 requires proof of intent to
discriminate). See also Chamallas, supra, at 748-49 (noting that "[t]he legal construction used
most consistently to address discrimination is 'intentional disparate treatment,"' which tends to
require proof of a conscious intent to discriminate, often based upon animus or hostility); John J.
Donohue III & Peter Siegelman, The Changing Nature of Employment Discrimination Litigation, 43 STAN. L. REV.983, 998 n.57 (1991) (reporting on American Bar Foundation survey that
found that less than 1.84% of employment discrimination cases filed between January 1, 1985
and March 31, 1987 were disparate impact cases).
This Article does not focus on a specific setting or doctrinal context (but see discussion infra
Part IV on medical care), but instead points out inadequacies of individual adjudication under
the intentional model of discrimination as means of redressing discrimination generally.
16. Scholars have noted and criticized the dominance of the intentional discrimination model
in a wide range of contexts. See, e.g., Chamallas, supra note 15; Ian F. Haney L6pez, Institutional
Racism: Judicial Conduct and a New Theory of Racial Discrimination, 109 YALE L.J. 1717
(2000); Linda Hamilton Krieger, Civil Rights Perestroika: IntergroupRelations After Affirmative
Action, 86 CAL. L. REV. 1251 (1998) [hereinafter Krieger, Civil Rights Perestroika];Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discriminationand
Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161 (1995) [hereinafter Krieger, The Content of Our Categories];Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987); Anthony C. Thompson, Stopping
the Usual Suspects: Race and the Fourth Amendment, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 956 (1999).
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For example, legal scholarship drawing from cognitive and social
psychological research has shown the inadequacy of the intentional
discrimination model to account for the ways in which racial and other
group-based biases are most likely to infect individuals' decisions in
contemporary times. 17 In an era that is characterized by the widespread, explicit adoption of nonracist, egalitarian ideals and the general decline of old-fashioned, overt racial bigotry, fewer individuals
than in the past are likely to be motivated by discriminatory animus. 18
Most of us are afflicted instead with unconscious cognitive and motivational biases that lead us to reflexively categorize, perceive, interpret the behavior of, remember, and interact with people of different

races differently. These unconscious biases, in turn, can lead us to
treat people differently based on race, but without intending to or
even being aware that we are doing so.19
Legal scholars also have shown that the intentional discrimination
model fails to provide for the context in which a decisionmaker oper-

ates. A theory of institutional racism 20 offers an account of individual
decision making within the cultural context that "nicely dovetail[s]"
17. Krieger has pointed out that the law has not kept pace with developments in social scientists' understanding of discrimination, as current legal standards reflect the state of psychological
research on discrimination from the 1920s into the 1980s. Krieger, The Content of Our Categories, supra note 16, at 1174.
18. See generally John F. Dovidio & Samuel L. Gaertner, On the Nature of Contemporary
Prejudice: The Causes, Consequences,and Challenges of Aversive Racism, in CONFRONTING RACISM: THE PROBLEM AND THE RESPONSE 3 (Jennifer L. Eberhardt & Susan T. Fiske eds., 1998);
Lawrence, supra note 16.
19. See generally Jody Armour, Stereotypes and Prejudice: Helping Legal Decisionmakers
Break the Prejudice Habit, 83 CAL. L. REV. 733 (1995); Krieger, The Content of Our Categories,
supra note 16; Thompson, supra note 16.
20. This theory was developed by Ian Haney L6pez, who drew upon New Institutionalism, "a
genre within organizational sociology." Haney L6pez, supra note 16, at 1723. Haney L6pez
explains that the focus of institutional racism is on
[h]ow racial institutions, whether followed in a script or path form, operate as takenfor-granted understandings of the social context that actors must adopt to make sense
of the world, as well as to be accepted as bona fide members of that milieu. Under the
sway of institutional racism, persons fail to recognize their reliance on racial notions,
and indeed may stridently insist that no such reliance exists, even while acting in a
manner that furthers racial status hierarchy.
Id. at 1827. He illustrates this theory through an examination of the grand juror nominating
process in Los Angeles, a process that in the 1960s resulted in "the near total exclusion of Mexican Americans from service on grand juries in Los Angeles," although each nominating judge
claimed to have "harbored no intention to discriminate," and which did little better at nominating Mexican Americans by the 1990s. Id. at 1722, 1728.
Building upon the work of Haney L6pez, Rend Bowser has applied the theory of institutional
racism to show how racialized medical research contributes to racial disparities in medical decision making. See Bowser, supra note 5. See also infra notes 426-435 and accompanying text.
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with cognitive theory.2 1 This theory shows how the cultural context
produces (and reproduces) unintentional discrimination when "frequently repeated but largely unexamined social practices or patterns"2 2 become so familiar that they form uncontested, taken-forgranted, background understandings that come to define what is "nor24
mal," and, in turn, what is "real" and even "natural. '23 These social
practices, norms, and processes thereby promote and perpetuate discriminatory decisions without any individual intending to discriminate
and without the discrimination being noticed. 25 As a result, racially
26
disparate outcomes are expected and regarded as inevitable.
This Article supplements those accounts of cognitive, motivational,
and cultural influences on discrimination by examining the influence
of the immediate situation in producing racially biased conduct, with a
particular focus on one-on-one social interactions. It describes two
lines of social psychological research that highlight the capacity of situations to both promote and obscure discrimination, thereby reinforcing the expectation and acceptance of racially disparate treatment and
outcomes. The first, which has been developed in conjunction with
the theory of aversive racism, 27 demonstrates the power of ambiguous
situations to channel discrimination even while masking it. This research shows, in other words, that individuals are most likely to discriminate in situations in which their behavior is least likely to be
viewed as discriminatory-thereby providing "cover" for their racially
biased conduct. The second line of research shows how racial bias can
actively create such situations, by showing that stereotypes do not just
influence how individuals categorize and perceive others based on
race, but also can play a role in eliciting from the target objective "evi21. Haney L6pez, supra note 16, at 1812 n.357 (discussing connections and differences between New Institutionalism, upon which he builds his theory of institutional racism and cognitive
psychology).
22. Id. at 1723.
23. Id. at 1724.
24. Although Haney L6pez focuses his analysis on individual decision making within organized settings, when its "explanatory power is particularly pronounced," he notes that "[a]ll of
social life depends on background routines and understandings, making institutional racism theory widely applicable." Id. at 1823.
25. Id.
26. Cf Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Twelfth Chronicle: The Problem of the Shanty, 85 GEO.
L.J. 667, 674-78 (1997) (discussing ways in which the "wretched conditions" suffered by some
groups come to seem "normal and ordinary" to others and citing example of conditions suffered
by poor Mexicans living in shanty towns, or colonias, on the Texas border).
27. See generally Dovidio & Gaertner, supra note 18; Samuel L. Gaertner & John F. Dovidio,
The Aversive Form of Racism, in PREJUDICE, DISCRIMINATION, AND RACISM 61 (John F. Dovidio
& Samuel L. Gaertner eds., 1986). See also infra notes 172-174 and accompanying text.
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dence" to simultaneously confirm the stereotype and obscure its
influence.
The situation-sensitive, contingent nature of these dynamics produces a state of affairs in which, as Linda Hamilton Krieger has
written:
[W]e can predict that intergroup bias will cause discrimination. But
we cannot say that intergroup bias will always cause discrimination
to occur, nor can we predict exactly when discrimination will occur.

We might not even be able to identify when discrimination has
occurred.28

The failure to appreciate the interacting influences of unconscious
bias, institutional norms, and situational channeling results, as Krieger
also has written, in "a fundamental 'lack of fit' between the jurisprudential construction of discrimination and the actual phenomenon it
purports to represent" 29-the direct consequence of which is the inability of individuals to secure legal redress for their injuries when
they have suffered losses as the result of discrimination that does not
fit the traditional mold. A less obvious but no less serious consequence of the conventional model is that it stands in the way of meaningful social change and itself becomes a link in a feedback loop that
perpetuates an artificial conception of bias. Traditional legal standards, in other words, are themselves part of the problem, to the extent that they direct attention to the search for invidiously motivated
individual decisionmakers and away from the need and potential for
institutional change-altering the "situation"-as a means of disrupting the noninvidious, "normal," but no less problematic routes by
which we perpetrate and perpetuate discrimination.
Moreover, when we limit our focus-and indeed, our condemnation-to discrimination that can be characterized as deviant and invidiously motivated, we construct discrimination that was influenced by
the social context as being legitimate and even desirable or, alternatively, as regrettable but inevitable. Even worse, we justify that discrimination on "moral" grounds. As Charles Lawrence has explained:
"[I]f there is no discrimination, there is no need for a remedy; if blacks
are being treated fairly yet remain at the bottom of the socioeconomic
ladder, only their own inferiority can explain their subordinate position."'30 In other words, the traditional, "perpetrator"-focused per28. Krieger, Civil Rights Perestroika, supra note 16, at 1313.
29. Krieger, The Content of Our Categories,supra note 16, at 1217.
30. Lawrence, supra note 16, at 325. See also Thomas Ross, Innocence and Affirmative Action, 43 VAND. L. REv. 297, 312 (1990). Ross notes that, conversely, "[t]he existence of unconscious racism undermines the rhetoric of innocence. The 'innocent white victim' is no longer
quite so innocent." Id. See also SUSAN T. FISKE & SHELLEY E. TAYLOR, SOCIAL COGNmION 86
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spective itself perpetuates discrimination, for it institutionalizes the
notion that much of the differential treatment of people of color is
31
acceptable and appropriate.
This Article makes the case for institutional change as a means of
disrupting the processes by which we come to expect and accept that
state of affairs. It argues for lessening our emphasis on individual
wrongdoers and increasing our attention to the context in which individuals operate.
Part II begins the argument by showing that individual adjudication
under the intentional model of discrimination is inadequate to redress
the largest share of modern discrimination, because the situations in
which discrimination is easy to see are not the ones in which it is most
likely to be found. Part II examines social psychological research
showing not only that racially biased conduct is situation sensitive, but
also that the very same "normatively ambiguous" situations that promote discrimination are those that tend to obscure it. Furthermore,
the individual who discriminates in such a situation may well do so
without intention or awareness, because the situation can conceal the
influence of racial bias from the perpetrator as well as the observer.
As a result, the actor and observer-and even the victim of discrimination-may not realize what has happened and may view the actor's
conduct not as racially biased, but as appropriate or justified.
Part III builds upon the points developed in Part II by showing that
situations are not purely "given." That is, individuals themselves can
actively (although often unwittingly) construct the very situations that
channel, seem to justify, and thereby mask racially biased conduct.
Specifically, Part III examines the power of people, acting on racial
stereotypes, to define situations in normatively ambiguous terms by
eliciting from the target of the stereotype the very "evidence" that
appears to confirm, and that thereby strengthens, the stereotype. It
will point out, however, that the real power of racial stereotypes lies
not so much in their ability to define situations in this way, but in their
ability to do so while concealing the role that they played.
Part IV brings together the situational account elaborated in Parts
II and III with the unconscious bias and institutional accounts of discrimination that have been developed by other legal scholars. It
shows how these dynamics interact in one context that has raised serious concern in recent years-racial bias in medical care-to produce
(1991) (discussing tendency of individuals to blame victims for their misfortunes, thereby maintaining belief in a just world).
31. Cf Haney L6pez, supra note 16, at 1723-24.
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an invisible, self-fulfilling, and self-perpetuating prophecy of racial
disparity.
Part IV, as well as the Article itself, ends on a more optimistic note
by pointing out the potential for institutional change to disrupt the
seemingly inexorable processes that channel and mask the use of race
as proxy. In other words, it argues that we can, if we so choose, alter
situations in ways that unmask and disrupt the self-fulfilling prophecy,
so that racial discrimination no longer seems either inevitable or
justified.
II.

SITUATIONAL RACISM

Traditional legal standards for discrimination reflect the influence
of lay psychology on how the law understands human behavior and
assesses responsibility. 32 The intent requirement itself mirrors lay
concepts of responsibility for negative outcomes, which center on the
question of whether the actor intended to produce that result. 33 Associated assumptions about the kind of person who discriminates and his
decision-making process 3 4 reflect the even more fundamental lay assumption that an individual's behavior is largely determined by his
character, including his attitudes and beliefs. 35 The conventional pro32. Legal and lay conceptions of discrimination are often equivalent, for the legal standards
that have been developed tend to reflect "lay psychology" or "folk theories" of prejudice and
discrimination, or to invite their application through the fact-finding process. See generally Gary
Blasi, Advocacy Against the Stereotype: Lessons From Cognitive Social Psychology, 49 UCLA L.
REV. 1241, 1242-46, 1266-72 (2002) (discussing "folk theories" of prejudice and stereotyping that
are incorporated into legal scholarship and advocacy); Susan T. Fiske, Examining the Role of
Intent: Toward UnderstandingIts Role in Stereotyping and Prejudice,in UNINTENDED THOUGHT
253, 268-75 (James S. Uleman & John A. Bargh eds., 1989) (comparing "intent as viewed by lay
psychology" and as viewed by "legal psychology"-including intent to discriminate-and noting
that many of the same principles are used to infer intent in both lay and legal settings; noting
also, however, that "to some extent, these principles overlap with what scientific psychologists
have written about intent"); Krieger, Civil Rights Perestroika,supra note 16, at 1309-11 (describing standard "discrimination schema" likely to be employed by jurors).
33. See FIsKE & TAYLOR, supra note 30, at 83-84 (discussing role of causal attribution in
assigning blame or responsibility and stating that "[bilame attributions tend to be made only
when an actor is seen as intending to produce an outcome, and achieving a negative outcome
was the actor's purpose").
34. Some of these assumptions have been captured in the "discrimination schema" described
by Krieger, see Krieger, Civil Rights Perestroika, supra note 16, at 1309-11, and the "folk theories" of prejudice and discrimination described by Blasi, see Blasi, supra note 32, at 1242-46,
1266-72.
35. This focus on character-based, internal explanations leads us to equate, and even to conflate, discrimination with bad character. Conversely, when we attribute disparate treatment to
external or situational factors, we tend-as with other negative outcomes that are attributed to
the situation-to view it as justified or understandable. Indeed, we may not even label it "discrimination" at all, but characterize it simply as a rational reaction to a particular set of objective
facts. Thus, for example, a criminal who targets Asian immigrants for violence because of his
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totype of discrimination thus does not just equate discrimination with

an intent to discriminate, but also assumes that someone who discriminates has a "taste for discrimination" 36 that "functions like a personality trait: it is something that exists inside the discriminator. It is
relatively stable and expresses itself consistently over time and across
different situations.

'37

Accordingly, lay and legal observers both tend

to disregard the influence of the situation on another person's behavior, believing that only someone who "is" prejudiced or racist would
discriminate on the basis of race, and to expect that someone who
discriminated in one set of circumstances would do so in another-or,
conversely, that someone who did not discriminate in one situation
38
would not in another.

We make a big mistake when we focus on the decisionmaker's character and disregard the situation in defining and understanding dishostility toward foreigners is considered to have committed a discriminatory "hate" crime, but
one who targets Asian immigrant shopkeepers for robbery because he views them as easy targets
or as unlikely to report the crime is viewed not as discriminating, but instead as behaving as a
rational robber naturally would. See, e.g., Lu-in Wang, The Complexities of "Hate," 60 OHIO ST.
L.J. 799, 823-24 (1999) (discussing view that a perpetrator who targets a particular social group
not out of animus but based on a cost-benefit analysis does not act with a punishable biased
motivation).
The tendency to draw sharp distinctions between character- and situation-based explanations
for others' behavior also introduces circularity into assessments of the acceptability of that behavior. People's expectations of how others typically behave in particular situations tend to bias
their explanations for and judgments of others' behavior. Behavior that is unexpected or considered extreme tends to be attributed to the actor's character and judged to be inappropriate or
unjustified, while behavior that is expected or viewed as typical tends to be attributed to the
situation and judged as appropriate or justified. See Daniel T. Gilbert & Patrick S. Malone, The
Correspondence Bias, 117 PSYCHOL. BULL. 21, 26 (1995) (discussing role of expectations in
causal attribution). (Even the referenced assessments of typicality may be biased by unrealistic
expectations of how both we and others would behave in various situations. See id. at 27 (discussing causes of biased assessments of typicality).) The former bias may explain why people
generally do condemn extreme acts of discrimination such as hate crimes, which they tend to
attribute to the perpetrators' deviant characters but not to situational influences. The converse
tendency, in contrast, may explain why more mundane forms of discrimination are seen as acceptable. People may overlook the biased beliefs or attitudes that contribute to more ordinary
kinds of discrimination such as racial profiling in law enforcement, and instead see the practice
as responsive to the situation and therefore not discriminatory.
36. Krieger, Civil Rights Perestroika,supra note 16, at 1310 (quoting the term used by economists) (citations omitted).
37. Id. at 1311.
38. Krieger illustrates this line of reasoning using the "same actor" doctrine in employment
discrimination law:
[T]he same actor doctrine[ ] hold[s] that if the same person who hired an employee
makes the decision to fire him, a strong inference or presumption of nondiscrimination
arises. This inference is seen as justified because it hardly makes sense to hire workers
from a group one dislikes (thereby incurring the psychological costs of associating with
them), only to fire them once they are on the job.
Id. at 1310 (citations omitted).
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crimination, however, because the most basic error people make in

assessing human behavior lies in drawing this distinction. We tend to
see someone else's conduct as being mostly or even exclusively deter-

mined by character (the kind of person she is) while overlooking the
context in which the person is acting. This fundamental attribution

error 39 or correspondence bias 40 is "[p]erhaps the most commonly
documented bias in social perception" in Western cultures, 41 and
causes us to attribute another person's behavior to his or her enduring
dispositionalqualities (such as personality, beliefs, or attitudes) while
overlooking the influence of situationalfactors (such as constraints or

expectations introduced by the social context).42 (And, as later sections will discuss, the fundamental attribution error does not just distort perceptions of why people discriminate, but also is itself an
important contributor to discrimination.) 43 The fundamental attribution error, along with related biases, 44 causes us to draw erroneous
inferences about people's characteristics and qualities from their be45 It
havior and to have unrealistic expectations for their behavior.
39. FISKE & TAYLOR, supra note 30, at 67; LEE Ross & RICHARD E. NISBETr, THE PERSON
PERSPECTIVES OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 125 (1991).

AND THE SITUATION:

40. Some writers prefer the term "correspondence bias." See, e.g., Gilbert & Malone, supra
note 35. I use the terms interchangeably.
41. The fundamental attribution error is "a ubiquitous part of Western causal inference, but is
not as dominant in non-Western cultures." FISKE & TAYLOR, supra note 30, at 68. A number of
explanations have been offered for the relationship between Western culture and the belief that
character determines behavior, including "the Judeo-Christian insistence on individual moral
responsibility [and] the intellectual underpinnings of capitalism and democracy in terms of the
imperative of freedom of action." Ross & NISBET-r, supra note 39, at 142. See also Gilbert &
Malone, supra note 35, at 35 (discussing influence of capitalism).
42. See, e.g., FISKE & TAYLOR, supra note 30, at 67; Ross & NISBETr, supra note 39, at 129-33.
See also Gilbert & Malone, supra note 35, at 21 (colorfully describing the correspondence bias as
our tendency to focus on "the meaty side" of the person's skin (internal or personal forces),
rather than on the "sunny side" (external or situational forces)).
This bias has significant, far reaching implications for antidiscrimination law and policy for, as
Krieger has stated, "At its core, our antidiscrimination law and policy suffers [sic] from a cognitive bias known . . . as the fundamental attribution error." Krieger, Civil Rights Perestroika,
supra note 16, at 1329.
43. See infra notes 220, 232, 235, 379-380, 476-477 and accompanying text for examples of how
the fundamental attribution error contributes to discrimination. See also Krieger, Civil Rights
Perestroika,supra note 16, at 1327 (stating that "[a]ttributing the causes of employment decisions
implicates the very processes of social perception and judgment bound up in the challenged
employment decisions themselves.")
44. Gilbert and Malone have explained that the correspondence bias actually "comprises a
number of distinct phenomena that only pose as one." Gilbert & Malone, supra note 35, at 22.
They have described four separate causes of the general phenomenon: "(a) lack of awareness,
(b) unrealistic expectations, (c) inflated categorizations, and (d) incomplete corrections." Id. at
24-25.
45. See generally FISKE & TAYLOR, supra note 30, at 67-72 (providing examples); Ross &
NISBEY-, supra note 39, at 125-38.
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leads us both to overemphasize the importance of character in determining another person's behavior and to expect people to behave consistently in different situations. 46 Internally focused, disposition-based

inferences often are not warranted, however, especially when the person's behavior is consistent with incentives, constraints, pressures, or
expectations introduced by the situation. 47 For example, a teacher
may be stern and business-like in the classroom because he or she
needs to cover assigned course material within the allotted time,

rather than because of a generally no-nonsense personality. Nor do
people always behave consistently across contexts, for different situa-

tions present different opportunities and limitations. 48 The same
teacher who is stern in the classroom may be kind and solicitous dur-

ing office hours, when he or she is free of time pressure.
46. According to Ross and Nisbett, the fundamental attribution error comprises two more
specific biases: "an overeager dispositionism and an underdeveloped situationism," both of
which have been empirically demonstrated. Ross & NiSETr, supra note 39, at 130. See also id.
at 126. The fundamental attribution error also leads to a third tendency, to "(3) make overly
confident predictions when given a small amount of trait-relevant information." Id.
47. In one experimental setting, for example, observers failed to appreciate the influence of
financial incentives in motivating people to volunteer for special projects, instead viewing their
willingness or unwillingness to do so as a reflection of their helpful or unhelpful dispositions and,
therefore, as predictive of whether or not the person observed would volunteer to help in a
different situation. Richard E. Nisbett et al., Behavior as Seen by the Actor and as Seen by the
Observer, 27 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 154, 157 (1973). In fact, the actors' willingness
to volunteer was directly related to the amount of payment offered. Id. The actors themselves
seemed to appreciate the influence of the financial incentive on their decision, for they "explained their behavior in terms of the sum of money they were offered." Ross & NISBETr, supra
note 39, at 140 (discussing this experiment).
This divergence between observers' and actors' explanations illustrates another tendency: for
the converse of the correspondence bias to influence people's explanations of their own conduct.
That is, while individuals tend to attribute other people's behavior to dispositional factors, they
are keenly aware of how the situation affects their own behavior. See FISKE & TAYLOR, supra
note 30, at 72-73, 75 (noting, however, that this effect is modest in size and can be reversed);
Ross & NISBE-rT, supra note 39, at 140-41. Not surprisingly perhaps, actors also have a tendency
to see their own positive behaviors as reflecting their personal qualities, but their negative behaviors as responsive to external pressures. See FISKE & TAYLOR, supra note 30, at 74, 78-79.
(Similarly, there is a tendency to take credit for success and deny responsibility for failure, by
attributing ones' own success to dispositional factors and failure to situational factors.) This selfserving bias extends beyond one's self, to include groups with which one is allied. See FISKE &
TAYLOR, supra note 30, at 80-81. A "group serving" or "ethnocentric" double standard in perception and understanding-which, again, has been found to be more pervasive and robust in
Western than in non-Western cultures-may help to explain why interpretations can vary so
widely between groups as to whether particular conduct is based in biased attitudes or merely
responsive to the situation, and therefore whether or not it is discriminatory. See id. at 81.
48. See generally Ross & NIsaErr,supra note 39, at 3-6, 27-58 (discussing power of situational
influences on human behavior). For example, as social psychologist Ziva Kunda has noted, the
polite, unassuming neighbor sometimes turns out to be a serial killer. See ZIVA KUNDA, SOCIAL
COGNITION: MAKING SENSE OF PEOPLE 426-27 (1999).
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Likewise, an individual's decision to treat people of different races

differently does not necessarily reflect a basically racist personality,
and an individual who discriminates on the basis of race in one setting
may not do so in another. Whether a person discriminates may-and
49
as this Article will discuss, often does-depend upon the situation.

Moreover, if we tend generally to overlook situational influences on
human behavior, we are especially prone to under-appreciate the existence and effect of precisely the kinds of factors that most strongly
influence discrimination. Social constraints, such as roles, expectations, norms, and stereotypes, can be powerful influences on a person's behavior, and may be no less a feature of the situation than
physical or temporal constraints, such as bad lighting or time pres-

sures.50 But, because they exist in the actor's brain and affect the actor's interpretation of the situation,5 l these forces often are invisible
52
to the observer.
Social psychological research has shown that situations play a far

greater role in driving behavior than we tend to appreciate.5 3 More
specifically, and as this section will elaborate, it has shown that some

situations can promote discrimination even while (and perhaps by) allowing it to escape notice, thus leading us to miss seeing it in precisely
those situations in which it is most likely to occur. 54 Furthermore, as
Part III will discuss, research also shows that group-based biases

themselves can actively create such situations by channeling the target's behavior in a way that appears to warrant a racially differential

response, while simultaneously concealing their own influence on the
situation. In other words, discriminatory behavior sometimes has the
49. See, e.g., Krieger, Civil Rights Perestroika,supra note 16, at 1312-16 (discussing "the situation-dependent nature of biased decision making").
50. See Gilbert & Malone, supra note 35, at 25 (discussing invisibility of some situational influences, including social norms).
51. Observers may perceive the situation differently from how the actor understands it, when
it is the actor's version of the situation that is relevant for purposes of explaining her behavior.
See id. at 26. This is most likely to be the case when psychological constraints, such as social
pressures or incentives, are at work. Id.
52. See id. at 25. Thus, for example, observers often fail to recognize that a person's role in a
given situation restricts the range of behavioral options available to him or her, and will unjustifiably judge a person's disposition or abilities without taking those limitations into account.
They might, for example, view clerical workers who perform low-skilled, repetitive tasks as lacking in leadership, assertiveness, and intelligence, while viewing managerial workers who have
more autonomy possessing these qualities-without recognizing that their jobs largely determine
whether or not people have the opportunity to demonstrate particular traits. See Ross & NisBETr, supra note 39, at 128 (summarizing findings of Ronald Humphrey, How Work Roles Influence Perception: Structural-CognitiveProcesses and OrganizationalBehavior, 50 AM. Soc. REV.
242 (1985)).
53. See discussion infra subpart HI(A).
54. See discussion infra subpart II(B).
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"The Power of the Situation":55 Channel Factors, Helping
and Harming

We often respond more readily to contextual circumstances, and
less readily to internal guides such as attitudes or beliefs, than might
be expected. Moreover, seemingly trivial or subtle differences in the
situation can produce substantial differences in behavior. Whether or
not we get a flu shot as recommended each winter may depend more
on the location and hours of the vaccination clinic than on our awareness of the benefits of receiving the inoculation, 56 and our decision to
donate to a particular charity may depend more on whether we receive a direct, personal request than on our agreement with the organization's cause. 57 Even how much we eat can be influenced more
strongly by external factors, such as how food is packaged, presented,
or priced, than by internal factors such as hunger or lack of will
power. 58 Social psychologists call these small but mighty influences
"channel factors" because of the critical role they play in directing
behavior. First, a channel factor determines how an individual defines
a situation-what kind of a situation it is, what interests are at stake,
and so forth; then, it "channels" his or her behavior by indicating the
appropriate conduct for that situation, essentially opening or closing
59
pathways for action.
Even how we treat other people can be influenced more strongly by
the situation than by our own dispositions. In a collection of now classic experimental studies, social psychologists discovered that what
seem to be insignificant features of a situation can influence people to
refrain from helping and even to actively mistreat others. Indeed,
sometimes very mild constraints can lead people to engage in abusive
55. Ross & NISBEa-r, supra note 39, at 27.
56. See id. at 10-11 (discussing substantial effect on medical compliance of simple situational
factors, in contrast to small effect of beliefs and attitudes).
57. See id. at 47-48 (discussing the use of social psychological insights to promote purchases of
U.S. bonds during World War II and to increase the success of charitable and business
solicitations).
58. See Erica Goode, The Gorge-Yourself Environment, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 2003, at D1 (Social scientists' findings show that "people do not gorge themselves solely because they lack selfcontrol. Rather ...a host of environmental factors-among them portion size, price, advertising, the availability of food and the number of choices presented-can influence the amount the
average person consumes.").
59. "Channel factors" are apparently minor but actually important details of the situation that
function as "critical facilitators or barriers" to action by either opening or blocking a "channel"
for behavior. Ross & NISBEar, supra note 39, at 10.
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conduct even when they do not wish to cause the other person harm
and are distressed by the knowledge that they are doing so.
A variety of contextual factors can inhibit or promote helping behavior. In a famous study inspired by the biblical parable of the
"Good Samaritan," seminary students were much more likely to help
a stranger in distress if they were not in a hurry than if they were late
for an appointment and therefore in a rush. 60 (Sixty-three percent of
students in the former situation helped, while only ten percent of students in the latter situation did. 61 ) While the existence or absence of
time pressure determined whether a seminarian would stop and help,
the students' own religious beliefs had no significant effect, 62 nor did it
matter much whether they had specifically been reminded of the helping behavior of the Good Samaritan just prior to encountering the
hapless stranger. 63 The students who were in a hurry and did not stop
were not just being callous, however. In some cases those students
moved on without helping simply because they did not have or take
time to observe what was happening around them and therefore did
not appreciate the victim's need for help. 64 Some students actually
stepped over the victim in their rush to get to their destination. 65 In
other cases, students in a hurry did not stop to help the victim because
they felt a sense of obligation to get to the appointment for which they
were running late and at which another person was depending on
them to help him.6 6 (Conversely, it has been suggested that the students who were not in a hurry because they were running early for
their appointments may have stopped in part because they were look67
ing for a way to fill the time.)

Another classic set of studies on helping behavior was inspired by
the infamous Kitty Genovese case, in which a woman was stabbed
repeatedly over a period of thirty minutes with at least thirty-eight
people within earshot, none of whom came to her aid or even called
the police. 68 These studies also demonstrated the importance of situa60. John M. Darley & C. Daniel Batson, From Jerusalem to Jericho: A Study of Situational
and DispositionalVariables in Helping Behavior, 27 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 100 (1973).

61. Id. at 105.
62. Id. at 106 (reporting no significant correlation between "types of religiosity" and helping).
63. Id. at 105.
64. Id. at 107-08.
65. Id. at 107.
66. Darley & Batson, supra note 60, at 108. For discussion of the ethical implications of such a
scenario, see Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Dimensions of Ethical Responsibility: Relevant Others, 54
U. PrrT. L. REV. 965, 971-73 (1993).

67. See Ross & NISBETr, supra note 39, at 49.
68. John M. Darley & Bibb Latand, Bystander Intervention in Emergencies: Diffitsion of Responsibility, 8 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 377 (1968).
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tional variables-this time, the presence or absence of other bystanders. They showed that people were highly likely to help a stranger
who was in danger if no other bystanders were available to help, but
were less and less likely to intervene as the number of other bystanders increased. 6 9 The presence of other potential helpers is believed to
channel unhelpful behavior in part because it dilutes or diffuses each
person's sense of responsibility to help. 70 An individual bystander
might reason, for example, that someone else is likely to help or that
others would be more competent to help. 7 ' In addition, the inaction
of others constructs the situation as one in which the victim's plight is
not so serious and intervention would be both unwarranted and
72
inappropriate.
Harming behavior, too, can be greatly influenced by the situation.
A disturbing set of eighteen studies by psychologist Stanley Milgram
between 1960 and 1963 revealed the ease with which individuals can
be manipulated to hurt others. 73 Milgram's studies showed the literally shocking lengths to which people of different ages and education
levels and from different walks of life 74 would go in knowingly harming others when the social context led them to feel as if they had no
choice but to do so-even when it should have been clear to them that
they did. At the same time, however, the studies showed that the subjects' actions in inflicting harm were not consistent with their values,
not expressions of aggression, nor even simply the consequence of
their having especially weak characters. Instead, their actions were a
product of how the situation and their options for responding to it
were presented to and perceived by the subjects. Here again, seemingly mild features of the situation played an important role in both
defining the situation and signaling to the actor the appropriate course
of conduct-or, to be more precise, in failing to provide the actor with
a "way out" of harming another.
69. Id. at 379-80.
70. Id. at 382.
71. See Samuel L. Gaertner & John F. Dovidio, The Subtlety of White Racism, Arousal, and
Helping Behavior, 35 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 691, 703 (1977).
72. See Darley & Latan6, supra note 68, at 382 (speculating that subjects were "concerned not
to make fools of themselves by overreacting," among other worries).
73. Milgram described and analyzed these experiments in STANLEY MILGRAM, OBEDIENCE
TO AUTHORITY:

AN EXPERIMENTAL VIEW (1974). The ways in which the studies illuminate the

"power of the situation" are discussed in Ross & NiSBErr, supra note 39, at 53-58.
74. See MILORAM, supra note 73, at 14-16 (describing demographic diversity of participants in
study). In all but one of the studies the subjects all were men. When women were subjects, their
level of obedience "was virtually identical to the performance of men," although women showed
higher levels of conflict about their actions. Id. at 63 (citations omitted).
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The basic experiment was presented to subjects as a study of the
effect of punishment on memory and learning. Each subject was assigned, apparently randomly, the role of "teacher," in which he was to
conduct a paired-associate word learning task that required responses
of another volunteer, the "learner." The learner was strapped into an
"electric chair" 7 5 in a separate room from the teacher, and the chair
appeared to be connected to a shock generator that the subject would
control. 76 The experimenter told the subject to give the learner a
shock each time the learner gave a wrong answer, and to increase the
level of shock given with each wrong answer. 77 The thirty lever
switches on the shock generator had been marked with voltage designations (in increments of fifteen, from 15 to 450 volts) and with descriptive designations for groups of four switches, going from left to
right and from lower to higher voltage levels: Slight Shock, Moderate
Shock, Strong Shock, Very Strong Shock, Intense Shock, Extreme Intensity Shock, and Danger: Severe Shock. The two switches after that
were labeled simply "XXX."' 78 Subjects were told that the shocks
"could be extremely painful" but would "cause no permanent tissue
79
damage."
Milgram, other behavioral scientists, and lay people whom Milgram
surveyed before he conducted the studies all had predicted that almost no one, including themselves, would apply the highest levels of
shock.80 Their predictions were based upon the assumptions that people generally do not wish to hurt others and are motivated by "empathy, compassion, and a sense of justice. '8 1 Further, they believed that
individuals' actions are driven by their personal values and that they
will not act in contradiction of those values unless they are threatened
82
or physically forced to do So.
What Milgram found when he put these assumptions to the test was
startling. The learner expressed discomfort at seventy-five volts, then,
as the shock levels rose, protested verbally and increasingly vehemently, demanded to be released, eventually screamed in agony and
75. Thus restrained, the learner was apparently unable to escape. An electrode had been
attached to his wrist after electrode paste was applied "to avoid blisters and burns," and the
subject was told that the shock generator was connected to the electric chair. The subject also
was given a sample shock of forty-five volts. Id. at 19.
76. Id. at 19-20.
77. Id. at 20-21. In fact, although unbeknownst to the subject, the learner would not actually
receive these shocks. Id. at 3.
78. MILGRAM, supra note 73, at 20.

79.
80.
81.
82.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

19.
28-31.
30, 31.
31.
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pounded the wall with each shock, and, finally, stopped responding to
the memory test and fell silent, even as he continued to "receive"
shocks for failing to respond.8 3 Nevertheless, most subjects continued
to raise the voltage to the highest level,8 4 frequently to their own psychological discomfort and even physical distress. Several subjects became so distraught that they began shaking, sweating, and stuttering,
85
and some developed uncontrollable cases of nervous laughter.
While many subjects expressed no verbal resistance to continuing the
experiment, a number did state their reluctance to continue, protested
against continuing the experiment, or denounced the exercise as "stupid and senseless."8 6 Surprisingly, however, few subjects-even
among those who protested-actually terminated their participation.
Most continued to the end without the application of any force or
compulsion other than the experimenter's calm instructions, repeated
as necessary, that they had no choice but to do so because the experiment required them to go on.8 7 In fact, all subjects should have
known that they did have the choice whether or not to continue, for
each knew that a failure to obey would result in no punishment-not
88
even the loss of the fee the subject had been paid to participate.
What explains these breathtaking results? Milgram sought to answer that question by testing a series of small variations on the basic
89
experimental set up-altering, for example, the institutional context,
the physical proximity of the learner or the experimenter to the subject,90 the number of teachers, 91 the number of experimenters and
their instructions to the subject, 92 the choices of shock level available
94
to the subject-teacher, 93 and the role of the recipient of the shocks.
Some contextual changes had no significant effect on subjects' obedi83. Id. at 22-23.
84. MILGRAM, supra note 73, at 40-41.

85. See id. at 33, 41-42, 53-54, 80, 161. Some subjects, on the other hand, did not show signs of
distress. See id. at 46-47 (obedient subject), 49-50 (obedient subject), 84-85 (disobedient
subject).
86. Id. at 41, 161-62.
87. Id. at 9, 21-22, 74-76.
88. Id. at 41.
89. Milgram changed it from the impressive environs of Yale University to the shabbier offices of a purportedly private research firm. Id. at 66-70 (describing Experiment 10).
90. See infra note 110 (describing Experiments 2, 3, and 4) and text accompanying notes 11518 (describing Experiment 7).
91. See MILORAM, supra note 73, at 116-22 (describing Experiments 17 and 18).
92. See infra text accompanying notes 111-14 and (describing Experiment 15).
93. See MILGRAM, supra note 73, at 70-72 (describing Experiment 11).
94. In these variations, Milgram had the subject administer shocks to an experimenter rather
than to another lay volunteer. See id. at 99-104 (describing Experiment 14).
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ence, 95 while others produced significantly higher levels of
96
disobedience.
Based on these results, Milgram ruled out the explanation that most

closely conforms to "common sense" 97 (meaning correspondence biasinfluenced 98 ) interpretations of the behavior observed: that the sub-

jects, taking advantage of a situation in which their conduct was socially acceptable, were acting out feelings of aggression, pent-up

anger, or sadism. Milgram noted that, in experimental variations in
which subjects did not receive unambiguous instructions to administer
increasingly higher levels of shock or could get away without raising
the level, they did not do so.99 He further pointed out that subjects in

the other variations displayed distaste toward their task, with many

95. For example, changing the institutional setting made no difference. Id. at 69. Other
changes that had no significant effect included: changing the location to a basement lab and
having the learner mention that he had a heart problem (Experiment 5), id. at 57; changing the
personalities of the experimenter and learner (Experiment 6), id. at 58-59; having women as
subjects (Experiment 8), id. at 63; having the victim condition participation on his being released
"when I say so" (Experiment 9), MILGRAM, supra note 73, at 66; having two authorities, one of
whom became the victim (Experiment 16), id. at 109-10; and having a peer, rather than the
subject, administer the shocks (Experiment 18), id. at 121-22.
In a few experiments, most subjects ceased administering shocks, but not because they were
defying the authority figure. In Experiment 12, for example, the learner demanded to be
shocked and the experimenter forbade it; the subjects obeyed the experimenter. Id. at 93. In
Experiment 13, an "ordinary man," rather than an experimenter, gave the order to continue, and
"there was a sharp drop in compliance." Id. at 97. In Experiment 13a (a variation on 13 that was
introduced when the subject refused to continue), the ordinary man would take over the administration of the shocks. Almost all subjects in this condition protested his doing so, and some
even took physical action to prevent it. Id. at 97-98. In Experiment 14, the experimenter was
the recipient of the shocks and an ordinary man gave the orders. "At the first protest of the
shocked administrator, every subject broke off, refusing to administer even a single shock beyond
this point." Id. at 103 (emphasis added).
96. Changes that had a significant effect on subjects' behavior included: giving the subject a
choice of what level of shock to administer; placing the learner nearby or even in physical contact with the subject, locating the experimenter in a different room from the subject; or having
two experimenters give the subject conflicting instructions on whether he could or could not stop
the test. For further discussion of these changes see infra notes 110-118 and accompanying text.
97. MILGRAM, supra note 73, at 166 (describing view that the subject, "in shocking the learner
...is satisfying instinctually rooted destructive tendencies" as "the typical common-sense interpretation of the observed obedience").
98. For discussion of the correspondence bias or fundamental attribution error, see supra
notes 39-52 and accompanying text.
99. In one variation in particular, subjects were given the freedom to choose what level of
shock to administer, with the experimenter being careful to indicate that all levers legitimately
could be used. Despite being given permission and even justification for inflicting high level
shocks, almost all subjects (with one or two exceptions) used only the lowest levels available; the
mean shock level used was 3.6, lower even than the level (5) at which a learner would begin to
express discomfort. MILGRAM, supra note 73, at 70-72 (describing Experiment 11), 166-67.

1032

DEPAUL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53:1013

protesting it-all the while, however, complying with instructions to
continue. 100
Instead, Milgram determined that the social structure of the testing
situation played a critical role in channeling harming behavior despite
the individual actors' wishes. People respond to socially determined
definitions of a situation. The testing situation that subjects encountered was unfamiliar to them and, thus, subjects came to it without a
stable "definition of the situation"-and with the events that ensued,
the testing situation did not make sense to them. 10 1 They therefore
were highly influenced by the definition provided by the experimenter, whom they identified as a legitimate authority figure. 10 2 That
authority prescribed the appropriate behavior for the situation. Further, with the authority directing the subjects to act in a particular
way-though, again, with no real power to compel obedience-the
subject's "moral focus" was not on the learner, but on the authority's
expectations of him, and so the subject assessed his performance ac10 3
cording to how well he had carried out his duty to the authority.
This sense of duty to authority, in turn, allowed the subject to separate
his actions from his "self," and thereby to shift responsibility for those
actions to the authority. 1°4
The sequential, incremental nature of the prescribed actions reinforced the subject's compliance, for as he continued delivering increasingly painful shocks, the subject felt the need to justify what he
had done. As Milgram explained, "one form of justification is to go to
the end. For if he breaks off, he must say to himself: 'Everything I
have done to this point is bad, and I now acknowledge it by breaking
off.' But, if he goes on, he is reassured about his past performance.' 05 Moreover, in order to end his pattern of conduct, the subject would have to breach the "situational etiquette" that had been
established by the testing context: "[T]he subject must breach the implicit set of understandings that are part of the social occasion. He
made an initial promise to aid the experimenter, and now he must
renege on this commitment."'10 6 To do so, the subject would have to
violate the experimenter's definition of the situation and risk appearing "arrogant, untoward, and rude.' 10 7 Milgram found that most peo100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

Id. at 165-68.
Ross & NISBETr, supra note 39, at 57-58; see also
MILORAM, supra note 73, at 145.
Id. at 8, 143-45.
See id. at 149.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 150.

MILGRAM,

supra note 73, at 145.

2004]

RACE AS PROXY

1033

pie would prefer to continue inflicting severe pain on the learner than
to contend with the awkwardness and embarrassment of disrupting
10 8
the well defined social situation.
Yet, changing even an apparently small feature of the testing situation produced dramatically different results-much more disobedience-if the change was one that altered the definition of the situation
or opened up a "disobedience channel." 10 9 For example, making the
learner more salient to the subject, and the experimenter comparatively less so, produced significantly more disobedience. 10 Altering
the testing situation to undermine the stability of its authority-determined definition produced the same results. Milgram did this by conducting a variation in which, instead of facing one experimenter who
conveyed unequivocally the appropriate behavior, the subject faced
two experimenters who gave conflicting instructions on how to behave
when he balked at continuing: one experimenter told him he must
continue, while the other directed him to stop."' The results of this
conflict were dramatic: every subject abruptly ended the shocks at or
near the point of the authorities' disagreement. Milgram explained
that the contradictory instructions "paralyzed" the action-"stopped
[it] dead in its tracks"-by destroying the hierarchical structure of the
situation.1 12 (Indeed, some subjects tried to reconstruct the hierarchy
by trying to determine which of the two experimenters was the higher
authority.113 ) Notably, this confusion produced an immediate end to
the test, whereas, in cases in which the authority's instructions were
unequivocal, nothing the learner did, no matter how insistent his
pleading or dire his apparent condition, was nearly as effective. Further, no subject in the conflicting authorities experiments took advantage of the justification for inflicting pain that the instruction to
continue would have provided.11 4
108. MILGRAM, supra note 73, at 150-51. But when other participants broke off, the subjects
also were willing to do so. See id. at 116-21 (describing Experiment 17).
109. Ross & NISBErr, supra note 39, at 57.
110. Milgram achieved these results in a series of variations in which he moved the learner
increasingly closer to the subject. In one such variation, the subject was further required to place
his hand over the learner's in order to shock him. The closer proximity of the learner in these
experiments produced higher levels of disobedience because, in conjunction with making the
victim more prominent to the subject and the authority less so, their closeness made clearer to
the subject the connection between his actions and the victim's pain and allowed the subject to
form an alliance with the victim, rather than with the experimenter. See MILORAM, supra note
73, at 32-40 (describing Experiments 2, 3, and 4).
111. Id. at 105 (describing Experiment 15).
112. Id. at 107.
113. Id.
114. Id.
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Milgram further discovered that offering the subject a "way out" of
complying with instructions-especially a way to disobey without
openly defying the authority's directive-also produced a high degree
of disobedience. Milgram created this condition by placing the experimenter in a remote location, a separate room, from which the subject
perceived that the experimenter was unable to monitor the subject's
actions. 115 The experimenter still was able to communicate with the
subject by telephone, and by phone gave the same instructions as in
the basic experiment. This variation produced interesting results:
First, a much higher number of subjects disobeyed the experimenter
when he gave orders by telephone than when he was physically present. 116 Second, several subjects kept up a pretense of following instructions-reporting in their phone conversations that they were
raising the shock level as directed-while actually subverting the authority by giving the lowest shock available.1 17 Notably, the experimenter was able to restore obedience when he reappeared in the
testing room.1 1
Milgram's studies demonstrated the power of the social context to
induce individuals, contrary to their own values or wishes, to knowingly harm innocent people. 119 The studies suggest the potential, in
particular, for authorities to induce subordinates to commit deeds of
extraordinary evil and have been cited to explain the complicity of
ordinary Germans in the atrocities of the Holocaust and the actions of
American soldiers in torturing and massacring civilian villagers during
the Vietnam War. 120 At a more general level, the studies illustrate the
power of small, seemingly insignificant features of a situation to channel behavior in a dramatic direction and the error in trying to interpret individuals' actions without appreciating their understanding of
115. Id. at 59-62 (describing Experiment 7).
116. MILGRAM, supra note 73, at 59-62.

117. Id. at 62.
118. Id.
119. The studies also highlighted the double standard that individuals apply in explaining their
own actions. Displaying the divergent biases typical of individuals in explaining their own negative and positive behavior, subjects who had complied to the end in administering the most
severe shocks tended to place responsibility for their actions with the experimenter or even the
"stupid" learner-that is, they attributed it to the situation-while those who disobeyed tended
to attribute their decisions to their own strong values and characters. See id. at 7-8. 10, 203-04.
See also supra note 47 (discussing self-serving attributional biases).
120. See MILGRAM, supra note 73, at 5-10, 175-89; Ross & NISBETr, supra note 39, at 52-53.
Cf Richard Delgado, Norms and Normal Science: Toward a Critique of Normativity in Legal
Thought, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 933, 944-46 (1991) (pointing out the power of "the mere pronouncement of something as normatively good or bad [to change] our perception of it," and
citing examples from Milgram's experiments to public opinion of civil rights laws, the proper role
of the judiciary, and professional societies' standards of behavior).
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the situation and the influence of social expectations on their perceptions of appropriate behavior.
B.

Normative Ambiguity and Modern Discrimination

These insights have particular relevance for understanding modernday racial discrimination, which is marked by an apparent mismatch
between values and behavior. Even as white Americans 12 1 are increasingly likely to report holding egalitarian, nondiscriminatory
views, 122 Americans of color continue to report that racial discrimination is a regular, pervasive part of their daily experience. 12 3 To be
sure, the discrimination of today is less likely to be as blatant or crude
as the racism of the (not so) distant past, and it is sometimes so ambiguous and subtle that one cannot be entirely sure it has occurred. 124
Racial disparities in objective measures of well-being (including economic, educational, and health status measures), 125 however, would
121. Most of the psychological research on racial bias to date has focused on white Americans' racial bias against black Americans. See Samuel R. Sommers & Phoebe C. Ellsworth,
White Juror Bias: An Investigation of Prejudice Against Black Defendants in the American
Courtroom, 7 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL'Y & L. 201, 202 (2001) ("[I]n psychology there is a substantial
body of theory and research on prejudice against minority groups and on White Americans'
racial bias against Black Americans in particular. By comparison, minority group prejudice
against the majority has received almost no theoretical or empirical attention, and there is little
reason to believe that the same psychological processes are involved."). This Article draws on
social psychological research that, likewise, focuses primarily on the bias of white Americans
against black Americans. See discussion infra subpart II(B) and Parts III and IV.
122. See, e.g., Dovidio & Gaertner, supra note 18, at 4 (citing survey results indicating decline
in overtly bigoted opinions among whites; noting, for example, that whereas "in 1933, 75% of
white respondents described blacks as lazy[,] in 1993 that figure declined to just 5%," and that
"[i]n 1958, the majority of whites reported that they would not be willing to vote for a wellqualified black presidential candidate; in 1994, over 90% said that they would") (citations
omitted).
123. See, e.g., Joe R. Feagin, The Continuing Significance of Race: Antiblack Discriminationin
Public Places, 56 AM. Soc. REV. 101 (1991); Sommers & Ellsworth, supra note 121, at 208.
124. See, e.g., Dovidio & Gaertner, supra note 18, at 8, 25; Feagin, supra note 123, at 102-03,
108-09. See also Peggy C. Davis, Law as Microaggression,98 YALE L.J. 1559, 1565-68 (1989).
Of course, as someone who has studied and written about hate crimes, see, e.g., Wang, The
Complexities of "Hate," supra note 35; Lu-in Wang, The Transforming Power of "Hate": Social
Cognition Theory and the Harms of Bias-Related Crime, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 47 (1997), I do not
mean to suggest that overt and even violent bigotry does not continue to present a significant
and serious problem. (Indeed, even as they note the general improvement in whites' attitudes
toward blacks and other minorities, Dovidio and Gaertner point out that "10-15% of the white
population still expresses the old-fashioned, overt form of bigotry."). See Dovidio & Gaertner,
supra note 18, at 4. I assert merely that its acceptability and prominence have lessened over the
years and that the more subtle and ambiguous discrimination on which this Article focuses is
more prevalent and problematic than we might realize.
125. For data showing and discussion of black-white disparities in income, employment, and
education, see generally ANDREW HACKER, Two NATIONS: BLACK AND WHITE, SEPARATE,
HOSTILE, UNEQUAL 99-183 (1993). For discussion of racial disparities in medical treatment and
outcomes, see discussion infra Part IV. For discussion and evidence of racial (and gender) dis-
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suggest that racial discrimination persists despite the widespread social acceptance and legal institutionalization of the view that it is
clearly wrong.
Of course, the reasons for the entrenchment of racial discrimination
are numerous and complex, and they operate at the societal, institutional, social, and individual levels. One factor that owes its influence
to the fact that it is both ubiquitous and not readily apparent lies in
the channeling power of situations. In particular, social psychologists
who study contemporary discrimination have discovered, much as
Milgram did, the power of ambiguity or the lack of definitional clarity
in a situation to open a channel to behavior that otherwise would
seem clearly wrong. 126 The situational ambiguity that promotes discrimination, moreover, also serves to mask it, by shifting the actor's
"moral focus" and alleviating his sense of responsibility for his behavior, much as the social structure of Milgram's basic experimental set
up supported the subjects' decisions to continue shocking their
partners.
Yet even as social psychologists have shown how situation-dependent and elusive racial discrimination can be, they also have shown
that it is resilient. Racially biased expectations are both omnipresent
and invisible, and can act as powerful channel factors in directing racially biased conduct. Like Milgram's authority figure, they can define a situation in a way that makes racially disparate treatment seem
appropriate and even justified. The real power of biased expectations,
however, lies not so much in their ability to define situations and
channel discriminatory behavior, but in their ability to do so while
concealing their own influence.
This section will examine the power of ambiguity to open the channel to discriminatory behavior, and Part III will discuss the situationdefining (and discrimination-obscuring) power of racial stereotypes.
The situations that might be expected to promote racial discrimination are not necessarily those in which it is most likely to occur. Nor
are the situations in which discrimination is easy to see the ones in
which it is likely to be found. One might assume that racial bias is
most likely to be triggered in situations in which racial issues are
prominent, such as in a criminal trial when the prosecution or defense
"plays the race card" by drawing attention to racial differences becrimination in three distinct markets (retail car sales, bail bonding, and kidney transplantation),
see IAN AYRES, PERVASIVE PREJUDICE? UNCONVENTIONAL EVIDENCE OF RACE AND GENDER
DISCRIMINATION (2001).
126. See supra notes 101-104 and accompanying text.
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tween the defendant and victim.1 27 For example, in a case in which a
black defendant is charged with assaulting a white victim, one might
expect that drawing attention to the defendant's race or presenting
evidence of racial tensions between the parties would lead white jurors to judge the defendant more harshly than if racial differences
were downplayed.' 28 Such an expectation might have been warranted
with respect to white juries of the past, when overtly racist norms were
more acceptable than they are today.1 29 However, as explicit racial
norms have changed, so have the situational factors that are likely to
cue racially discriminatory decisions and behavior.
Social psychological research shows that, today, making racial issues
salient, rather than obscuring them, can actually reduce the racial bias
exhibited by whites. Studies of white juror bias in mock trials, for
example, have revealed that discrimination occurs less frequently
when racial issues are highlighted than when they are downplayed.
Those studies compared white subjects' decisions in cases of interracial crime involving black or white defendants when racial issues were
explicitly mentioned to decisions in cases involving the same facts but

no mention of race-related issues.1 30 The subjects tended to judge
black defendants more harshly than whites, and also to view the
evidence against black defendants as stronger and their defenses

weaker, when racial issues were not explicitly mentioned in the
trial summary. t 31 When racial issues were explicitly raised, how127. See, e.g., Armour, supra note 19, at 734-38 (discussing and questioning this assumption);
Sommers & Ellsworth, supra note 121, at 203, 211 (discussing this assumption).
128. Sommers & Ellsworth, supra note 121, at 211 (discussing examples).
129. See id. at 203. On the other hand, racial issues probably did not have to be highlighted in
order for racial bias to affect white jurors' deliberations during that time period. See id.
130. Specifically, half of the jurors read trial summaries that involved a defendant who was
identified as white and a victim (a member of the same basketball team as the defendant) who
was identified as black, and half read a version with a black defendant and white victim. Half of
each respective set of jurors read a race-salient version of the trial, in which a defense witness
testified "that the defendant was one of only two Whites (or Blacks) on the team, and had been
the subject of racial remarks and unfair criticism through the season from many of his Black
[White] teammates." The other half read a non-race-salient version that made no reference to
the defendant's race but instead included testimony of the same defense witness that "the defendant had only one other friend on the team and had been the subject of obscene remarks and
unfair criticism from many of his teammates." Id. at 215-16.
131. Black defendants had a significantly higher conviction rate than whites (90% to 70%)
and were sentenced to significantly longer terms. In addition, jurors viewed the prosecution's
case as the black defendant as stronger (though only marginally significantly) than its case
against the white defendant and the black defendant's case as significantly weaker than the white
defendant's (again, only marginally so), in the non-race-salient version. See id. at 217-19
(describing results). See also Samuel R. Sommers & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Race in the Courtroom: Perceptions of Guilt and DispositionalAttributions, 26 PERSONALrrY & SOC. PSYCHOL.

BULL. 1367 (2000) (reporting similar findings in study involving domestic assault fact pattern and
use of racially-charged statement by defendant as means of making racial issues salient).
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ever, jurors reached comparable decisions for black and white
defendants.

132

These results show that situations characterized by normative clarity-that is, situations that include clear indications of right and wrong
behavior-tend to lessen the likelihood of discrimination. In particu-

lar, they suggest that, in situations in which racial issues are conspicuous, people are mindful of their egalitarian ideals 133 and are more
likely to make an effort to avoid acting on racial prejudice. 134 When

racial issues are obscured, on the other hand, they do not guard

135
against, but instead act upon, racial bias.
While salience and clarity tend to reduce discrimination, "norma-

tive ambiguity" has been found to promote it-and, significantly, the
power of ambiguity to channel discrimination goes hand-in-hand with
its ability to mask it. Normative ambiguity can arise in a couple of
different ways. The situation may be one in which appropriate (and,
accordingly, inappropriate) behavior is not clearly identified. In such
a context, choosing to act indifferently or unhelpfully toward a black
person does not necessarily mark one as a racist because it is not clear

that what one has done is wrong. 136 A situation also may be ambiguous if clearly negative behavior can be justified on some basis other
132. See Sommers & Ellsworth, supra note 121, at 217-19 (reporting that jurors reached comparable decisions for white and black defendants in the race-salient version of the trial). See also
Sommers & Ellsworth, supra note 131, at 1373-76 (reporting similar findings in study involving
domestic assault fact pattern and use of racially-charged statement by defendant as means of
making racial issues salient).
Sommers and Ellsworth contend that other researchers' studies that have purported to find no
evidence of white juror racial bias are not inconsistent with their own findings and interpretations regarding the influence of situational cues on the manifestation of such bias, because, in
those other studies, racial issues were salient. See Sommers & Ellsworth, supra note 121, at 21011 (discussing studies).
133. Of course, although such values may be more widely shared than in the past, not everyone shares them. See supra note 124. Some individuals' tendency to discriminate may not,
therefore, be as situation-sensitive as others'. See also Patricia G. Devine, Stereotypes and
Prejudice: Their Automatic and Controlled Components, 56 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 5,
13-14 (reporting different results, in study described at infra note 134, for low- and highprejudice subjects).
134. See Sommers & Ellsworth, supra note 121, at 220-21. Similarly, social psychologist Patricia G. Devine found in her well-known studies that both high- and low-prejudiced subjects evaluated ambiguous behaviors consistently with racial stereotypes when they did not have the
opportunity to monitor those responses, but when racial issues were made salient and they were
able to think about their responses, low-prejudice subjects controlled their stereotype-consistent
thoughts and instead expressed views reflecting egalitarian values and negating racial stereotypes. See generally Devine, supra note 133.
135. See Sommers & Ellsworth, supra note 121, at 220. See also Devine, supra note 133, at 1516.
136. See Gaertner & Dovidio, supra note 27, at 67-68 (defining normative ambiguity; describing helpful behavior in ambiguous situations as "prosocial").
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than race because, again, a person who chooses to behave that way
did not necessarily choose to do so for racist reasons. 137 Social scien-

tists have demonstrated the channeling power of both kinds of ambiguity in studies that included variations on the helping behavior
138
studies discussed earlier.

A number of experimental studies have confirmed the effect of the
first type of situational ambiguity in promoting discrimination. 139 A
fairly recent study found racially disparate responses when it tested

simultaneously the effects of two different types of factors on helping
behavior: the perceived reason why the victim needed help (that is,

whether the victim was to blame for needing help because she did not
try hard enough on an assigned task or whether, instead, an external
factor had caused her problem) and the source of the request for help

from the bystander (the victim herself or a third party). 140 Discrimination against black victims occurred in situations in which the victims
both appeared to have caused their own problems and asked for help
from the bystander.1 41 Conversely, black victims were treated just as

favorably as, or even more favorably than, whites when bystanders
perceived that the victims' plight was caused by factors outside of
their control (regardless of who asked for help) 142 or when a third
party requested that the bystander help (regardless of the cause of the
victims' predicament). 143 The researchers pointed out that, in this ex-

periment, normative clarity discouraged racial bias, but normative ambiguity channeled it: subjects chose to discriminate when they could
rationalize a failure to help by viewing the help as "undeserved,"'

44

137. See id. at 67.
138. See supra notes 60-72 and accompanying text. Similar results have been obtained in variations on Milgram's aggression studies, discussed at supra notes 73-118 and accompanying text.
See also Faye Crosby et al., Recent Unobtrusive Studies of Black and White Discriminationand
Prejudice: A Literature Review, 87 PSYCHOL. BULL. 546, 552-55 (1980) (reviewing aggression
studies).
139. In addition to the study discussed in the text, other studies by the same and other researchers-some in naturalistic settings rather than the laboratory-have obtained similar results. See, e.g., Samuel L. Gaertner, Helping Behavior and Racial Discrimination Among
Liberals and Conservatives, 25 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 335 (1973); Lauren G. Wispd &
Harold B. Freshley, Race, Sex, and Sympathetic Helping Behavior: The Broken Bag Caper,17 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 59 (1971). For a review of studies of race and helping behavior,
see Crosby et al., supra note 138, at 548-52.
140. David L. Frey & Samuel L. Gaertner, Helping and the Avoidance of InappropriateInterracial Behavior: A Strategy That PerpetuatesA Nonprejudiced Self-Image, 50 J. PERSONALITY &
Soc. PSYCHOL.

141.
142.
143.
144.

1083 (1986).

Id. at 1086-87.
Id. at 1087.
Id. at 1086-87.
Krieger, Civil Rights Perestroika,supra note 16, at 1324 (discussing this study).
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but not when such a characterization was unwarranted or another
145
party signaled that it was not appropriate to withhold assistance.
Experiments also have confirmed the discrimination-promoting effect of the second type of normative ambiguity, under which clearly
46
negative behavior can be justified on some basis other than race.'
They have shown, moreover, that different rationales can be constructed to fit different situations.
Once again, researchers used a series of helping studies to test the
responsiveness of bystanders to the misfortunes of black and white
victims under various conditions and thereby to study the effect of
nonracial justifications on spontaneous decision making. They found
no discrimination in the simplest-and only normatively unambiguous-scenario, involving one victim and one bystander-subject. In
those situations, bystanders helped black victims equally as or more
frequently and quickly than white victims. 147 When researchers introduced complications that could form a nonracial basis for rationalizing
a failure to help, however, the subjects did discriminate against black
victims, helping them significantly less frequently or less quickly than
white victims.
First, in a study modeled closely on the classic bystander intervention studies discussed above, 148 a bystander's awareness that others
were nearby, and the attendant diffusion of her sense of responsibility
to help, put black victims at a significant disadvantage compared to
white victims: black victims were helped only half as often as whites,
and when they did receive help it was significantly slower in coming. 149 A second study showed that people were more susceptible to
social pressure not to intervene when the victim was black than when
the victim was white. In that study, although almost all bystanders
ultimately did help both black and white victims, they were significantly slower to help black than white victims if they were in the face150
to-face presence of others who made no move to help.
The researchers determined that subjects in the two studies had
constructed different rationalizations to suit their respective situations
and support the decision to treat the black victim negatively: whereas
145. See Frey & Gaertner, supra note 140, at 1088.
146. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
147. See Gaertner & Dovidio, supra note 71, at 696; Samuel L. Gaertner et al., Race of Victim,
Nonresponsive Bystanders, and Helping Behavior, 117 J. Soc. PSYCHOL. 69, 73-74 (1982).
148. See supra notes 68-72 and accompanying text.
149. Gaertner & Dovidio, supra note 71, at 696-97.
150. Gaertner et al., supra note 147, at 73-74. Although almost all victims received help in the
end, the researchers pointed out that the speed of assistance can have a substantial effect on the
outcome of an emergency. Id. at 73.
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a diffused sense of responsibility channeled discrimination in the first
study, social pressure to conform produced a similar effect in the second. 151 Key differences in the design and results of the two studies
supported these differing interpretations. First, as noted, in the second study, subjects were in the immediate presence of the other bystanders, not merely told that others were in rooms nearby. 152 Also,
in the second study, the subjects' post-emergency evaluations of the
severity of the victim's injury showed no differences in their perceptions based upon the presence of others. 153 Finally, measures of subjects' heart rates in the two studies indicated that different levels of
"arousal" accompanied the different situations tested.
Subjects in the first study showed a lower level of arousal when the
emergency occurred if others were available than if they were alone
(indicating that they interpreted the situation as not requiring their
involvement), 54 while subjects in the second study had higher heart
rates-were more aroused-if others were present than if they were
alone when the emergency occurred. 155 This heightened level of
arousal indicated that subjects in the face-to-face presence of
nonresponsive bystanders did not feel a lesser sense of responsibility,
but instead were contending with a dilemma: whether to help the victim or to conform to the behavior of the others.1 56 The racially disparate results showed that pressure to conform exerted a stronger
influence on subjects when the victim was black than when the victim
157
was white.
Researchers observed similar channeling effects when they examined decision making in more deliberative contexts, such as mock
jury deliberations in criminal cases. In such settings, subjects reached
conclusions that were significantly harsher toward black than white
defendants-but, again, only when the decision was not likely to be
seen as racist because a nonracial justification was available to support
the negative decision.
For example, in a study of juror deliberations in the sentencing
phase of a mock death penalty case in which all other jurors spoke in
favor of death, low-prejudice jurors favored the death penalty more
strongly for black than for white defendants-if the otherwise all151. Gaertner & Dovidio, supra note 71, at 697; Gaertner et al., supra note 147, at 74.
152. Compare Gaertner et al., supra note 147, at 72-73, with Gaertner & Dovidio, supra note
71, at 695.
153. Gaertner et al., supra note 147, at 74.
154. Gaertner & Dovidio, supra note 71, at 697-98.
155. Gaertner et al., supra note 147, at 75.
156. Id. at 74-76.
157. Id.
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white jury included one black juror who advocated death. 5 8 When

the jury comprised solely white jurors, on the other hand, lowprejudice subjects did not discriminate against black defendants, but,
159
instead, treated them more favorably than white defendants.

Subjects' responses to a postdeliberation questionnaire evaluating
the other jurors eliminated a possible substantive basis for the effect
of the black juror's advocacy of death in the case of the black defen-

dant: namely, that subjects perceived the black juror's views as being
more credible and persuasive because he stated a position that was
against the interests of his own racial group. 160 Instead, the disparate

outcomes appeared to result from subjects' ability to avoid an attribution of racial bias in their decisions favoring death when a black juror
also advocated death. 161 In other words, the black juror's advocacy

seems to have provided "cover" for the subject on that score.
Similarly, the availability of a nonracial justification increased discrimination against black defendants in a study examining the influence of race on the use of inadmissible evidence of guilt in reaching a
verdict. 162 In that study, jurors reached similar verdicts for black and

white defendants when the evidence at issue was either omitted (the

"control" condition) or admissible. 163 However, results differed sig-

nificantly when subjects were presented with the evidence of guilt but
later told to disregard it because it had been ruled inadmissible. Sub-

jects reached significantly harsher verdicts for black than for white
defendants in that condition. 164 Further, when compared with verdicts reached in the control condition, the effect of the inadmissible

158. John F. Dovidio et al., Racial Attitudes and the Death Penalty, 27 J. APPLIED Soc.
1468 (1997).
159. High-prejudice subjects consistently discriminated against black defendants regardless of
the racial composition of the jury. Id. at 1478.
160. The questionnaire sought subjects' ratings of how knowledgeable, sincere, likable, trustworthy, and persuasive they perceived the other jurors to be, and the rating patterns did not
conform to jurors' pattern of recommendations for the death penalty. Id. at 1479-81.
PSYCHOL.

161. Id. at 1481.
162. James D. Johnson et al., Justice Is Still Not Colorblind: Differential Racial Effects of
Exposure to Inadmissible Evidence, 21 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 893 (1995). The
evidence that served as the focus of the experimental manipulation was a taped conversation,
obtained through a wiretap, in which a third party made strong and unequivocal statements that
directly contradicted the suspect's defense in a bank robbery case. The suspect claimed that he
had lawfully obtained the cash that the police found on him when they arrested him, because he
had borrowed it from a loan shark. In the taped conversation, the loan shark declared that he
"would never loan [the suspect] any money." Id. at 895.
163. Id. at 896.
164. Id.
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evidence was significantly greater for black than for white
165
defendants.
Paradoxically, jurors perceived themselves as being significantly less
influenced by the inadmissible evidence in cases involving black defendants than in those involving whites. 166 The researchers explained
the greater influence of inadmissible evidence on decisions involving
black defendants as likely being the result of subjects' rationalizing
their verdicts as not being racist but instead as decisions to do "the
right thing" by not permitting a guilty person to go free. 167 The researchers also speculated that the subjects' perception that they were
less influenced by inadmissible evidence of black defendants' guilt was
a reflection of the subjects' predisposition to believe that black de168
fendants were guilty.
Perhaps the most interesting point to emerge from the studies of
both spontaneous and deliberative decision making is the researchers'
explanation of why the existence of a justification for a negative decision disadvantaged black victims and defendants to a greater degree
than it did whites. The nonracial justification for a negative decision-that is, the factor that made each situation normatively ambiguous-could have supported equally negative decisions for white
victims and defendants as for blacks. However, the racially disparate
results in each study showed that such factors were more powerful
when subjects had to make decisions affecting blacks than when their
decisions affected whites. 16 9 In other words, in addition to introducing
ambiguity into the situation, the nonracial justification became more
salient and potent when it supported the negative treatment of
170
blacks.
At least three explanations might account for the power of ambiguous situations to channel discrimination or, more generally, for the
seeming mismatch between attitudes and actions that emerges in such
situations. First, the mismatch may be more apparent than real: Discrimination in ambiguous situations might actually provide a truer indication of an individual's beliefs than does his behavior in
normatively clear contexts, when he would avoid discriminating in or165. Id.
166. Id.
167. James D. Johnson et al., supra note 162, at 896.
168. Id. at 897.
169. See Gaertner & Dovidio, supra note 27, at 73 (describing "an indirect attitudinal process
that operates differentially as a function of another person's race to enhance the salience and
potency of non-race-related elements in a situation that would justify or rationalize a negative
response even if a white person were involved").
170. See id.
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der to present and preserve a nonracist public image. That is, the actor might simply have been looking for an excuse or opportunity to
discriminate that would allow him to indulge his "taste for discrimina171
tion" while appearing to conform to popular social norms.

Alternatively, the mismatch between attitudes and actions may indeed be real, at least at some level-the result of a genuine conflict

between an individual's sincere egalitarian ideals and his unacknowledged, largely unconscious, negative feelings toward and beliefs about
blacks. 172 The desire to maintain an egalitarian self-image might prevent him from discriminating in situations when it clearly would be

inappropriate, but his hidden negative feelings prompt him to discriminate in "subtle, indirect, and rationalizable ways"-that is, by ambiguous means or in ambiguous situations-because he can do so without
seeing himself as racist.1 73 In this case, the actor most likely does not
intend to discriminate and is fooling himself as much as he fools
1 74
others in striving to maintain a nonracist self-image.

Finally, the explanation might lie not in the actor's racist feelings or
beliefs, but in her unconscious cognitive biases.1 7 5 This account would
distinguish between an actor's personal beliefs and values, which di-

rect her conscious decisions of how to behave, and her unconsciously
held stereotypes, which she absorbed from childhood, which are constantly being reinforced through social and cultural influences, and
which, like a "bad habit," direct her behavior when she is not con171. In other words, situational ambiguity might provide the actor with the opportunity to
engage in "impression management," whereby he acts upon but "cover[s] up truly believed but
socially undesirable attitudes." Devine, supra note 133, at 15 (citing Crosby et al., supra note
138).
172. This account is the theory of aversive racism that has been offered by social psychologists
Samuel L. Gaertner and John F. Dovidio. See generally Gaertner & Dovidio, supra note 27.
173. Accordingly, an apparently race-neutral justification for negative treatment is more salient to such an actor when the target is black because the subject is motivated (albeit perhaps
unconsciously) to find a reason to justify a negative decision that would at the same time allow
him or her to avoid being seen as racist. See Dovidio et al., supra note 158, at 1480-81.
174. See Dovidio & Gaertner, supra note 18, at 7.
175. See Devine, supra, at 15-16 (distinguishing between an individual's "stereotype structure"
and his or her "personal belief structure," id. at 16, as well as between automatic stereotype
activation, which "is equally strong and equally inescapable for high- and low-prejudice subjects," and intentional, controlled processes, which can inhibit prejudiced responses if an individual has the inclination and resources to engage them). See also JODY DAVID ARMOUR,
NEGROPHOBIA AND REASONABLE RACISM: THE HIDDEN COSTS OF BEING BLACK IN AMERICA

126-39 (1997) (distinguishing between "stereotypes"-culturally transmitted knowledge structures that can be automatically activated like a bad habit-and "prejudice"-beliefs that, for
example, whites are superior to blacks-and therefore also between Devine's account of "ubiquitous unconscious bias" and the "aversive racism" explanation offered by Gaertner and
Dovidio, see notes 172-74 supra).
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When normative clarity cues the need to be

mindful-and assuming she has the requisite "intention, attention,
and time" 177-an individual can control her response and act in a
nonprejudiced way that is consistent with her nonracist beliefs. However, she is likely to discriminate in ambiguous situations despite her
egalitarian values and lack of prejudice, because she may not be aware
of the need to monitor her response and because racial stereotypes
are always accessible and automatically activated, and will lead her to
discriminate despite her best intentions. 178 Of these three explanations, only the first conforms to the conventional discrimination
schema 179 and might result in liability under the traditional intent requirement. 180 The other two explanations, on the other hand, are
18
more likely to capture most contemporary racial discrimination. 1
But whatever the underlying basis for the power of situational ambiguity to channel discrimination, the point remains that the situations
that are most likely to lead to discrimination are also those that tend
to mask it, making the legal question of whether the actor intended to
discriminate-that is, whether race was the "real" reason for her decision-both difficult to answer and unlikely to arise.
The normative ambiguity studies show that racially biased treatment and legitimate, nondiscriminatory justifications are likely to coexist in many cases. More specifically, they show that the existence of
a legitimate justification for a negative decision does not necessarily
discredit racial bias as an explanation for that decision. The presence
of such a justification may, instead, be cause to suspect that the decision in fact was racially biased, because racial discrimination today
seems most likely to occur through the racially biased application of a
nondiscriminatory reason.
This likelihood presents two significant challenges to the use of
traditional, individual adjudication as a means of redressing discrimination. First, it suggests that discrimination can easily occur in individual cases without being detected, because the existence of a
legitimate reason can mask the fact that the neutral reason was ap176. See Devine, supra note 133, at 15-16.
177. Id. at 16.
178. See id. at 15-16.
179. For discussion of the conventional discrimination schema, see supra notes 34-38 and accompanying text.
180. See infra notes 184-189 and accompanying text.
181. See generally ARMOUR, supra note 175, at 128-39 (discussing ubiquity of unconscious
cognitive bias); Gaertner & Dovidio, supra note 18, at 4-6 (discussing prevalence of aversive
racism).
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plied in a racially biased manner. 182 In the experiments discussed, the
researchers themselves were able to identify the racially discriminatory effect of nondiscriminatory justifications because they replicated
the same situation numerous times and could see the pattern that
emerged when the cases were viewed in the aggregate. Rarely in life
will the same situation be repeated, with nothing changed but the
races of the targets, in this fashion. As a result, even the victims of
discrimination may not realize what has happened, many cases of discrimination are likely to escape notice, and a large share of modern
discrimination is likely to go unremedied. 183

Second, the studies cast doubt on the intentional discrimination
model's assumption that the unlawful, discriminatory reason can be
disentangled from the lawful, nondiscriminatory reason that could
support the same conclusion. The intentional discrimination model

requires the fact finder to engage in an exercise in causal attribution184-to answer the question, "Why did the defendant treat the
plaintiff negatively?"-by making a choice between alternative accounts: Did the plaintiff's race affect the decision, as she alleges-or

was it, as the defendant claims, based entirely on some legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason? 185 Did the employer fail to hire the candidate because of her race or because another candidate was better
qualified? 18 6 Did the police officer stop the driver because of his race
182. See Gaertner & Dovidio, supra note 27, at 67, 73 (pointing out the masking effect of each
kind of normative ambiguity).
183. Krieger has offered similar reasons why "reliance on ... individual disparate treatment
adjudications will result in the significant underidentification of discrimination, not only by decisionmakers ... but by victims and factfinders as well." Krieger, Civil Rights Perestroika,supra
note 16, at 1304. She points out, for example, that people have more difficulty identifying discrimination when they examine case-by-case as opposed to aggregated data and that rarely is
aggregated data available, even in litigation. Id. at 1305-07. Further, when cases are examined
in isolation, "differences in treatment are too easily attributed to observed differences in one or
another input variable." Id. at 1308.
184. Id. at 1327 ("Determining in any given case whether discrimination has occurred is fundamentally an exercise in causal attribution. The employer has taken some negative action, most
frequently a termination of employment, against the plaintiff. The jury's role is to determine
why that negative action was taken.").
185. To further complicate the question, we should recognize that, in some cases, racial bias
influences the way a decisionmaker processes and interprets objective information. Therefore, a
decisionmaker might judge the objective behavior of different individuals differently based on
race, and racial bias itself may thereby produce an apparently unbiased justification for her decision. See, e.g., Krieger, The Content of Our Categories,supra note 16, at 1202-07 (describing
effect of cognitive biases on interpretation of ambiguous behavior and attribution of cause for
that behavior); Thompson, supra note 16, at 983-91 (describing effect of cognitive bias on law
enforcement officers' interpretation of behavior).
186. Krieger has explained that, in cases requiring the fact finder to compare two candidates,
"plaintiffs often fail ... to convince courts that the more favorable treatment of an employee of a
different race or gender evidences intergroup bias," because the two candidates are rarely identi-
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or because he committed a minor traffic violation? 87 While the law
requires the fact finder to select a decisive reason for the defendant's

decision, 188 the truth may be that the two possibilities-race and some
other reason-are not really distinct. To be more precise, the truth
may be that the decisionmaker relied on the nondiscriminatory reason
in making her decision-but saw that reason as persuasive only because of the plaintiff's race. 189
cally situated and "because differences in treatment are easily attributed to these differences
rather than to discrimination." Krieger, Civil Rights Perestroika,supra note 16, at 1308.
187. As David A. Harris has noted, "[N]o one can drive for even a few blocks without committing a minor violation-speeding, failing to signal or make a complete stop, touching a lane
or center line, or driving with a defective piece of vehicle equipment." Harris, supra note 8, at
311 (footnote omitted). Police officers therefore can find a reason to "stop any driver, any time
they are willing to follow the car for a short distance." Id. (noting that the Supreme Court's
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, as articulated in Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996),
allows such a result even if an officer subjectively chose to stop a particular driver because of the
driver's race).
188. See Krieger, Civil Rights Perestroika,supra note 16, at 1327.
As Krieger also has explained in the context of disparate treatment doctrine in employment
discrimination jurisprudence, the legal framework only "knows how to tell" two stories. Krieger,
The Content of Our Categories, supra note 16, at 1170. Even the disparate treatment doctrines
that recognize that discriminatory and nondiscriminatory justifications can appear in the same
case-pretext and mixed motives doctrines-ultimately require the fact finder to make a choice
between two competing explanations. Under pretext doctrine, notes Krieger, "it is simply not
possible for an employment decision to be both motivated by the employer's articulated reasons
and tainted by intergroup bias; the trier of fact must decide between the two." Id. at 1179. See
also id. at 1177-79, 1213 (describing the pretext model of discrimination first articulated in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973), and refined in Texas Department of
Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 n.6 (1981), as setting up a "true reason/phony
reason" dichotomy). Mixed motives doctrine, too, assumes that the fact finder can determine
whether the same decision would have been made for a legitimate reason wholly without regard
to the plaintiff's race, because it assumes that the decision maker himself is sufficiently selfaware that he drew that distinction at the moment he made the crucial decision. See id. at 1183,
1213 (discussing mixed motives analysis under cases following Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490
U.S. 228 (1989)). See also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2000) (amending Title VII so that a violation
is established when race was a "motivating factor ... even though other factors also motivated"
the decision); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (limiting remedies in a mixed motives case in which
the defendant proves that it "would have taken the same action in the absence of the impermissible motivating factor").
Similarly, Anthony C. Thompson has pointed out that the Supreme Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence reflects the view that the world can be "essentially divided.., into two neat,
straightforward categories: those in which there clearly is and those in which there clearly is not
probable cause."' Thompson, supra note 16, at 982. As a result, the Court's decisions
treat race as a subject that can be antiseptically removed from a suppression hearing
judge's review of whether a police officer had probable cause for an arrest or warrantless search or reasonable suspicion for a stop or frisk. The decisions imagine a world in
which some officers are wholly unaffected by racial considerations and in which even
biased officers may make objectively valid judgments that courts can sustain despite the
underlying racial motivations of the officer.
Id. at 983. As Thompson goes on to demonstrate through an examination of cognitive psychology, however, "mental states do not break down into such neat categories." Id.
189. See supra notes 169-170 and accompanying text.
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At the same time as it reveals the difficulty of determining why, and
even whether, an individual has discriminated in a particular case,
however, our realization of the power of the situation to channel discrimination should give us hope for change, because situations are not
purely "given." They can be altered in ways that reduce the potential
for normative ambiguity and hence for subtle and rationalizable, but
nonetheless real, discrimination to occur. Before I pursue that optimistic thought, 190 however, a few more pessimistic points are in order.
The following section will discuss the ways in which individuals can,
and often do, actively construct normatively ambiguous, discrimination-promoting situations, whether or not they realize that they are
doing so. In particular, it will discuss the potential for individuals to
act on racial stereotypes in a way that generates the apparently neutral justifications that both promote and justify discrimination.
III.

"SELF-FULFILLING

STEREOTYPES'

191

Not only does the existence of a nondiscriminatory justification fail
to rule out discrimination as the explanation for a decision, but sometimes that apparently neutral factor is itself the product of discrimination. This section explains how this might be so by elaborating upon
another means by which discriminatory decisions are both promoted
and obscured. It also provides an account of how discriminatory patterns of interaction are reinforced, because it shows how stereotypes
can be "confirmed" and strengthened, despite their inaccuracy.
The phenomenon that produces these results is the "self-fulfilling
prophecy": a process by which people, acting on the basis of an assumption or prediction, and regardless of its truth or falsity, actually
Devon W. Carbado points out that, in such a case, "[o]ne could argue" that the decision was
based on race. Devon W. Carbado, (E)Racing the Fourth Amendment, 100 MICH. L. REV. 946,
1032 (2002). Using Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996), as an example, he explains:
The claim would be that, but for Whren's race (he is black), the officers' suspicions
would not have been aroused, and they would not have stopped the vehicle. Put another way, if Whren were white, the police likely would not have noticed [his vehicle]
and Whren would have escaped the encounter altogether.
Carbado, supra, at 1032. Carbado goes on to explain, however, that such a claim is not only
difficult to prove, but also is not cognizable under Fourth Amendment law, for which "race does
not matter." Id. at 1032-33. Nor would such a claim appear to satisfy the "discriminatory purpose" requirement of an equal protection analysis, to which the Court has relegated claims of
racial profiling in law enforcement. See Whren, 517 U.S. at 813. For discussion of the difficulty
of establishing a denial of equal protection in this context, see COLE, supra note 9, at 39-40 and
Angela J. Davis, Race, Cops, and Traffic Stops, 51 U. MIAMI L. REV. 425, 436-38 (1997).
190. See infra subpart IV(D) for discussion of how altering the situation might reduce racial
discrimination.
191. Mark Snyder, Self-Fulfilling Stereotypes, in SELF AND SOCIETY 30 (Ann Branaman ed.,
2001).
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cause that assumption to be verified or prediction to occur-thereby
"confirming" the "accuracy" of the belief. This process in interracial
interactions is simply one variation of a long-recognized, though continually surprising, phenomenon by which expectations influence, and
then become, "reality."' 192 In an influential 1948 essay, sociologist
Robert K. Merton pointed out the resiliency and power of this "basic
process of society" 193 when he wrote that "[t]he specious validity of
the self-fulfilling prophecy perpetuates a reign of error. For the
prophet will cite the actual course of events as proof that he was right
from the very beginning. . . . Such are the perversities of social
logic."1 94

The self-fulfilling prophecy is a familiar phenomenon. A typical
scenario occurs when an individual who expects to do well or poorly
at a task (for example, an athletic feat) ends up performing at the
predicted level. 195 Frustrated market watchers will recognize the common pattern in which predictions of a sluggish economy lead consumers and investors to reduce their spending and investing-thereby
causing the economy actually to slow down, in confirmation of the
prediction. 19 6 Another example is the California gas "shortage" of
1979, when newspapers' predictions of an impending gasoline
shortage caused motorists to fill up their gas tanks and to keep them
full-which surge in demand exhausted the reserves and "so brought
about the predicted shortage practically overnight .... After the excitement died down, it turned out that the allotment of gasoline to the
97
state of California had hardly been reduced at all.'

192. The self-fulfilling prophecy has been described as a "reversal of cause and effect," in
which "what is supposed to be a reaction (the effect) turns out to be an action (the cause)," or a
situation in which "the 'solution' produces the problem" and "the prophecy of the event causes
the event of the prophecy." Paul Watzlawick, Self-Fulfilling Prophecies,in THE PRODUCTION OF
REALITY: ESSAYS AND READINGS ON SOCIAL INTERACTION 425, 426 (Jodi O'Brien & Peter

Kollock eds., 2d ed. 1997).
193. Robert K. Merton, The Self-Fulfilling Prophecy, 8 ANTIOCH REV. 193, 196 (1948).
194. Id. at 195-96.
195. This and numerous other examples are explored in RUSSELL A. JONES, SELF-FULFILLING
PROPHECIES:

SOCIAL,

PSYCHOLOGICAL,

AND

PHYSIOLOGICAL

EFFECTS

OF

EXPECTANCIES

(1977).
196. Similarly, Merton offered as a case-in-point the actions of depositors in a financially
sound bank who, upon hearing rumors of the bank's impending insolvency, rush to withdraw
their deposits, thereby causing the bank to become insolvent. Merton, supra note 193, at 194-95.
197. Watzlawick, supra note 192, at 425.
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Stereotypes as Channel Factors

The idea that "expectations have consequences because they exist,
regardless of whether they are accurate or inaccurate"' 198 has significant implications for the perpetuation of biased treatment of certain
groups. Because group-based stereotypes and prejudice are simply
expectations about people, 199 they, too, can be "confirmed" through a
self-fulfilling process. Indeed, Merton declared in 1948 that "[i]t is the
self-fulfilling prophecy which goes far toward explaining the dynamics
of ethnic and racial conflict in the America of today. '200 Both historically and in contemporary times, the self-fulfilling effect of negative
group-based expectancies has operated at many levels-in societal
structures, public policies, social interaction, and even within the stereotyped individual himself or herself-to provide putative justification for the biased treatment of disfavored social groups.20 1 In these
contexts, stereotypes act not only as erroneous judgments of those
groups, but also lead to the production of objective facts to support
their own accuracy.
At the highest of these levels, institutional structures in society that
incorporate stereotypes have contributed to the false "confirmation"
of those stereotypes. As R.D. Ashmore pointed out in 1970:
At a societal level, the self-fulfilling prophecy works by creating a
political, economic, and social structure which dooms outgroup
members to an inferior position. This structure in America has
aptly been called institutionalracism.... For example, in the days
of slavery black people were regarded as intellectually inferior and
consequently were seldom taught to read and write. Without education, the slaves were indeed less intellectually sophisticated than
the masters. In short, the stereotype of the black person led to discriminatory practices
which produced black people congruent with
20 2
that stereotype.
Contemporary policies and practices based on social group stereotypes also generate their own statistical justification through their very
enforcement. Legal scholars have identified this phenomenon in the
198. JONES, supra note 195, at 58; see also Steven L. Neuberg, Expectancy-Confirmation
Processes in Stereotyped Tinged Social Encounters: The Moderating Role of Social Goals, in 7
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF PREJUDICE, THE ONTARIO SYMPOSIUM, 103, 105-06 (Mark P. Zanna &
James M. Olson eds., 1994).
199. See JONES, supra note 195, at 62.
200. Merton, supra note 193, at 196.
201. For a discussion of a number of "sociological self-fulfilling prophecies," see Lee Jussim et
al., Stigma and Self-Fulfilling Prophecies, in THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF STIGMA 374, 403-10

(Todd F. Heatherton et al. eds, 2000).
202. R.D. Ashmore, Prejudice: Causes and Cures, in SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY (B. Collins ed.,
1970), quoted in JONES, supra note 195, at 58.
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use of racial profiling in policing. Katheryn K. Russell, among others,
has explained that "[r]ace based policies pit law enforcement against
minorities and create an unbreakable cycle: racial stereotypes may
motivate police to arrest Blacks more frequently. This in turn generates statistically disparate arrest patterns, which in turn form the basis
for further police selectivity by race. '2 3 Similarly, Chief Justice William Rehnquist recently described the subtle way in which the stereotype of women as caregivers is perpetuated through employment
practices that rest on, reinforce, and obscure the discriminatory
stereotype:
Stereotypes about women's domestic roles are reinforced by parallel stereotypes presuming a lack of domestic responsibilities for
men. Because employers continued to regard the family as the
woman's domain, they often denied men similar accommodations or
discouraged them from taking leave. These mutually reinforcing
stereotypes created a self-fulfilling cycle of discrimination that
forced women to continue to assume the role of primary family
caregiver, and fostered employers' stereotypical views about
women's commitment to work and their value as employees. Those
perceptions, in turn,... lead to subtle discrimination
that may be
20 4
difficult to detect on a case-by-case basis.
(As Krieger has pointed out, the converse-a self-fulfilling process
whereby ingroup favoritism produces its own justifications-also may
occur: in an employment context, for example, an ingroup member
who has "profited over time from a series of subtle, incremental advantages is apt to be objectively better situated" 20 5 than outgroup
203. RUSSELL, supra note 9, at 45. As David A. Harris has written:
[T]he belief that blacks are disproportionately involved in drug crimes will become a
self-fulfilling prophecy: Because police will look for drug crime among black drivers,
they will find it disproportionately among black drivers. More blacks will be arrested,
prosecuted, convicted, and jailed, thereby reinforcing the idea that blacks constitute the
majority of drug offenders. This will provide a continuing motive and justification for
stopping more black drivers as a rational way of using resources to catch the most
criminals. At the same time, because police will focus on black drivers, white drivers
will receive less attention, and the drug dealers and possessors among them will be
apprehended in proportionately smaller numbers than their presence in the population
would predict.
Harris, supra note 8, at 297. See also Roberts, supra note 8, at 818 ("Racial profiling becomes a
self-fulfilling prophecy: targeting Blacks for police surveillance results in higher rates of arrests,
reinforcing the presumption of Black criminality. If police stopped and frisked whites as frequently as they do Blacks, white arrest rates would increase."). Cf. Davis, supra note 189, at 442
(noting that "[i]n a sense, discriminatory police stops are the first in a chain of racially lopsided
decisions by officials in the criminal justice process.").
204. Nev. Dep't of Human Resources v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003) (discussing legislative
rationales for enacting the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993).
205. Krieger, Civil Rights Perestroika,supra note 16, at 1326.
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members who have not so profited when the time comes for a hiring
or promotion decision to be made.)
Moreover, members of stigmatized groups themselves may be
vulnerable to negative expectations of their group-and, ironically,
the very fear of serving as a source of confirmation of those expectations may cause group members to perform consistently with expectations. In a series of experiments, social psychologists Joshua Aronson,
Claude Steele, and their colleagues have documented a phenomenon
they call "stereotype threat. '20 6 This process causes members of
groups that are stereotyped as being less able (intellectually) to perform more poorly on standardized tests when that stereotype is made
salient to them than when the stereotype is not invoked. Specifically,
the researchers found that African-American, Latino, and female students performed significantly worse than Caucasian male students on
standardized tests in areas such as verbal or math ability in which their
group is stereotyped as having lesser ability-but only when they were
20 7
tested after somehow being "reminded" of the negative stereotype.
When researchers did not induce stereotype threat, members of these
groups performed just as well as white males on the relevant tests. 20 8
Through various experimental refinements, the researchers were
able to identify the cause of poor performance in the stereotype threat
2' 0 9
condition as a situationalfactor based in "domain identification.
That is, when an individual from a stereotyped group cares enough
about the ability supposedly being measured to want the stereotype of
'210
low ability to be untrue, the test becomes a "high-stakes endeavor.
The individual then feels apprehensive, anxious, and distracted-emotions that interfere with performance on the test. In other words,
even when an individual's abilities do not conform to the stereotypeand especially when he or she wants to prove that the stereotype is
206. These studies are described in Joshua Aronson et al., The Effect of Stereotype Threat on
the Standardized Test Performance of College Students, in READINGS ABOUT THE SOCIAL
ANIMAL 403 (Elliot Aronson ed., 8th ed. 1999). See also Claude M. Steele & Joshua Aronson,
Stereotype Threat and the Intellectual Test Performance ofAfrican Americans, 69 J. PERSONALITY
& SOC. PSYCHOL. 797 (1995).
207. The researchers used different methods to induce stereotype threat in the various experiments. For example, in one experiment they told a group of subjects that the standardized test
would be used to obtain a precise measure of their ability, while in another experiment a group
of subjects were simply asked to indicate their race, among other information, on a brief questionnaire. In yet another experiment, a group of subjects were asked several questions, including
whether they thought that standardized tests were biased against certain groups such as women
or ethnic minorities. In all experiments, subjects in the "no stereotype threat" condition were
not exposed to such a manipulation. See Aronson et al., supra note 206, at 405-06, 408-10.
208. Id. at 406-09, 411.
209. Id. at 411.
210. Id. at 405.
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invalid-making the stereotype salient alters the testing situation by
placing an extra psychological burden on the individual. 211 As the re-

searchers explained, "The predicament is this: the mere existence of a
devaluing stereotype means that anything one does, or any of one's

features that conform to it, makes the stereotype more plausible as a
self-characterization, in the eyes of others, and perhaps even in one's
own eyes.1

212

Aronson, Steele, and their colleagues further supported this situa-

tional conception of stereotype threat by providing compelling evidence that the psychological burden of stereotype vulnerability is not
unique to members of stigmatized groups but, to the contrary, can
affect anyone under the right circumstances. In an experiment designed to test the effect of stereotype threat on the math performance
of white male students (who, presumably, were not subject to any negative stereotypes about math ability) 2 13 the experimenters found that
students who had previously identified themselves as caring about

their math abilities performed significantly worse than students who
did not so identify-but only when they were reminded of the stereotype that Asian students consistently outperform other groups on

standardized tests of math ability! 214 From this experiment, the researchers concluded that "one need not be a minority to be bothered
by stereotypes,"21 5 and that underperformance in this situation appar'216
ently results from "trying too hard.

These examples demonstrate that stereotypes constitute more than
just inaccurate over-generalizations about groups of individuals. Stereotypes also operate as channel factors-they define situations in a
211. Id. at 404.
212. Id.
213. Aronson et al., supra note 206, at 413.
214. Id. at 412-13. The converse effect-"stereotype lift"-can work to "boost" the performance of members of groups that are not subject to stereotypes about their intellectual abilities,
such as white males. Through a meta analysis of stereotype threat studies, Gregory M. Walton
and Geoffrey L. Cohen have shown that men and whites receive a performance boost when they
are reminded (whether explicitly or implicitly) of the negative stereotypes associated with other
social groups before taking evaluative tests. See generally Walton & Cohen, supra note 1. Walton and Cohen explain stereotype lift as the result of "downward social comparisons with a
denigrated outgroup" that elevate the ingroup member's "self-efficacy or sense of personal
worth" and enhance performance by contributing to the individual's confidence and motivation.
Id. at 456. Walton and Cohen view stereotype lift as complementary to stereotype threat, and
note its significant implications: "[A]lthough the effects of stereotype lift may be subtle on any
given test, its impact on the achievement of the nonstereotyped may be dramatic when its effects
accumulate either within a large group of test-takers or across numerous performance opportunities for a single individual." Id. at 465.
215. Aronson et al., supra note 206, at 413.
216. Id.
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way that limits the potential outcomes by directing a particular path
for performance or behavior. 217 As Merton said of self-fulfilling
prophecies generally, "public definitions of a situation (prophecies or
predictions) become an integral part of the situation and thus affect
'2 18
subsequent developments.
Moreover, the real power of stereotypes as self-fulfilling prophecies
lies in the failure of people to recognize the situation-defining role
they play, and their tendency instead to see the outcome of the situation as objective evidence of the truth of (or "kernel of truth" in) the
stereotype. As Merton put it:
As a result of their failure to comprehend the operation of the selffulfilling prophecy, many Americans of good will are (sometimes
reluctantly) brought to retain enduring ethnic and racial prejudices.
They experience these beliefs, not as prejudices, not as prejudgments, but as irresistible products of their own observation.
"The
219
facts of the case" permit them no other conclusion.
This failure is simply another example of the correspondence bias or
fundamental attribution error that leads people to attribute an individual's behavior solely to his or her disposition or personal qualities,
and prevents them from seeing that the individual's behavior was also
influenced by the situation. 220 In the case of stereotypes, observers
fail to recognize that a stereotyped individual's options in a situation
often are limited by biased institutions or policies, or even simply by
the ways in which others act toward him based upon their stereotyped
view of him. Instead, they think it obvious that the person's stereotype-consistent actions are an accurate reflection of who he "is," and
the stereotype is therefore ascribed validity that it does not merit.
B.

Behavioral Confirmation of Stereotypes in Social Interaction

Self-fulfilling prophecies also have been shown to occur through social interaction in a number of settings that are critical to individuals'
access to equal opportunity for social and economic advancement, and
in ways that have serious implications for members of negatively stereotyped groups. This unnoticed process may prevent members of disfavored groups from even getting in the door to a program or job. A
22 1
classic study in 1974, which will be discussed in greater detail below,
showed that interviewers acted more coldly and less receptively to217. For discussion of channel factors, see supra notes 56-59 and accompanying text.
218. Merton, supra note 193, at 195.
219. Id.
220. For discussion of the fundamental attribution error or correspondence bias, see supra
notes 39-52 and accompanying text.
221. See infra notes 260-279 and accompanying text.
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ward black candidates than toward whites. When reproduced in interviews with white candidates, the type of distancing behaviors adopted
by those interviewers contributed to less favorable interview performances by the white candidates, indicating that interviewer behavior influences interviewee performance. In other words, an interviewer's
initially negative attitude toward a black candidate can "doom" their
interaction in a way that causes the candidate to perform poorly and
thereby to provide confirmation for the interviewer's unfavorable prejudgment and a neutral reason for making a negative decision about
the candidate.
In addition, once an individual is on the job, or in the classroom,
self-fulfilling stereotypes may present a further obstacle to his or her
advancement. A number of experimental studies have demonstrated
that teachers' and supervisors' expectations or attitudes toward students and workers can have a strong self-fulfilling effect on those individuals' performances. In one famous experiment, for example, social
psychologists Robert Rosenthal and Lenore Jacobson found that,
when teachers were told that certain students (actually selected by the
researchers at random) had the potential to achieve greater intellectual development, those children actually did show greater intellectual
development later in the school year. 2 22 The researchers hypothesized
that the teachers' behavior toward the identified students communicated their expectations of improved intellectual performance and
that those communications, coupled with changes in teaching technique, contributed to changes in the children's self-concepts, expectations and motivation, and even the children's cognitive skills.22 3 This
"Pygmalion effect" also can operate among adults in the workplace,
where supervisors' experimenter-induced expectations of high performance from designated workers have been shown to result in confirmation by supervisors' evaluations, peers' ratings, and objective
tests of subjects' performance. 224 As will be examined further below,
222. This experiment is discussed at Robert Rosenthal & Lenore Jacobson, Pygmalion in the
Classroom: Teacher Expectation and Pupils' Intellectual Development, in THE PRODUCTION OF
REALITY: ESSAYS AND READINGS ON SOCIAL INTERACTION, supra note 192, at 443. See also
ROBERT ROSENTHAL & LENORE JACOBSON, PYGMALION IN THE CLASSROOM: TEACHER EXPEC-

(1968).
223. See Rosenthal & Jacobson, supra note 222, at 446-47.

TATION AND PUPILS' INTELLECTUAL DEVELOPMENT

224. See Albert S. King, Self-Fulfilling Prophecies in Training the Hard-Core: Supervisors'
Expectations and the Underprivileged Workers' Performance, 52 Soc. SCI. Q. 369-78 (1971) (con-

firming operation of self-fulfilling prophecy in program designed to train disadvantaged workers
as welders, pressers, and mechanics). See also Dov Eden & Abraham B. Shani, Pygmalion Goes
to Boot Camp: Expectancy, Leadership, and Trainee Performance, 67 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 194-

99 (1982) (confirming "Pygmalion hypothesis" in fifteen-week combat command course at an
Israeli military training base).
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racial and other social stereotypes can work, similarly to these experimenter-manipulated expectations, to create behavior in the target that
22 5
confirms the initially erroneous expectations of the perceiver.
Self-fulfilling prophecies operate to "confirm" and reinforce stereotypes in surprising and subtle ways in one-on-one interactions. Despite the subtlety of its operation, however, this process, operating
within such contexts, has a real, cumulative impact on individuals and
society. As social psychologist Steven L. Neuberg has explained:
[E]ach day, the outcomes of social encounters determine friendship
choices, educational opportunities, job hirings, housing decisions,
the ability of people to get along peacefully with each other, and so
forth. When stereotypes and prejudices color such encounters,
leading people to form mistaken impressions of others, the personal
consequences
of these encounters can be momentous for all parties
226
involved.
1.

The Process of Behavioral Confirmation: The Studies

The behavioral confirmation of expectancies is a well established
phenomenon in social interactions. The literature examining this process is one line of recent work in social psychology that shows that
individuals are not just passive recipients and processors of informa22 7
tion, but play an active role in constructing their own social reality.
The interaction itself cements that construction when parties to the
exchange accept the designated script for their respective roles.
Social psychologist Mark Snyder and his colleagues have illustrated
the process by which expectations are confirmed and reinforced in social interactions using the example of a "perceiver" (Jim) who has
been told by a third person that another individual, the "target"
(Chris) is cool and aloof.228 Snyder and his collegues explain that,
when Jim meets Chris, he will tend to notice Chris's expressions of
coolness and aloofness, and then will overestimate the extent to which
those expressions are attributable to Chris's cool and aloof disposition
and underestimate the extent to which they are attributable to Jim's
own cool and aloof behavior toward Chris-which in turn was in225. See infra subparts III(B)(1), III(B)(2). See also Snyder, supra note 191, at 32.
226. Neuberg, supra note 198, at 104.
227. As Edward E. Jones has stated, "We act while we see, and what we see is in part affected
by our own actions." EDWARD E. JONES, INTERPERSONAL PERCEPTION 237 (1990), quoted in
Mark Chen & John A. Bargh, Nonconscious BehavioralConfirmation Processes: The Self-Fulfilling Consequences of Automatic Stereotype Activation, 33 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 541,
542 (1997).
228. Mark Snyder et al., Social Perception and Interpersonal Behavior: On The Self-Fulfilling
Nature of Social Stereotypes, 35 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 656, 658 (1977).
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duced by his preconceived notions about Chris. 229 Another perceiver,
however (Snyder and colleagues call him "Tom"), might have been
told that Chris was warm and friendly, and have seen that impression
of Chris confirmed through their interaction. 230 Snyder and his colleagues explain:
The perceiver (either Jim or Tom) is not aware that his original perception of the target individual (Chris) is inaccurate. Nor is the perceiver aware of the causal role that his own behavior (here, the
enactment of a cool or warm expressive style) plays in generating
the behavioral evidence that erroneously confirms his expectations.
Unbeknownst to the perceiver, the reality that he confidently perceives to exist in the social world has, in fact, been actively constructed31by his own transactions with and operations upon the social
2
world.
As this example suggests, the fundamental attribution error is a key
facilitator of the self-fulfilling prophecy in social interactions, because
it leads the perceiver to overlook the role that his or her own behavior
played in "causing" the other person's behavior, and to assign too
much significance to the other's behavior. 2 32 Jim and Tom attribute
Chris's behavior to his cool or warm disposition, rather than recognizing that their own expectations of him led them to define the situation
in a particular way and to tailor their treatment of Chris accordingly.2 33 Their own behavior then constrained Chris's options for how

to respond to them, leading him to reciprocate their overtures and
thereby to act consistently with, and in confirmation of, their initial
impressions of him. 234 In other words, the perceivers' expectations

acted to "channel" the interaction so as to actively create their own
confirming evidence.
And it is not just parties to the interaction whose judgments of the
target are affected. Nonparticipant observers will judge the target's
character in accordance with his behavior as well, due to their own
tendency to overlook the ways in which his behavior may have been
23 5
affected by the constraints imposed by the situation.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id. See also FISKE & TAYLOR, supra note 30, at 74-75 (noting that "active observers,"

who are simultaneously interacting with and observing an actor, may be more inclined than
passive observers to attribute the actor's behavior to dispositional factors); KUNDA, supra note
48, at 442-43 (noting that people often fail to recognize the effect of their own behavior on the
behavior of others).

233. Snyder et al., supra note 228, at 658.
234. Id.
235. See Saul M. Kassin et al., Behavioral Confirmation in the Interrogation Room: On the

Dangers of Presuming Guilt, 27 L. & HUM.

BEHAV.

187, 199 (2003).
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A number of social psychological experiments have demonstrated
the channeling power of erroneous or constructed expectations in social interactions. In these experiments, individuals' expectations of
237 soothers-for example, that the other was hostile, 236 extroverted,
ciable, 238 or even guilty of a crime 239-actually induced those others
to behave in conformity with expectations, thereby "confirming"
them, even when the expectations were wholly created by the experimenters. The experiments have further shown that this behavioral
confirmation process is reciprocal, as both perceiver and target act in
accordance with the perceiver's expectations and the corresponding
signals that the perceiver's behavior sends to the target. (Indeed, the
falsely perceived individual may even come to see himself or herself,
or continue to behave, consistently with the perceiver's originally erroneous belief.240 )
Group-based stereotypes also can act as powerful channel factors in
one-on-one interactions, especially between individuals who do not
have prior experience with one another and therefore must make
judgments on the basis of first impressions that are influenced strongly
by the other person's most visible characteristics, such as race, color,
gender, age, or physical appearance. 2 41 In these situations, it can be
expected that the initial impressions of people who have had no opportunity to learn about one another will incorporate general stereotypes that may lead to a grossly inaccurate impression of a particular
individual. 242 Further, cognitive biases often contribute to "perceptual confirmation" of the erroneous prejudgment, because people
tend to "see" what they expect to see. 243 What is surprising, however,
236. See Mark Snyder & William B. Swann, Jr., Behavioral Confirmation in Social Interaction:
From Social Perception to Social Reality, 14 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 148 (1978).
237. See Mark Snyder & William B. Swann, Jr., Hypothesis-Testing Processes in Social Interaction, 36 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1202 (1978).
238. See Dana Christensen & Robert Rosenthal, Gender and Nonverbal Decoding Skill as

Determinants of Interpersonal Expectancy Effects, 42 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 75
(1982).
239. See Kassin et al., supra note 235.
240. See, e.g., Smith et al., Target Complicity in the Confirmation and Disconfirmationof Erroneous Perceiver Expectations: Immediate and Longer Term Implications, 73 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 974 (1997); Snyder & Swann, supra note 236, at 151, 156-57.
241. See Mark Snyder & Julie A. Haugen, Why Does Behavioral Confirmation Occur? A
Functional Perspective on the Role of the Perceiver, 30 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 218,
220-21 (1994).
242. See Mark Snyder, When Belief Creates Reality: The Self-Fulfilling Impact of First Impressions, in THE PRODUCTION OF REALITY: ESSAYS AND READINGS ON SOCIAL INTERACTION,
supra note 192, at 438.
243. See Mark Snyder & Julie A. Haugen, Why Does Behavioral Confirmation Occur? A
Functional Perspective on the Role of the Target, 21 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 963

(1995).
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is that rather than disconfirming the perceiver's erroneous impression,
the stereotyped individual's own behavior during the interaction often
serves to confirm and strengthen the inaccurate expectation.
Two classic studies in the 1970s demonstrated the power of stereotypes to act as self-fulfilling prophecies and illuminated the interactive
process by which behavioral confirmation of stereotypes occurs. In
1977, Mark Snyder, Elizabeth Decker Tanke, and Ellen Berscheid
documented the channeling effect on interactions of the stereotype
that physically attractive people are more friendly and likable, showing that this expectation elicits its own behavioral confirmation from
the stereotyped individual without regard to that individual's actual
physical appearance. 244 To do so, the researchers set up a controlled
"getting acquainted" telephone interaction between a male perceiver
and a female target who did not know one another. Before the telephone conversation they gave each perceiver a photograph that he
was told depicted his female interaction partner but that actually did
not.2 45 The photos had been prepared in advance and depicted the
target as either physically attractive or physically unattractive.2 46 A
photo was assigned randomly to each set of partners, who did not otherwise see one another.2 4 7 They engaged in an unstructured, ten-minute telephone conversation, each side of which was tape recorded
separately.2 48 Afterward, judges listened to separate tapes of either
the perceivers' or the targets' side of the conversations and assessed
2 49
the participants' behavior.
The judges, who were completely unaware of the perceived attractiveness of the female targets, assessed those targets who had been
randomly assigned to the "attractive" condition consistently with the
stereotypical expectations. Specifically, they found them to "manifest
greater confidence, greater animation, greater enjoyment of the conversation, and greater liking for their partners than those women who
interacted with men who perceived them as physically unattrac244. This study appears in Snyder et al., supra note 228, and is also discussed in Snyder, supra
note 242.
Snyder and his colleagues relied on experimental evidence that physically attractive people
are stereotyped as "possess[ing] more socially desirable personality traits and are expected to
lead better lives than their unattractive counterparts," Snyder et al., supra note 228, at 658.
245. Id. at 659. The female participants were not told of these photographs, nor did they
receive photographs of their male partners. Id.
246. Id. The photos had been rated earlier by a different group of men. Id.
247. Id.
248. Snyder et al., supra note 228, at 660.
249. Id.
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tive. '' 250 As Snyder and his colleagues put it, "the 'beautiful' people
251
became 'good' people."
Just how did the "'beautiful' people" become "'good' people"? The
researchers used the judges' ratings of each participant's voice to track
the process of behavioral confirmation of stereotype-based expectations, and uncovered the reciprocal nature of the behavioral confirmation process. First, they had clear evidence that the male perceivers
formed their first impressions of the female targets based on the stereotype linking physical attractiveness with socially desirable personality
traits, because each perceiver had been asked to characterize his initial impression of the target after seeing "her" photograph but before
engaging in the telephone conversation. 252 Perceivers who had been
assigned "attractive" targets said that they expected their partners to
be "comparatively sociable, poised, humorous, and socially adept,"
while those who had been assigned "unattractive" targets anticipated
their partners would be "rather unsociable, awkward, serious, and socially inept. '253
Second, the researchers found that these expectations set off a
"chain of events" that led to the confirmation of the perceivers' initially erroneous, artificially created expectations. The judges' ratings
of the male perceivers' parts of the conversations indicated that the
perceivers interacted differently with targets who had been assigned
to different attractiveness conditions. Those perceivers who
conversed with "attractive" targets presented themselves as "more sociable, sexually warm, interesting, independent, sexually permissive,
bold, outgoing, humorous, obvious, and socially adept" than those
men who spoke with "unattractive" partners. 254 The judges also assessed the perceivers in the attractive target condition as being more
animated, confident, and comfortable in their conversations, and
judged them as both seeing their partners and being seen by their
partners as more attractive. 255
This study demonstrates that one reason why stereotypes are so resilient lies in their power to shape the context in which individuals get
to know one another. Stereotypes act as situational factors that channel behavior and thereby define the terms of the parties' interaction.
In this experiment specifically, the perceivers first formed erroneous
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.

Id. at 662.
Snyder, supra note 242, at 440.
Snyder et al., supra note 228, at 659-60.
Id. at 661.
Id. at 663.
Id.
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impressions of the targets based on their general stereotypes of physically attractive people. Then, the perceivers presented themselves to
their partners and interacted with them in a style that was shaped by
those stereotypical expectations. The partners responded consistently
with the way they were being treated, so that those who were believed
to be physically attractive, and therefore more likeable, "actually
came to behave in a friendly, likable, and sociable manner. '2 56 Thus,
the perceivers' stereotypical but erroneous expectations became
257
real.
Having witnessed the power of stereotypes to constrain targets' behavioral options and to elicit stereotype-consistent behavior, Snyder
and his colleagues wondered about the larger societal implications of
their findings: "Might not other important and widespread social stereotypes-particularly those concerning sex, race, social class, and
ethnicity-also channel social interaction in ways that create their
own social reality?" 2 58 The researchers further speculated that "[a]ny
self-fulfilling influences of social stereotypes may have compelling and
2' 59
pervasive societal consequences.
Indeed, in a slightly earlier study, Carl 0. Word, Mark P. Zanna,
and Joel Cooper had found that a self-fulfilling prophecy did operate
in interracial encounters, and in a context that could have wide-ranging implications for an important social issue-black unemployment. 260 Word and his colleagues conducted two related experiments
to examine whether poor performances by black persons in job interviews might sometimes be the result of a self-fulfilling prophecy, by
which a white interviewer's negative attitude toward a black applicant
elicited a less favorable performance from the applicant. Specifically,
they hypothesized that a white interviewer might convey negative
evaluations toward blacks through nonverbal behavior, and that a
black interviewee might reciprocate these nonverbal cues in a way
that resulted in a negative assessment of the interview performancethus confirming the interviewer's initial expectation.2 61 In order to
256. Id.
257. See also Mark Snyder & Arthur A. Stukas, Jr., InterpersonalProcesses: The Interplay of
Cognitive, Motivational, and Behavioral Activities in Social Interaction, 50 ANN. REv. PSYCHOL.
273, 277 (1999) (identifying four crucial steps in the behavioral confirmation process: perceiver's
adopting beliefs about the target, perceiver's behaving toward the target as if the beliefs were
true, target's fitting behavior to perceiver's overtures, perceiver's interpreting target's behavior
as confirming perceiver's beliefs).
258. Snyder et al., supra note 228, at 664.
259. Id.
260. Carl 0. Word et al., The Nonverbal Mediation of Self-Fulfilling Propheciesin Interracial
Interaction, 10 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 109 (1974).
261. Id.at 111.
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determine whether such a dynamic might indeed be the result of a
self-fulfilling prophecy, the researchers first tested for differences between the interaction styles of white subjects interviewing black candidates and those interviewing whites. 26 2 In a second study, they
compared the interview performances of a different group of white
subjects, some of whom were treated similarly to the black candidates
and others of whom were treated similarly to the white candidates
263
from the first study.
Earlier studies had found that individuals tended to avoid and cut
short interaction with "stigmatized" persons, such as those with a
physical disability, and that individuals' attitudes toward another per264
son were reflected in their nonverbal behavior toward that person.
More positive attitudes toward a target person resulted in an individual's maintaining more "immediate" behaviors-including "closer interpersonal distances, more eye contact, more direct shoulder
orientation, and more forward lean. ' 265 In the first interview experiment, Word and his colleagues used these and related behaviors as
measures of the degree of "immediacy" that white interviewers employed in interacting with white and black interviewees. All of the
interviewees had been trained beforehand to act in a standardized
way, both as to the content of their answers and their nonverbal behavior, and they were monitored to ensure that they maintained standard behaviors throughout the interviews. 266 As each white
interviewer-subject interviewed a white and then a black applicant (or
vice versa), two judges scored the interviewers' immediacy
267
behaviors.
Overall, the results indicated that black applicants received less immediate behaviors from white interviewers than did white applicants.
Specifically, the interviewers physically placed themselves farther
away from the black applicants, interviewed them for shorter periods
of time, and committed a higher rate of speech errors (such as sentence changes, repetitions, stuttering, incomplete sentences, and "intruding, incoherent sounds") with black than with white applicants. 268
From these results, the researchers concluded that black applicants
262.
263.
264.
265.

Id. at 112-15.
Id. at 115-19.
Id. at 110.
Id. (citing A. Mehrabian, Inference of Attitudes from the Posture, Orientation,and Distance of a Communicator, 32 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 296 (1968)).
266. Word et al., supra note 260, at 112-13.
267. Id. at 113.
268. Id. at 114-15.
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were treated with less immediacy than white applicants, consistent
269
with blackness being viewed as a "stigmatizing" trait.
In the second experiment, the researchers examined the effect on a
job applicant's performance of being treated with less immediate behaviors. 270 They removed the applicant's race as a factor in performance by using only white subjects in this experiment. 271 Because this
time they were interested in examining the interviewees' behavior in
response to being treated with or without immediacy, the researchers
trained two interviewers to act differently with respect to the factors
on which the interviewers in the first experiment had shown significant differences (speech error rate, length of interview, and physical
distance from applicant): one behaved precisely as the interviewers
had behaved toward white applicants (the "immediate" condition),
and one behaved precisely as the interviewers had behaved toward
black applicants (the "nonimmediate" condition). 272 On all other behaviors they were trained to act similarly. 273 Then, interviews with
subjects in the two conditions were rated by both nonparticipant
274
judges and the subjects themselves.
The results confirmed the operation of a self-fulfilling prophecy, for
the applicants who were treated more negatively were judged both to
perform more poorly than the other applicants and to respond to the
interviewers with less favorable behaviors of their own. The judges
rated the applicants in the nonimmediate condition as performing less
adequately and being less calm and composed than applicants in the
immediate condition. 27 5 In addition, applicants in the nonimmediate
condition reciprocated the interviewer's negative nonverbal behaviors
by moving their chairs farther away from the interviewer's when given
the opportunity to move through a contrived interruption in the interview. 27 6 In contrast, applicants in the immediate condition moved
their chairs closer to the interviewer's, committed fewer speech errors,
and generally responded with more immediate behaviors, such as forward lean, eye contact, and direct shoulder orientation. 277 Finally, applicants in the nonimmediate condition rated their interviewers as less
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.

Id. at
Id.
Id.
Word
Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.

115.

et al., supra note 260, at 116.
116-17.
117-18.
118.
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friendly and less adequate overall than did applicants in the immedi278

ate condition.
Word and his colleagues pointed out the important implications of
this two-stage experiment: "The present results suggest that analyses
of black-and-white interactions, particularly in the area of job-seeking
Blacks in white society, might profit if it were assumed that the 'problem' of black performance resides not entirely within the Blacks, but
'279
rather within the interaction setting itself.
Subsequent studies have reproduced this behavioral confirmation
process, further documenting the situation-defining and self-fulfilling
nature of social stereotypes associated with race 280 and gender. 28 1 Recent experiments have even shown that behavioral confirmation of
stereotypes can occur when the stereotype is not consciously activated-for example, when a stereotype is cued subliminally, by a stim-

282
ulus outside of the perceiver's awareness.
Collectively, these studies suggest that the behavioral confirmation
process can have a significant effect in social interactions when racial
and other group-based stereotypes come into play. Specifically, they
show that stereotypes can define the terms of an interaction by inducing the perceiver to treat the target in a way that "boxes in" the target
by giving him or her little choice but to act according to, and therefore
in confirmation of, the stereotype. The target might even see advantages to behaving in conformity with the perceiver's expectations-if,
for example, he or she anticipates a positive response to such behavior
or, conversely, a negative response to attempts to disconfirm the perceiver's expectations. 283 Thus, stereotypes can be perpetuated and
even strengthened despite their inaccuracy, because the perceiver and
observers fail to recognize the power of biased expectations to define
situations and channel behavior and because the behavioral confirmation process produces ostensibly objective evidence to support the
stereotype. This "evidence" in turn serves to justify the continued differential treatment of the stereotyped group.
278. Word et al., supra note 260, at 119.
279. Id. at 119-20.
280. See, e.g., Chen & Bargh, supra note 227.
281. See, e.g., Berna J. Skrypnek & Mark Snyder, On the Self-Perpetuating Nature of Stereotypes About Women and Men, 18 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 277-91 (1982); Carl L. von
Baeyer et al., Impression Management in the Job Interview: When the Female Applicant Meets the

Male (Chauvinist) Interviewer, 7 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 45-51 (1981). See also
Mark P. Zanna & Susan J. Pack, On the Self-Fulfilling Nature of Apparent Sex Differences in
Behavior, 11 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 583-91 (1975).

282. See Chen & Bargh, supra note 227.
283. See discussion infra notes 321-328 and accompanying text.
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The Potentialfor Behavioral Confirmation of Racial Stereotypes
in Authentic Interactions

Although it is well established in the literature and has been consistently produced in the laboratory, some might point out that the behavioral confirmation of expectancies is not inevitable. 28 4 People
sometimes are surprised by others who act inconsistently with their
expectations, and may themselves even seek out disconfirming information. Even in laboratory contexts, behavioral confirmation of expectations does not occur in every perceiver-target interaction, 85 and
a few experiments have even produced evidence of self-disconfirming
(or "suicidal") prophecies. 2 6 Outside of the laboratory we may expect behavioral confirmation to be even less consistent.
For one thing, real-life interactions often bear little resemblance to
the neatly arranged, highly artificial encounters produced in an experimental setting. In daily life, people's expectations about others are
not usually supplied or triggered by an outside party's manipulations;
nor do people's dealings proceed in as isolated or orderly a fashion as
in researcher-contrived interactions. In addition, individuals are not
relegated to simple roles as either "perceiver" or "target"; in authentic
interactions, both participants play both roles, and thus each person's
expectations of the other will come into play.2 8 7 Further, in day-today interactions the participants may be motivated by various goals
that determine what they hope to get out of the encounter and influence how they deal with one another. For example, someone who is
motivated to make an accurate judgment about another person-perhaps because he depends on her to work with him on a project, 288
knows that he will later be required to justify his assessment, 2 89 or
284. See, e.g., Edward E. Jones, Interpreting Interpersonal Behavior, 234 Sci. 41, 46 (1986)
(stating that self-fulfilling prophecies are "by no means inevitable," but going on to state, "there
are a number of reasons why they might be widely expected in a variety of settings with different
kinds of behavioral expectancies"); Neuberg, supra note 198, at 110.
285. See, e.g., Snyder & Haugen, supra note 241, at 234 (describing results in the "basic" and
"adjustive" conditions of their experiment).
286. See, e.g., Dale T. Miller & William Turnbull, Expectancies and InterpersonalProcesses,37
ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 233, 234 (1986).

287. See Snyder & Stukas, supra note 257, at 287-88 (addressing the "frequently asked question": "Aren't Both Parties to the Interaction Really Perceivers and Targets?").
288. See Steven L. Neuberg & Susan T. Fiske, Motivational Influences on Impression Formation: Outcome Dependency, Accuracy-Driven Attention, and Individuating Processes, 53 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 431, 431-38 (1987) (reporting results of study in which subjects'
"short-term, task-oriented outcome dependency" on target resulted in their evaluating targets
with respect to their actual characteristics as opposed to manipulated expectancies).
289. See Philip E. Tetlock & Jae I1 Kim, Accountability and Judgment Processes in a Personality Prediction Task, 52 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 700 (1987) (reporting on study that
found that subjects who knew they would be held accountable for their assessments of another
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simply has been prompted to form an accurate impression 29 0-may
consciously refrain from imposing his expectations on the other person, may be more attentive to the effect of the situation on, as well as
disconfirming evidence in, her behavior, and may seek more individuating information about her, all of which behaviors give the other person the opportunity to behave inconsistently with the perceiver's
expectations. 29' Similarly, someone who is motivated to get another
person to like him will behave in a more open, even ingratiating way
''2 92
that tends "not [to] elicit self-fulfilling outcomes.
Even the random particulars of the situation-such as whether or
not the parties are in a hurry, whether they are focused on one another or distracted by some other concerns-may affect whether their
interaction follows the textbook pattern.2 93 Moreover, although the
behavioral confirmation model stresses the power of the perceiver in
defining the situation and limiting the target's options for how to respond, we should not underestimate the desire, and sometimes even
the power, of an individual in the target position to "disconfirm" the
perceiver's expectations. 294 Someone who becomes aware of another's negative impression of her and feels threatened by that view
295
may choose to behave in ways that visibly disconfirm expectations.
These means for disrupting the process are supported in the literature and suggest that human interaction is not hopelessly mired in a
person (by having to justify them to others) formed more complex impressions and made more
accurate predictions than subjects who were not placed in this condition).
290. See Neuberg & Fiske, supranote 288, at 440-41 (reporting results of study in which telling
subjects that it was "extremely important that [they] make every effort to form as accurate an
impression as possible" encouraged subjects' use of individuating processes in attending to information); Steven L. Neuberg, The Goal of Forming Accurate Impressions During Social Interaction: Attentuating the Impact of Negative Expectancies, 56 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 374
(1989) (reporting results of similar study in which motivating subjects to form accurate impressions influenced them to interact in a way that enabled them to gather more, and higher quality,
target information).
291. See, e.g., Neuberg, supra note 198, at 114; Neuberg & Fiske, supra note 288, at 441-42.
292. Snyder & Stukas, supra note 257, at 283 (citing Steven L. Neuberg et al., Perceiver SelfPresentation Goals as Moderators of Expectancy Influences: Ingratiationand the Disconfirmation of Negative Expectancies, 64 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 409 (1993)).

293. See Neuberg, supra note 198, at 120-22.
294. The target's own desire for verification of his self-concept often competes with the process that promotes behavioral confirmation of the perceiver's expectations about him. See generally William B. Swann, Jr. & Robin J. Ely, A Battle of Wills: Self-Verification Versus Behavioral
Confirmation, 46 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1287, 1299 (1984).
295. See, e.g., James L. Hilton & John M. Darley, ConstructingOther Persons:A Limit on the
Effect, 21 J. EXPER. Soc. PSYCHOL. 1 (1985) (discussing experiment in which behavioral confirmation did occur when perceivers who expected targets to be cold interacted with naive targets,
but did not occur when targets were told that perceivers expected them to be cold).
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vicious circle of self-fulfilling prophecy. 296 Nevertheless, behavioral
confirmation of negative expectations is highly reliable in the types of
interactions that may have the most far-reaching effects on racial minorities' access to opportunity and vulnerability to discrimination, as
well as on the perpetuation and entrenchment of the negative stereotypes that influence both. Interactions in a range of such settings in
which racial discrimination is a perpetual concern-such as employment, health care, and the criminal justice system-tend to be characterized by the presence of factors that promote behavioral
confirmation and the absence of factors that might disrupt the process. 297 In these settings, the types of expectations at issue, the typical
power differences between the parties, the parties' respective roles in
and goals for their interaction, the circumstances under which they
interact, and the institutional practices that structure their encounter,
all come together to limit the target's options for acting other than in
confirmation of negative stereotypes.
First, while some expectations of the kind tested in laboratory settings (for example, that a random target is hostile or extroverted)
might be harder to create and more easily dashed, negative cultural
and social stereotypes are the very kind of expectancies that have the
strongest influence on interactions and the most likelihood of being
behaviorally confirmed. 298 They tend to be held with more certainty
than other interpersonal expectancies, because they are shared and
validated by others-often by society at large. 299 In addition, groupbased stereotypes are often both automatically activated and "chronically accessible," 300 and therefore are insidious and powerful in coloring perceivers' interpretations of interactions.
Further, negative stereotypes of minority groups tend to come into
play within interactions that are structured to favor their behavioral
confirmation, because "the same people who are typically the targets
of social and cultural stereotypes are often those who have less power
in our society (e.g., members of minority groups)."' 30 1 The mere exis-

tence of a power differential plays a significant role in behavioral confirmation, because it structures the real-life interaction similarly to a
296. See Neuberg, supra note 290, at 385 ("optimistically" suggesting "that people are not
hopelessly limited by their expectancies, stereotypes, and prejudices").
297. See infra subparts III(B)(3), IV(C).
298. See Snyder & Stukas, supra note 257, at 278 (noting the "greater potential for the confirmation" of stereotypes that are "generalizations based on characteristics associated with group
membership").
299. See Swann & Ely, supra note 294, at 1299.
300. See Snyder & Stukas, supra note 257, at 279. See also Devine, supra note 133.
301. Snyder & Stukas, supra note 257, at 287.
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laboratory setup, in which one party clearly functions as perceiver and
the other as target. 30 2 While both parties literally bring their own expectations of one another into their interaction, the more powerful of
the two tends to set the tone for the interaction, thereby functioning
as the perceiver. 30 3 Further, in the settings that raise the most concern, the roles of perceiver and target are designated consistently with
the power differential: The interviewer evaluates the interviewee's
suitability for employment, the doctor diagnoses and formulates treatment options for the patient, and the police officer assesses the sus3°4
pect's likely guilt or innocence.
In addition to structuring the interaction in a way that promotes
textbook behavioral confirmation, the power differential influences
the parties' goals for the encounter, and therefore each party's choice
of an interaction strategy.30 5 The perceiver's goals play an important
part in determining whether she gives the target opportunities to disconfirm expectancies or whether she instead boxes the target in to
behaving so as to confirm her expectations. 30 6 For example, a perceiver who seeks to intimidate the target or to establish her superior
position might treat the target in an unfriendly or contemptuous manner, thereby constraining the target's options for responding and setting off a confirmatory chain of events. 30 7 Further, the more powerful
perceiver may not be aware of her biased expectations, may not be
motivated to form an accurate impression of the target, or may even
be motivated to confirm her preformed judgment of the target. 308
These motivations can promote behavioral confirmation even in situations in which the perceiver's goal is to learn about the target for
purposes of making a decision about him, for the goal of acquiring
302. Id. at 288.
303. See id.
304. See id. at 286 (pointing out designated functions of teachers-students, employers-employees, and therapists-clients, and noting "the power differences inherent in the roles of perceiver
and target").
305. Id. at 283; Swann & Ely, supra note 294, at 1300.
306. See, e.g., John T. Copeland, Prophecies of Power: Motivational Implications of Social
Power for Behavioral Confirmation, 67 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 264 (1994) (reporting
on study finding that the relative power of perceiver affected his or her goals and choice of
interaction strategy, as well as the likelihood of behavioral confirmation).
307. See Neuberg, supra note 198, at 116 (noting that the perceiver might trigger an accommodating or deferential response from the target or limit the target's opportunities to reveal disconfirming information by asking questions that focus on the target's flaws or by cutting short the
interaction).
308. Id. at 111. See also Snyder & Haugen, supra note 241 (finding that behavioral confirmation occurred when experimenters triggered in perceivers the motivation to acquire knowledge
that enabled them to view the world as stable and predictable, but not when perceivers were
motivated to ensure a smooth and coordinated interaction by being responsive to their partners).
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knowledge is not necessarily the same as the goal of making an accurate assessment (which, as discussed above, 30 9 tends to allow for disconfirmation of expectations).31° As Mark Snyder and Julie A.
Haugen have explained and demonstrated, sometimes knowledge-

seeking perceivers strive to obtain a "stable and predictable" impression of the target, rather than an accurate one. 311 Some settings-for
example, interviewing or counseling situations or teacher-student relationships 312-might activate a perceiver's desire to get a stable and
predictable view of the target so she can perform her duties of assessment. 31 3 Further, people may sometimes simply desire "a sense that
the world is a stable and predictable place in which their beliefs, ex-

pectations, preconceptions, hunches, and stereotypes are reliable
predictors of events in their dealings with other people.

'3 14

In such

cases, the powerful perceiver tends to find her expectations confirmed, and it is not hard to see why: a person in this position will
tend to limit the amount of information that she gathers and therefore
needs to process (perhaps by asking the target biased and leading
rather than open-ended questions), 3 15 to focus on information that is

consistent with her expectations, to interpret ambiguous information
as confirming those expectations, and to elicit expectation-confirming
behavior from the target. 316 Moreover, even if the target's behavior is

ambiguous, the perceiver (and third parties) may view it as consistent
with expectations due to the general tendency of observers to inter309. See supra notes 288-291 and accompanying text.
310. See Copeland, supra note 306, at 275 (speculating that "perceivers operating with an
accuracy goal may differ from knowledge-oriented perceivers in that accuracy-oriented perceivers are fairer and more equitable in their information search ... [and] may supplement their
information search with questions they would not have otherwise asked if fairness was not important-questions that can lead to an absence of behavioral confirmation") (citations omitted).
311. See Snyder & Haugen, supra note 241, at 239 (making this point, but also noting that,
while the two motivations are "not necessarily the same," neither are the "two facets of beliefs
... necessarily mutually exclusive").

312. See id. at 241.
313. See id. As Snyder and Haugen explain:
[T]herapists and counselors need to know what to expect from their clients, typically
having to make assessments of their clients' well-being and their prognosis for improvement in treatment. Employers also seek a predictable view of job candidates, oftentimes trying to decide during the job interview what they are like and how they will
perform on the job. Similarly, teachers often are tempted to make quick judgments of
their students and get an idea of what kinds of learning curves they can expect from
them.
Id.
314. Id. at 222 (speculating on perceivers' motivations in acquiring and using social
knowledge).
315. Neuberg, supra note 290, at 375 (citing studies).
316. See Snyder & Haugen, supra note 241, at 234-36.
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pret the ambiguous behavior of another person in accordance with the
observer's expectations, 317 and the specific tendency to interpret am318
biguous behavior in conformity with racial stereotypes.
In turn, a lower status, less powerful target realistically has fewer
options in choosing an interaction strategy. Assuming he is aware of
the perceiver's expectations, 31 9 a target sometimes can disconfirm expectancies by failing or refusing to accommodate the perceiver's definition of the situation. 320 However, a target who is subordinate to the
perceiver is not likely to even try to do so,321 especially if he determines that it is not in his self-interest to respond inconsistently with
the perceiver's overtures. 322 A target may have a number of reasons
for choosing to defer to the perceiver's script. Sometimes a target
simply feels that it is not worth making the effort to challenge the
perceiver's views because the consequences of being misperceived are
trivial.323 However, in many situations involving a more powerful perceiver, the target may determine that he has little choice but to defer,
because he has too much to lose by challenging the perceiver's
script.324 Social norms generally discourage disconfirming behavior,
and a target sometimes pays a heavy social price for violating the
rules.325 Especially if the target depends upon the perceiver's goodwill in order to avoid a negative outcome, the wiser course may be
simply to take "the line of least resistance" 326 by responding in accordance with her overtures, even if it results in confirming her expectations about him. 327 A lower status target also may see an advantage to
behaving in conformity with the perceiver's expectations, because he
317. See, e.g., Mark Snyder, Motivational Foundations of Behavioral Confirmation, 25 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 67, 79 (1992).
318. See, e.g., Birt L. Duncan, DifferentialSocial Perception and Attribution of Intergroup Violence: Testing the Lower Limits of Stereotyping of Blacks, 34 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.

590 (1976); H. Andrew Sagar & Janet Ward Schofield, Racial and Behavioral Cues in Black and
White Children's Perceptions of Ambiguously Aggressive Acts, 39 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.

(1980).
319. See Snyder & Stukas, supra note 257, at 296 (noting that targets may never become
aware of perceivers' negative expectations).
320. See Snyder & Haugen, supra note 243, at 971; Swann & Ely, supra note 294, at 1288,
1298.
321. Even the mere belief that the perceiver is of higher status than he can lead a target to
behave consistently with expectations. See Neuberg, supra note 198, at 119-20.
322. See Swann & Ely, supra note 294, at 1299.
323. Neuberg, supra note 198, at 119.
324. Id.
PSYCHOL. 590

325. JONES, supra note 227, at 45.

326. Id.
327. See Miller & Turnbull, supra note 286, at 242-43.
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may anticipate being rewarded for so complying. 328 Furthermore, the

target in such a situation may not be able to avoid being perceived
consistently with the stereotype no matter how he behaves, because
his actions may be interpreted in a biased fashion by the other
anyway.

329

Other aspects of the situation may reinforce these tendencies or add
new pressures toward behavioral confirmation. Sometimes the situation simply does not present the opportunity for disconfirming behavior, because it is not the type of setting in which the target has a
330
chance to act in ways that challenge the perceiver's expectations.

Sometimes the parties lack the cognitive or behavioral resources to do
more than resort to stereotype-confirming patterns of behavior and
interpretation by default. 331 For example, the perceiver may be under
too much stress or too busy to do much more than rely on cognitive
and behavioral shortcuts. People who are aroused 332 or under greater

cognitive load 333 may rely more heavily on expectations and stereo328. For example, in studies of gender role stereotypes, female subjects presented themselves
as more traditionally "feminine" when interacting with a male job interviewer or an attractive,
"desirable" male partner whom they expected to hold a more traditional view of women. See,
e.g., Carl L. von Baeyer et al., Impression Management in the Job Interview: When the Female
Applicant Meets the Male (Chauvinist) Interviewer, 7 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 4551 (1981); Mark P. Zanna & Susan J. Pack, On the Self-Fulfilling Nature of Apparent Sex Differences in Behavior, 11 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 583-91 (1975).

329. Snyder & Stukas, supra note 257, at 281, 296; Miller & Turnbull, supra note 286, at 24547.
330. See Miller & Turnbull, supra note 286, at 243 ("A student may be motivated to resist a
teacher's unflattering perception, but unless the student has the resources to compensate for the
lack of support he or she is receiving from the teacher, behavioral confirmation may be unavoidable."); id. at 248 (pointing out that some attributes can be expressed only in specific situations
or are internal and unobservable).
331. See Neuberg, supra note 198, at 121.
332. See Hai-Sook Kim & Robert S. Baron, Exercise and the Illusory Correlation: Does
Arousal Heighten Stereotypic Processing?, 24 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 366 (1988) (re-

porting results of study in which high physiological arousal (produced through a cycling exercise
and not eliciting any significant effect on mood) increased stereotypic information processing;
speculating, at 378, that "overload, fatigue, low task confidence, intoxication, as well as conditions that make processing difficult (i.e., sensory distraction, lack of structure, or temporal constraints) all may exacerbate stereotypic bias").
333. See Snyder & Stukas, supra note 257, at 280. Cognitive busyness does not affect stereotype use in the straightforward way that many have tended to assume, however. Experiments
have shown that the effect of cognitive load on stereotyping can cut in different directions, depending on when during the encounter the perceiver labors under it. Gilbert and Hixon have
found that "the timing of the onset of busyness" makes a significant difference in the effect of
stereotyping: If the perceiver is occupied with other mental tasks when she comes upon the
target, that busyness may actually prevent her from activating stereotypes. Once the stereotype
is activated, however, cognitive busyness does tend to promote its application. Daniel T. Gilbert
& J. Gregory Hixon, The Trouble of Thinking: Activation and Application of Stereotypic Beliefs,
60 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 509 (1991).

This finding has implications for common

practices in a number of areas. For example, in medical care it calls into question the standard

1072

DEPAUL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53:1013

types. One study even found that "morning people (i.e., those who
reach their peak of cognitive functioning early in the day) are more
likely to rely on their stereotypes at night," while the opposite was the
case with "night people. ' 334 Time pressures also limit the ability and
motivation of both parties to avoid stereotype confirmation. 33 5 Under

these constraints, perceivers will find it easier to both see and treat the
target consistently with expectations, 336 and the target likewise may

find it easier to get through the interaction by complying with the per33 7
ceiver's script for their interaction.

3.

Behavioral Confirmation in Context: "Creating Suspects" 338 in
CriminalInterrogations

Behavioral confirmation of erroneous expectations can have especially dire consequences in some situations that are almost ideally
structured for such a result. One example of such a context is police
interrogations of criminal suspects, which can determine whether a
person goes free or is prosecuted, and ultimately may influence

whether he is acquitted or convicted and the severity of his sentence.
There is good reason to believe, and initial experimental evidence to

support the belief, 339 that these interactions have great potential to
produce behavioral confirmation of erroneous expectations of guilt.
An interrogation that does elicit false confirmation of guilt-particularly one that results in a false confession 3 4 0-has serious consepractice of noting the patient's race as a routine part of examination and recitation of case. See
infra notes 422, 451-452 and accompanying text.
334. Neuberg, supra note 198, at 121 (describing findings in Galen V. Bodenhausen, Stereotypes as Judgmental Heuristics: Evidence of Circadian Variations in Discrimination,1 PSYCHOL.
SCIENCE 319 (1990)).

335. See Neuberg, supra note 198, at 121.
336. Neuberg explains that "when resources are scarce," perceivers will tend to: gather less
information, and focus on gathering expectancy-consistent information; attend to and interpret
information consistently with expectations; and behave in a way that expresses their expectations
because "to monitor one's expressive behaviors and to control the leakage of sentiments is not
always a simple task." Id.
337. See id. (noting that "it is typically easier to accommodate the script of another than it is
to coax another into a script of one's own").
338. Lucy Akehurst & Aldert Vrij, Creating Suspects in Police Interviews, 29 J. APPLIED SOC.
PSYCHOL. 192 (1999).

339. See Kassin et al., supra note 235 (reporting on experimental study of behavioral confirmation of expectation of guilt in mock interrogations).
340. The frequency with which police induce false confessions is unknown. See Welsh S.
White, Miranda's Failure to Restrain Pernicious InterrogationPractices, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1211,
1229 (2001) [hereinafter White, Miranda's Failure] (noting that "[i]t remains disputed whether
the documented cases of proven or probable police-induced confessions are aberrations or the
'tip of the iceberg"') (footnote omitted). However, in recent decades "a significant number of
suspects have claimed that standard interrogation techniques have led them to give false confessions." Welsh S. White, False Confessions and the Constitution: Safeguards Against Untrustwor-

2004]

RACE AS PROXY

1073

quences for the suspect. Not only does the encounter fail to bring an
end to the criminal investigation, but the suspect's behavior tends to

be viewed as especially persuasive evidence of his guilt.34 ' Furthermore, the behavioral confirmation of erroneous expectations of guilt
would compound, and certainly would not check, the effect of racial

bias in the criminal justice system to the extent that race already acts
as a proxy for criminality in decisions that are made at various points
342
throughout the criminal justice process.

Whether or not the interrogator intends to produce false evidence
of guilt, 343 the interrogation process provides a nearly textbook examthy Confessions, 32 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 105, 108-09 & n.26 (1997) [hereinafter White, False
Confessions] (collecting examples). See, e.g., Richard A. Leo & Richard J. Ofshe, The Consequences of False Confessions: Deprivations of Liberty and Miscarriagesof Justice in the Age of
Psychological Interrogation,88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 429, 433 (1998) (reporting "a study
of sixty cases of police-induced false confessions in the post-Miranda era").
341. See infra notes 366, 369-80 and accompanying text. A false confession is particularly
harmful, because confessions are considered to be the most persuasive evidence of a suspect's
guilt. See, e.g., Leo & Ofshe, supra note 340, at 429 ("[A] confession is universally treated as
damning and compelling evidence of guilt ... A false confession is therefore an exceptionally
dangerous piece of evidence to put before anyone adjudicating a case."). Confession evidence is
so powerful because the confessor is assumed to have first-hand knowledge of the event in question and "people find it difficult to believe that anyone would confess to a crime that he or she
did not commit." Saul M. Kassin & Katherine Neumann, On the Power of Confession Evidence:
An Experimental Test of the Fundamental Difference Hypothesis, 21 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 469,
481-82 (1997) (confirming through experimental studies that confessions are "devastating to a
defendant," and "uniquely potent").
342. The literature on racial bias in the criminal justice system is voluminous, and a single
footnote cannot do it justice. For a sampling of this literature, see generally COLE, supra note 9;
Sheri L. Johnson, Black Innocence and the White Jury, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1611 (1985); KENNEDY,
supra note 10; RUSSELL, supra note 9; and sources cited supra notes 8-9, 187-189, 203.
343. The standard interrogation manual, FRED E. INBAU ET AL., CRIMINAL INTERROGATION
AND CONFESSIONS (4th ed. 2001), explicitly condemns such an approach. See id. at xii ("[W]e are
opposed to the use of any interrogation tactic or technique that is apt to make an innocent
person confess."). See also id. at 8 ("The purpose of an interrogation is to learn the truth.").
Accordingly, the manual distinguishes between the "interview," which is nonaccusatory and designed to provide an opportunity for the investigator to assess the suspect's credibility and likelihood of guilt, and the subsequent "interrogation," which is accusatory and to be conducted "only
when the investigator is reasonably certain of the suspect's guilt." Id. at 5-9.
The intent to obtain a false confession is not necessary for behavioral confirmation to occur, or
even a false confession to be elicited, if the interrogator believes the suspect is guilty. As Ofshe
and Leo have stated:
Although there is little evidence that American police intend to extract confessions
from the innocent, they too frequently become so zealously committed to a preconceived belief in a suspect's guilt or so reliant on their interrogation methods that they
mistakenly extract an uncorroborated, inconsistent, and manifestly untrue confession.
Too often interrogations appear to give no thought to the possibility that the confession
they have extracted could be false.
Richard J. Ofshe & Richard A. Leo, The Social Psychology of Police Interrogation: The Theory
and Classification of True and False Confessions, 16 STUDIES IN L., POLITICS & SOC'Y 189, 193
(1997).
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pie of an interaction that is set up to allow such a result. First, the
interrogator enters the interaction with a strong expectation-"predisposed and reasonably certain of the suspect's guilt" 344-because standard practice 345 is to interrogate only those suspects whom
investigators have determined are likely to be guilty based upon a preliminary interview. 346 The strength with which this belief is held may

not be warranted, however. The determination of guilt often is based
on an officer's assessment that the suspect is lying when he denies the
allegations against him, 347 and may not be supported by external evidence. 348 Moreover, studies have shown that "even experienced
detectives" may not achieve better than "chance-level" accuracy in
distinguishing between true and false denials of guilt, although they
349
may be quite confident in their judgments.
Second, the interrogation of a criminal suspect may be the epitome

of the goal-driven social interaction, for the primary objective of an
interrogator typically is to obtain a confession, 350 and interrogators
344. Kassin et al., supra note 235, at 189.
345. The Inbau Manual, see supra note 343, is the most influential police interrogation manual
in the United States and throughout the world. See, e.g., WELSH S. WHITE, MIRANDA'S WANING
PROTECTIONS: POLICE INTERROGATION PRACTICES AFTER DICKERSON 25 (2001) ("Of all the
interrogation manuals, the Inbau Manual, as it is commonly known, has been the most influential[,] ... has played a major role in shaping modern interrogation practices[,J ... [and] [o]ver the
past four decades has remained the predominant interrogation manual, exerting great influence
not only in this country but throughout the world."). Therefore, descriptions of standard interrogation practice commonly rely on the recommendations of the Inbau Manual. See, e.g., Kassin et
al., supra note 235, at 188; WHITE, supra, at ch. 3 (entitled "The Evolution of Modern Police
Interrogation Tactics").
346. See INBAU ET AL., supra note 343, at 8 ("An interrogation is conducted only when the
investigator is reasonably certain of the suspect's guilt.").
347. See Kassin et al., supra note 235, at 188 (noting that police officers claim to "initiate
interrogation only after an initial interview during which time they analyze the suspect's verbal
and nonverbal behavior to determine that he or she is deceptive and, hence guilty").
348. See id.
349. Kassin et al., supra note 235, at 188-89 (citing studies); id. at 199 ("Thus, the pivotal
decision to interrogate a suspect is based on prejudgments of guilt confidently made but frequently in error"). See also Christian A. Meissner & Saul M. Kassin, "He's Guilty!": Investigator Bias in Judgments of Truth and Deception, 26 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 469 (2002) (reporting on
study that found evidence that training in interviewing and interrogation increases the likelihood
of false positives in judgments of deception).
350. While the interrogator's explicit purpose may be to get a truthful statement, see INBAU
ET AL., supra note 343, at 8 (stating that this is the purpose of an interrogation), if she believes
that the suspect is guilty the interrogator will view the interrogation as successful if it results in a
confession. See, e.g., Kassin et al., supra note 235, at 189 ("[A]n interrogation is a theory-driven
social interaction led by an authority figure who holds a strong a priori belief about the target
and who measures success by his or her ability to extract an admission from that target."); Ofshe
& Leo, supra note 343, at 195 ("Accusatory interrogation (as distinct from interviewing) ... has
only one goal: to obtain a confession from whomever is selected for processing."); WHITE, supra
note 345, at 26 ("[T]he Inbau Manual has always been primarily directed toward obtaining truthful confessions from guilty suspects."). But see INBAU ET AL., supra note 343, at 8 (stating that
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may use a number of strategies to achieve that goal (and, by defini-

tion, to deny the suspect the opportunity to disconfirm the expectation
of guilt). 35 1 The interrogator uses this goal to set the tone of the interaction, as the standard interrogation manual advises interrogators to

"convince the suspect that [s]he has no doubt as to the suspect's
guilt. ' 352 Techniques designed to prod the suspect toward confessing
include suggesting that forensic evidence of his guilt exists when in
fact none has been found, 353 pretending to sympathize with the sus-

pect, perhaps by minimizing the "moral seriousness" of the offense or
suggesting a more palatable motivation for the crime than the one that
is presumed. 354 Interrogators are advised to "communicate[ ] to the

suspect the futility of maintaining his innocence"35 5 and to resist the
356
suspect's attempts to deny his guilt.

Moreover, the social structure of the interrogation is ideal for behavioral confirmation of the interrogator's expectations, because she
is both the perceiver and the more powerful of the two parties. Not
357
only does her role require her to question and evaluate the suspect,
but she also has the ability to control both the course of the interroga-

tion itself 358 and the fate of the suspect 359-and

may play up those

abilities whenever it seems strategically expedient to do so. 36 0 The
the idea that "the purpose of an interrogation is to elicit a confession" is "a common
misperception").
351. See generally Kassin et al., supra note 235, at 188; Ofshe & Leo, supra note 343, at 197206; WHITE, supra note 345, at 26-36.
352. WHITE, supra note 345, at 27 (citing INBAU ET AL., CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CON-

FESSIONS 81-82 (earlier edition of the Inbau Manual)).
353. See WHITE, supra note 345, at 28-29.
354. See id. at 28.
355. Id. See also Ofshe & Leo, supra note 343, at 197.
356. Interrogators may, in fact, become so fixated on obtaining a confession that they ignore
disconfirming evidence that the suspect offers. See Ofshe & Leo, supra note 343, at 197 (noting
that interrogator may become "insensitive to and ignore the evidence the suspect offers to support his protestations of innocence" because the interrogator is focused on moving the suspect
closer to giving a confession).
357. Such a role designates the questioner as the more powerful party to the interaction. See
supra note 304 and accompanying text.
358. See, e.g., WHITE, supra note 345, at 27 (noting that interrogators are trained to interrogate the suspect "under circumstances where [they are] in complete control of the situation").
359. See Ofshe & Leo, supra note 343, at 200 (noting that "the interrogator wields the power
of the state to take the suspect into custody, detain him against his will, and subject him to a trial
that can lead to severe punishment").
360. See Ofshe & Leo, supra note 343, at 200 (noting that "[tihe initial structure of an interrogation (both as to its physical characteristics and psychological aspects) is designed . . . to create
the impression that the interrogator has the power to radically alter the suspect's life"); id. at
204-05 (describing ways in which interrogator might lead suspect to believe that interrogator will
act to procure a benefit for the suspect if he confesses); WHITE, supra note 345, at 27 (summarizing Inbau Manual's advice to the interrogator to conduct the interrogation in private; "emphasize his complete control of the situation [by] requir[ing] the suspect to wait alone in the
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suspect, on the other hand, may tend to be deferential and accommodating, especially if he is innocent and believes that he should continue

responding to questions in order to clear up the interrogator's mistaken belief that he is guilty. 36 1 However, because she has been
trained to ignore the suspect's protestations, to maintain her attitude
of certainty, and to systematically break down the suspect's resistance,
the interrogator is not likely to relent in pursuing a confession. Instead, she is likely to continue to try to convince the overborne sus362
pect that it is in his best interest to confess.
As Richard J. Ofshe and Richard A. Leo have explained, even an
innocent suspect may end up believing that he is better off confessing
if the interrogator is successful at creating the impression that he has
little chance of "surviving police questioning without being arrested
and punished.

' 36 3

Even if the suspect continues to maintain his inno-

cence, moreover, the interrogator may continue to believe he is guilty,
because she may interpret his denials as being deceptive or defensive. 364 However, as Welsh S. White has pointed out, although interinterrogation room for a brief period before meeting with him"; "invade the suspect's body
space, direct him to be seated if he attempts to stand, and prohibit him from smoking or fidgeting"). Welsh S. White has pointed out, moreover, that the interrogator's assertion of dominance
may discourage the suspect from invoking his rights, under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1966), to remain silent or to have an attorney present. See White, Miranda's Failure,supra note
340, at 1215 (stating that "the practices employed by seasoned interrogators will often have the
effect of undermining a suspect's ability or inclination to assert rights"; explaining that interrogators may control pace and substance of discussion to provide suspect with "no practical opportunity" to assert rights or may establish relationship with suspect that suspect is reluctant to
disrupt by asserting his rights).
361. See Ofshe & Leo, supra note 343, at 199-200. The suspect may even synchronize his
physical movements with those of the interrogator, perhaps increasing his movement in the presence of a "lively" interrogator. Ironically, such an increase in movement tends to be viewed as
deceptive or "guilty" behavior. See Akehurst & Vrij, supra note 338 (reporting on study finding
that suspects engaged in "interactional synchrony" with police interviewers, becoming more
"lively" when interviewed by a lively officer, and that suspects interviewed by a lively officer
were judged as less credible than those interviewed by a nonlively officer).
362. See generally Ofshe & Leo, supra note 343, at 204-07 (describing incentives such as
"moral or self-image benefits," "different sentencing outcomes," or "systemic benefits," including the interrogator's "help" (with the offer left "deliberately vague")); WHITE, supra note 345,
at 32-33 (discussing difficulty in drawing the line between permissible and impermissible incentives to confess).
363. Ofshe & Leo, supra note 343, at 207. Ofshe and Leo explain that both guilty and innocent suspects may come to view confessing as a rational choice, because interrogators are trained
to manipulate a suspect's perception of his situation, convincing him "either that he has been
caught (if he is guilty) or that his situation is hopeless (if he is innocent), that further denial is
pointless and that it is in his self-interest to confess." Id. at 194.
364. See Kassin et al., supra note 235, at 194, 200, 201 (reporting that interrogators in study
could not distinguish between truth and deception, did not stop to re-evaluate their expectations
of guilt when faced with "innocent suspects who issued plausible denials," and "interpreted the
denials as proof of a guilty person's resistance-and redoubled their efforts to elicit a confes-
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rogators may believe that they can distinguish between truthful and
deceptive suspects, few people-including law enforcement officersare able to do so. 365 Moreover, some supposed indications of decep-

tion are equally consistent with the anxiety that an innocent suspect
would display because he is "overwhelmed by the dynamics of the
'3 66
interrogation process.
A recent experimental study by Saul M. Kassin and his colleagues

found that, when interrogators employed standard practices, the po367
tential for confirmation of erroneous expectations of guilt was high.

Regardless of the guilt or innocence of the suspects they questioned,
interrogators who entered the interrogation believing that most suspects were guilty chose to ask more guilt-presumptive questions, used

more interrogation techniques, and more frequently perceived suspects as being guilty than did interrogators who believed that most
suspects were innocent. 368 Regardless of their actual guilt or innocence, moreover, suspects who were expected to be guilty behaved

consistently with expectations, for they became "noticeably more defensive. ' '369 Further-and, as the researchers noted, "paradoxical[ly]"
and "disturbing[ly]" 37 0-interrogators with an expectation of guilt exerted the most pressure to confess on suspects who were actually innocent and therefore provided plausible accounts of their activities
during the relevant time period. 37 1 Indeed, the innocent suspects
[b]rought out the worst in the guilt-presumptive interrogators ....
Interrogators who approached the task with a guilty base-rate expectation never stopped to reevaluate this belief-even when
paired with innocent suspects who issued plausible denials. Rather,
sion"; and speculating that the study's "results may underestimate the risks incurred in criminal
justice settings in which police are trained to have confidence, unfounded as it is, in their ability
to divine guilt form a suspect's interview behavior" and other contextual factors aggravate guiltconfirmation biases).
365. See WHITE, supra note 345, at 30-32 (discussing difficulty of distinguishing between truthful and deceptive denials of guilt and empirical evidence showing that, "in most instances, people
are not able to detect deception from behavioral clues, and that, with rare exceptions, law enforcement officers have no more skill than others in this area"). See also supra note 349.
366. WHITE, supra note 345, at 31.
367. Kassin et al., supra note 235.
368. Id. at 193-94 (describing results of study of behavioral confirmation of expectations of
guilt in mock interrogations). In the Kassin study, subjects' expectations of guilt were manipulated through the experimenters's telling them either that 80% of the suspects in the study had
actually committed the crime or that only 20% had. Id. at 191.
369. Id. at 199.
370. Id.
371. Id. at 194, 197, 199 (reporting that interrogators themselves, suspects, and third-party
observers all viewed interrogators' behavior this way). Interrogators also "used more interrogation techniques overall" when interviewing innocent suspects. Kassin et al., supra note 235, at
194.
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it appears that they interpreted the denials as proof of a guilty person's resistance-and
redoubled their efforts to elicit a
372
confession.

Finally, neither interrogators nor third-party observers were able to
distinguish between truthful (innocent) and deceptive (guilty) suspects: 373 "In short, a presumption of guilt triggered aggressive interrogations, which constrained the behavior of suspects and led others to
infer their guilt-thus confirming the initial presumption" 3 74-regardless of whether that presumption was correct.
The researchers pointed out that the observers' inability to determine that an innocent suspect was telling the truth has the "most devastating" 375 implications. First, the observers were able to distinguish
between interrogators with guilty and innocent expectations, and perceived the former as putting more pressure on suspects and working
harder to get a confession. 376 Second, observers considered the innocent suspects' denials to be more plausible than those of the guilty
suspects. 377 Nevertheless, observers still were more likely to consider
a suspect's behavior defensive and judge him to be guilty if the interrogator expected him to be guilty. 378 In other words, despite being
aware of the situational constraints under which the suspects labored,
observers failed to consider how those constraints might have influenced the suspects' behavior and ultimately judged them in accordance with the presumptions of the interrogator. 379 The observers
thus "committed the fundamental attribution error," 380 by failing to
correct the impressions they drew from the suspect's behavior to account for the chain of events set in motion by the interrogator's initial
presumption of guilt.
Nor are existing legal controls likely to account for the behavioral
confirmation process through which erroneous expectations can con372. Id. at 200.
373. See id. at 194 (reporting that only 30% of interrogators judged their suspects guilty, that
the results were "marginally consistent with the hypothesis that preinterrogation expectations
would bias judgments," and that actual guilt did not affect interrogators' ultimate judgments of
guilt or innocence); id. at 198 (reporting that observers (who were not informed of the interrogators' expectations or the suspects' guilt or innocence, see id. at 196) viewed suspects in the
guilty expectations condition as more defensive than those in the innocent expectations condition, but that "[n]o differences emerged as a function of the suspect's actual guilt or innocence").
374. Kassin et al., supra note 235, at 199.
375. Id. at 200.
376. See id. at 197, 200.
377. See id. at 198, 200.
378. See id.
379. See id. at 199.
380. Kassin et al., supra note 235, at 199. For discussion of the fundamental attribution error,
see supra notes 39-52 and accompanying text.

2004]

RACE AS PROXY

1079

tribute to legal determinations of guilt. The standard psychological
interrogation techniques described above are not, generally speaking,
unlawful, 38 1 so law enforcement agencies have no incentive not to employ them and are unlikely to face sanctions (such as the inadmissibility of the statement obtained) if they do. 382 Guilt-consistent responses
of suspects in such interrogations-perhaps even including false confessions-are likely to be taken by law enforcement officers at face
value, 38 3 and therefore will promote the decision to prosecute and
perhaps be used to press the suspect for a guilty plea. If the case goes
to trial and the defendant's statement is admitted into evidence, Kassin's study suggests that jurors are unlikely to factor into their assessments of guilt the extent to which the suspect's apparently guilty
behavior might have been influenced by the conditions of the interrogation.38 4 This may be the case even if the court instructs the jury to
consider the conditions of the interrogation in evaluating the defendant's statement. 38 5 Furthermore, the mock juror study discussed
above in subpart II(B) suggests that jurors may be even less willing or
able to discount inculpatory but potentially faulty evidence when the
381. See generally White, Miranda's Failure, supra note 340, at 1217-21 (explaining that
neither Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1996), nor the due process voluntariness test-two
standards that courts have conflated, although they are theoretically distinct-prohibits standard
psychological interrogation practices, even some that are quite "pernicious").
382. See also id. at 1218-19 (discussing law enforcement's inclination to err on side of enforcement interests when techniques in question are not expressly prohibited).
383. Further, the suspect's behavior may be read as consistent with guilt even if it is ambiguous or includes plausible denials of guilt. See supra notes 369-380 and accompanying text.
384. For discussion of observers' tendency to commit the fundamental attribution error and,
therefore, to fail to take into account the interrogator's behavior in assessing the suspect's response, see supra notes 375-380 and accompanying text.
385. The court might, for example, instruct the jury to consider, in determining how much
weight to give the defendant's statement, how the defendant was treated while he was under
interrogation or the circumstances under which the defendant's statement was made. See, e.g.,
KEVIN F. O'MALLEY ET AL., FEDERAL JURY PRAcrICE AND INSTRUCTIONS § 14.03 (5th ed.
2000) (collecting federal jury instructions to this effect). Jurors may be unable to disregard a
statement once they have heard it, however-even if they are told to take into account the
circumstances under which it was obtained or to disregard it altogether. In another experimental
study, Kassin and Sukel found that "[t]he mere presence of a confession was ... sufficient to turn
acquittal into conviction, irrespective of the contexts in which it was elicited and presented."
Saul M. Kassin & Holly Sukel, Coerced Confessions and the Jury: An Experimental Test of the
"Harmless Error" Rule, 21 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 27, 42 (1997). Jurors who were exposed to a
defendant's confession "did not sufficiently discount" the confession in reaching their verdicts,
"even when they saw the confession as coerced, even when the judge ruled the confession inadmissible, and even when participants said that it did not influence their decision-making." Id.
See also Saul M. Kassin & Lawrence S. Wrightsman, PriorConfessions and Mock Juror Verdicts,
10 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 133 (1980) (finding that jurors failed to discount confessions obtained
through promises of leniency, although they did discount confessions obtained through threats of
harm or punishment).
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suspect is not white. 38 6 The "danger[ ] of presuming guilt," 3 87-especially for suspects of color-is that, even in the absence of an officer's
intent to convict an innocent person, an erroneous expectation of guilt
sometimes both creates its own confirmation and conceals its effect in
producing that confirmation, leaving only objective "evidence" on
which to base final judgment.

IV.

RACE AS PROXY IN MEDICAL CARE

The foregoing sections support legal scholars' arguments that individual adjudication under the predominant legal model is inadequate
to address the most prevalent forms of racial bias. 388 In particular,
these sections have shown the difficulty of identifying cases in which
racially disparate treatment has occurred-not to speak of determining whether it was intended-becausethe same situations that tend to
promote discriminatory behavior also tend to obscure it. These points
have their most important implications in contexts that are characterized by both normative ambiguity and conditions that promote rather
than disrupt the behavioral confirmation of expectations. The worst
such contexts would be settings in which decision making is complex
and subjective (and, accordingly, in which decisionmakers tend to be
granted a great deal of discretion and deference), race-based expectations are institutionally accepted and reinforced, and decisionmakers
have greater power than the subjects of their decisions but lack the
incentive or resources to disrupt the influence of erroneous expectations on their behavior and decisions.
Medical care is one context that is characterized by all of these factors and in which the potential for racial bias has received great attention recently. We know that substantial race-based disparities in
health care status and medical treatment exist because they have been
documented. 389 On the other hand, and as the following sections will
discuss, pinpointing the cause, or even identifying the existence, of racial bias in an individual case is a more complex and controversial
proposition. One generalization that can be asserted with some confidence, however, is that it is not so much the "person" (that is, the
medical decisionmaker) as it is the situation that produces the large
share of racial disparities in medical care. As medical professionals,
social scientists, and legal scholars have shown, the medical decision
386. See supra notes 162-168 and accompanying text.
387. Kassin et al., supra note 235, at 187.
388. See supra notes 15-26 and accompanying text, discussing criticisms of the intentional discrimination model.
389. See infra subpart IV(A).
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making context is shaped by conditions that promote racial bias, in-

cluding institutional knowledge, practices, and constraints that channel medical decisionmakers to think in terms of race and lead patients,
sometimes, to respond accordingly.

After briefly reviewing the institutional and cognitive accounts of
how racial bias infects medical decision making, this section supple-

ments those accounts by describing the ways in which social interaction in clinical encounters can interact with and exacerbate those
influences.
A.

Racial Disparitiesin Medical Outcomes and Treatment

Recent statistics document significant differences in mortality and
health status between blacks and whites. 390 Those numbers show, for
example, that blacks have a shorter life expectancy and higher death
rate, 391 higher rate of infant mortality, 392 and higher prevalence of

many diseases than whites. 393 Moreover, numerous studies indicate
that patients from racial and ethnic minority groups receive an inferior level of medical care compared to white patients. 3 94 For example,
African-American patients tend to undergo fewer expensive or ad390. Because most of the empirical studies have focused on disparities between blacks and
whites, see Bowser, supra note 5, at 80 n.4, and because of the unique history of African-Americans and medicine in this country, see, e.g., infra subpart IV(B), this discussion focuses on differences between the health outcomes and medical treatment of blacks and whites. Some of the
points made in this section, however, undoubtedly apply to other social groups. See, e.g., discussion infra note 443.
391. See, e.g., W. MICHAEL BYRD & LYNDA A. CLAYTON, AN AMERICAN HEALTH DILEMMA:
A MEDICAL HISTORY OF AFRICAN AMERICANS AND THE PROBLEM OF RACE 29 (2000) (reporting, based on data through the early 1990s, that the black life expectancy was 69.2 years, compared to 76 years for whites, and that the "Black death rate of 783.1/10' is 1.6 x the White rate").
392. See id. (reporting that "Black IMR of 17.7 per 1000 live births is 2.2 x the White rate").
393. See id. at 31-33 (reporting black-white comparisons of prevalence of several diseases).
394. While these differences may take the form of "more" or "less" care for blacks as compared with whites, the real issue is that the disparities suggest that "minorities may have health
care services poorly matched to their needs." INST. OF MED., UNEQUAL TREATMENT: CONFRONTING RACIAL AND ETHNIC DISPARITIES IN HEALTH CARE 176 (2002) (emphasis added).
The literature on racial disparities in medical care is large, and I offer in the text just few of the
many examples that have been found. For fuller discussion and more detailed examination of
the empirical evidence of racial disparities in health care, see, for example, Bowser, supra note 5,
at 83-91 (discussing studies providing empirical evidence of racial discrimination in medical
treatment); Mary Crossley, Infected Judgment: Legal Responses to Physician Bias, 48 VILL. L.
REV. 195, 201-17 (2003) (discussing difficulty in isolating relationship between patient characteristics such as race and differences in medical treatment and studies that provide evidence of bias
based on race); INST. OF MED., supra, at app. B (summarizing selected literature documenting
racial and ethnic disparities in health care); Barbara A. Noah, Racial Disparitiesin the Delivery
of Health Care, 35 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 135, 138-56 (1998) (discussing studies finding racial disparities in the delivery of health care); Michael S. Shin, Redressing Wounds: Finding a Legal
Framework To Remedy Racial Disparitiesin Medical Care, 90 CAL. L. REV. 2047, 2054-58 (2002)
(discussing studies finding racial differences in medical treatment); and Sidney D. Watson, Race,
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vanced medical procedures 395 and to receive a lower level of pain relief than whites, 396 while also being subjected more frequently to
medical hardships, such as amputations. 397 In addition, black patients
with psychiatric disorders often are given more severe diagnoses and

prescribed more restrictive treatment than white patients exhibiting
similar symptoms, or, alternatively, are not treated for their mental
illnesses because they are misdiagnosed as having substance abuse
problems.

398

Many experts believe that at least part of this disparity can be attributed to racial bias in the delivery of medical care. For example, in
its 2002 report, Unequal Treatment: Confronting Racial and Ethnic
Disparities in Health Care, the Institute of Medicine concluded that

"[b]ias, stereotyping, prejudice, and clinical uncertainty on the part of
health care providers may contribute to racial and ethnic disparities in
healthcare" and called for "greater understanding" of and research
into "the prevalence and influence of these processes. ' 399 Other

prominent physicians and organizations have expressed similar concerns. 4°° Some commentators, on the other hand, have asserted that
Ethnicity and Quality of Care: Inequalities and Incentives, 27 AM. J.L. & MED. 203, 205-09
(2001) (discussing studies finding racial differences in health outcomes, resources, and care).
395. See, e.g., Kevin A. Schulman et al., The Effect of Race and Sex on Physicians' Recommendations for Cardiac Catheterization,340 NEW ENG. J. MED. 618 (1999).

396. See, e.g., Roberto Bernabei et al., Management of Pain in Elderly Patients with Cancer,
279 JAMA 1877 (1998); Knox H. Todd et al., Ethnicity and Analgesic Practice, 35 ANNALS
EMERGENCY MED. 11 (2000). See also Carmen R. Green et al., The Unequal Burden of Pain:
Confronting Racialand Ethinic Disparitiesin Pain, 4 PAIN MED. 277 (2003) (reviewing literature
on racial and ethnic disparities in pain care across different types of pain and settings, as well as
literature on patient, health care provider, and heath care system factors that contribute to those
disparities); Knox H. Todd et al., Ethnicity as a Risk Factorfor Inadequate Emergency Department Analgesia, 269 JAMA 1537 (1993) (reporting differences in Hispanic patients and similarly
situated non-Hispanic white patients' receipt of pain medication).
397. See, e.g., Edward Guadagnoli et al., The Influence of Race on the Use of Surgical Procedures for Treatment of PeripheralVascular Disease of the Lower Extremities, 130 ARCH. SURGERY 381 (1995).

398. Mental health diagnosis and treatment decisions may be even more likely to reflect the
influence of racial bias than other medical decisions, because the kinds of judgments that must
be made can implicate a wide range of racial stereotypes (including the stereotypes of blacks as
aggressive or violent, as less complex intellectually or psychologically, or as more likely to engage in substance abuse than whites) and because mental health professionals may feel less empathy or optimism for black patients. See generally Erica Goode, DisparitiesSeen in Mental Care
for Minorities, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 2001, at Al; Lawson et al., supra note 6; Pavkov et al., supra
note 6; Steven P. Segal et al., Race, Quality of Care,and Antipsychotic PrescribingPracticesin
Psychiatric Emergency Services, 47 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 282 (1996); Jay C. Wade, Institutional
Racism: An Analysis of the Mental Health System, 63 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 536 (1993);
Whaley, supra note 7.
399. INST. OF MED., supra note 394, at 140.

400. See, e.g., Council on Ethical & Judicial Affairs of the Am. Med. Ass'n, Black-White Disparities in Health Care, 263 JAMA 2344, 2346 (1990) (noting the possibility that disparities in
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the focus on physician bias is itself "divisive" and "worrisome, ' 40 1 or
that more important explanations for racial disparities lie elsewhere,

such as in differential resources and access to health care 40 2 or differ40 3
ential patient preferences.
Undoubtedly, a complicated set of factors play a role in producing
disparities in health care and outcomes. 40 4 Disparities in access and

resources alone do not account for the documented inequalities in
health status, however, for racially disparate outcomes persist even
studies control for access to health care and socioeconomic stawhen
tus. 40 5 Nor can an explanation based in patient preferences be viewed
as negating that of racial bias in treatment. Proponents of the "patient
preference" explanation suggest that patients' own cultural preferences play a role in health disparities, for some members of groups
receiving inferior care may prefer the types of treatment they receive. 40 6 To be sure, patients' preferences generally should be taken

into account in prescribing treatment, 40 7 and patients may decline to
submit to particular interventions for a range of reasons, such as cultural beliefs favoring nontraditional treatment or individual aversion

to risky or invasive procedures. Yet patient preference cannot be considered a sound alternative explanation for racial disparities, because it

ignores the potential for racial bias on the part of the physician to
treatment decisions reflect subconscious bias and describing it as "a serious and troubling problem"); Editorial, Racial Disparitiesin Medical Care, 344 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1471 (2001) (noting
potential for undetected racial bias in medical decision making).
401. SALLY SATEL, How POLITICAL CORRECTNESS IS CORRUPTING MEDICINE 5 (2000).
402. See, e.g., Ana I. Balsa et al., Clinical Uncertainty and HealthcareDisparities, 29 AM. J.L.
& MED. 203, 217 (2003) ("Whether or not a patient has medical coverage, it should be stressed,
is a much more powerful determinant of the healthcare she receives than is her race or ethnicity."); M. Gregg Bloche, Race and Discretion in American Medicine, 1 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y,
L. & ETHICS 95, 97-99 (2001) (arguing that greater political attention should be focused on
socio-economic inequalities that lead to racial gaps in health status).
403. See SATEL, supra note 401, at 166-70. See also Bloche, supra note 402, at 105 (noting and
refuting this argument, characterizing it as a "reductionistic account"); Bowser, supra note 5, at
92-95 (citing studies in which this explanation is offered for racial differences in treatment, and
refuting that claim).
404. See Bloche, supra note 402, at 96-97.
405. See, e.g., INST. OF MED., supra note 394, at 127 ("When differences in treatment attributable to insurance, access to care, health status, and other factors are eliminated, however, racial
and ethnic health care disparities still remain."); Watson, supra note 394, at 208-09 (stating that
race-based treatment differences cannot be attributed to other factors such as "biology, age,
gender, clinical condition, severity of disease," insurance status or income, and citing studies).
For a review of such studies, see INST. OF MED., supra note 394, at 38 (summarizing studies from
peer-reviewed journals within the ten years prior to publication of the report "that assess racial
and ethnic variation in health care while controlling for differences in access to healthcare ...
and/or socioeconomic status," among other criteria); id. at app. B.
406. See SATEL, supra note 401, at 166.
407. See Bloche, supra note 402, at 103 (discussing the ethical ideal of patient autonomy).
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influence the patient's view of his or her choices.40 8 (In other words,
and as will be examined further below, 40 9 differential patient preferences may in some cases constitute another example of a self-fulfilling
prophecy that provides false confirmation of the expectation of
difference.)
Further, some patient "preferences" are themselves a product of
race discrimination.4 1 0 They may, for example, be a reaction to the
patient's experience or expectation of being treated poorly within a
biased system and reflect the patient's mistrust of health care professionals.4 11 Their awareness of the history of racial discrimination in
medicine-including medical experimentation and other discriminatory practices 412-may lead black patients to fear abuse or to feel an
aversion toward aggressive treatment.' 13 Differential preferences also
may mirror racial disparities in treatment. Some studies have traced
differential preferences to differences in patterns of referral for treatment or to perceived chances of positive outcome. For example, black
patients sometimes are not referred as frequently as whites for advanced procedures or are referred at a later point in their illness, when
the suggested procedure is less likely to be helpful.4 14 Other studies
have found that patients' resistance to a proposed treatment sometimes is based in a lack of familiarity with procedures that may be
related to race. That is, patients are disinclined to agree to procedures
that have not been explained to them, and sometimes patients of color
408. Bloche, supra note 402, at 105.
409. See infra notes 511-512 and accompanying text.
410. See Bowser, supra note 5, at 94-95 (explaining apparent patient preferences as being "a
product of racial disparities in medical treatment" rather than an explanation for them);
Crossley, supra note 394, at 222-23 (similar).
411. See, e.g., Bloche, supra note 402, at 105.
412. For a comprehensive discussion of the historical abuses and contemporary disparities
that have engendered African Americans' fear and distrust of the American health system, see
Vernellia R. Randall, Slavery, Segregation and Racism: Trusting the Health Care System Ain't
Always Easy! An African American Perspective on Bioethics, 15 ST. Louis U. PuB. L. REV. 191
(1996). See also infra notes 427-430 and accompanying text.
413. As Crossley explains, this cycle may be self-perpetuating:
[T]he history of racial abuses in American medicine may have had the effect of putting
into motion a vicious cycle: The history of discrimination causes blacks, as a group, to
distrust white doctors; because blacks distrust doctors, they are generally more likely to
decline aggressive or risky medical treatment; since blacks as a group are more likely to
decline aggressive treatments, doctors (employing stereotypes) assume that individual
black patients will prefer less aggressive treatment; and because doctors make this assumption, they are less likely to offer aggressive treatment to their black patients.
Crossley, supra note 394, at 222.
414. See Bowser, supra note 5, at 93-94 (providing examples).
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do not receive the relevant information. 41 5 Alternatively, resistance

to a course of treatment may reflect patients' belief that the suggested
procedures tend to result in greater complications for patients in com416
munities that receive a lower level of care.
Moreover, to assert that racial bias influences the delivery of health

care is not to suggest that individual medical professionals intentionally deliver inferior care to people of color.4 17 Indeed, those who cite
bias as a cause of disparate outcomes have been careful to explain that

inequities in health care cannot, for the most part, be attributed to
individual, ill-intentioned "perpetrators" and can occur despite individual practitioners' good intentions. 4 18 In the health care context, no
less than in other areas of life, racial discrimination can best be understood as a product of the "symbiotic relationship ' 41 9 among a number

of forces. The medical context is characterized by factors that both
promote and obscure the influence of racial bias, such that "racial
profiling" 420 can occur "unreflectively, even unconsciously, as a matter
of routine.
B.

'42 1

Channeling Racially Disparate Care: Institutional and Cognitive
Influences on Medical Decision Making

Medical institutions themselves actually reward and perpetuate
race-based diagnosis and treatment when they transmit and sustain
415. See, e.g., Jeff Whittle et al., Do Patient Preferences Contribute to Racial Differences in
CardiovascularUse?, 12 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 267, 271 (1997) (reporting on study finding that
patients' level of familiarity with coronary revascularization procedures was the most important
predictor of racial differences in patients' attitudes toward the procedures).
416. Thus, as Dr. Jeffrey N. Katz has noted, "patient 'preference' for less intensive treatment
may in fact represent resignation to the perceived status quo-that interventions are unavailable, unaffordable, ineffective, or unduly risky-even if those perceptions are not accurate." Jeffrey N. Katz, Commentary, Patient Preferences and Health Disparities, 286 JAMA 1507-08
(2001). See also Balsa et al., supra note 402, at 213 (pointing out that "different behaviors by
members of different racial and ethnic groups need not stem from different underlying 'preferences' about healthcare, but simply from different perceptions of the costs and benefits of participation in the healthcare system").
417. While some individual practitioners may do so, intentional discrimination is not thought
to be a significant explanation for racial disparities in health care. See, e.g., INST. OF MED., supra
note 394, at 166 (noting lack of evidence "that any significant proportion of healthcare professionals in the United States harbors overtly prejudicial attitudes"); Noah, supra note 394, at 165
("No matter how compelling the evidence of racial inequities in the health care context, nothing
convincingly suggests a pattern of widespread intentional discrimination.").
418. See, e.g., Bloche, supra note 402, at 98; Crossley, supra note 394, at 218. See also Ana I.
Balsa & Thomas G. McGuire, Prejudice, Clinical Uncertainty and Stereotyping as Sources of
Health Disparities,22 J. HEALTH ECON. 89, 111 (2003) (analyzing, through economic models,
explanations for race-based healthcare disparities other than provider prejudice).
419. Bowser, supra note 5, at 97.
420. Id. at 115-24 (discussing use of racial profiles in medical decision making).
421. Bloche, supra note 402, at 121.
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the view that race is an important, "natural," scientific category, and
therefore a relevant factor in health care through a number of standard practices. For example, a doctor presenting a case to colleagues

is expected to identify the patient's race and will be questioned for
failing to do So. 4 2 2 This practice, along with "a mixed bag of notions,
views and attitudes" 4 23 about correlations between race and disease,

are part of the "silent curriculum" that is transmitted from each generation of practitioners to the next, 424 and contributes to a culture in
which thinking about patients in terms of race has become both ex' 425
pected and invisible-simply "the way that it is done.
In recent law review articles, Ren6 Bowser has shown that the idea

that race is relevant was created, and continues to be developed and
transmitted, through medical research that uses race as a variable,
linking race to biological difference and perpetuating the notion that

biological inferiority, rather than other factors such as differences in
resources or care, accounts for the inferior health outcomes of
blacks. 426 The tradition of racialized medical research had shameful

origins, having begun with an agenda to justify slavery4 27 and having
422. See Bowser, supra note 5, at 119; Steven H. Caldwell & Rebecca Popenoe, Perceptions
and Misperceptions of Skin Color, 122 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 614 (1995); Thomas Finacune &
Joseph A. Carnese, Racial Bias in Presentationof Cases, 5 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 120 (1990)
(reporting on study finding that "[r]ace was specified more often during presentations of black
than of white patients").
423. Delthia Ricks, "Silent Curriculum": Racial, Ethnic Bias Hazardous to Health, PiTrsBURGH POsT-GAZETTE, Jan. 5, 1999, at D3.
424. Id. (quoting Dr. Judith Gwathmey). See also Balsa et al., supra note 402, at 209 (describing the "statistical discrimination" that doctors are taught and even urged to apply as a way of
coping with clinical uncertainty); Caldwell & Popenoe, supra note 422, at 616 (noting that the
practice of citing patient's race is common in U.S. medical schools, as it is "either passed along as
oral tradition or formally taught").
425. Bowser, supra note 5, at 98.
426. See id. at 110-11 (noting failure of medical researchers to explain reasons for associations
between race and health outcomes once such associations are found, as if such differences are
inherent and require no further explanation) (citing Mindy Thompson Fullilove, Deconstructing
Race in Medical Research, 148 ARCHIVES PEDIATRICS ADOLESCENT MED. 1014, 1014-15 (1994));
Ren6 Bowser, Racial Bias in Medical Treatment, 105 DICK. L. REV. 365, 374-75 (2001). Some
scholars have argued, on the other hand, that including race as a variable in medical research is
an important means of identifying the role that racial discrimination plays in producing health
disparities. Stephen B. Thomas, for example, argues that race-related medical data are needed
in order to "monitor progress or setbacks" in addressing inequalities. Stephen B. Thomas, The
Color Line: Race Matters in the Elimination of Health Disparities,91 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1046,
1047 (2001). He also warns, however, that "[w]e must be cautious ... in our use of race as a
variable, taking care to define what race means in our research, avoiding assumptions of biological differences, and accounting for distinctions between race and socioeconomic status." Id.
427. See, e.g., Bowser, supra note 5, at 104-05. See also BYRD & CLAYTON, supra note 391, at
106-08, 207-08, 258-59; JOHN HOBERMAN, DARWIN'S ATHLETES: How SPORT HAS DAMAGED
BLACK AMERICA AND PRESERVED THE MYTH OF RACE 171-72 (1997); DAVID BARTON SMITH,
HEALTH CARE DIVIDED: RACE AND HEALING A NATION 21-22 (1999).
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included the use of African Americans as "clinical material in teaching and research" 42 8-perhaps the most famous example of such being
430
the Tuskegee syphilis experiment of 1932-1972.429 But that history
has largely been overlooked or forgotten, and the belief that blacks
are biologically, as well as culturally, different from whites has become part of the unquestioned, "background" knowledge of the profession. 431 "Evidence" derived from such research is incorporated
into "racial profiles" on which doctors may, consciously or not, rely in
making decisions about diagnosis and treatment. These profiles include the assumptions that blacks are genetically predisposed to certain diseases, 43 2 better able to tolerate pain and suffering, 4 33 and
culturally disinclined to take an active role in their health care or to
comply with treatment plans. 434 As commentators have noted, medi-

cal decisions that rely on race as a diagnostic factor when it may not
be warranted nevertheless contribute to the perpetuation of racial
profiles in medicine by creating a self-fulfilling prophecy whereby
physicians' racially biased diagnoses are incorporated into epidemiological data that, in turn, are used as objective, empirical "evidence"
of race-related biological difference. 435
428. SMITH, supra note 427, at 24.
429. See id. at 25-26 (describing the Tuskegee experiment, including biological and cultural
assumptions about blacks held by health professionals involved in the study that "still exert a
powerful hold on the organization of services and on treatment decisions"). The Tuskegee
Study-perhaps more than any other event-has engendered widespread and lasting feelings of
distrust of the medical community among African Americans. See generally Vicki S. Freimuth et
al., African Americans' Views on Research and the Tuskegee Syphilis Study, 52 Soc. ScI. MED.
797 (2001). Although Freimuth and her colleagues focused their inquiry in African Americans'
distrust of medical research, they found that African Americans were cautious about "all aspects
of involvement with the medical community, including treatment and initiatives designed to promote the health and wellbeing of African Americans through appropriate preventive care and
behaviors." Id. at 802.
430. The history of race and medicine also includes the racial segregation of medical care and
the outright denial of medical care to black people. See, e.g., SMITH, supra note 427, at 9-33;
Watson, supra note 394, at 210-13. See also infra notes 523-524 and accompanying text.
431. See Bowser, supra note 5, at 102-15 (tracing the history and institutionalization, and continuing perpetuation, of race-based medical research).
432. See, e.g., id. at 109 (stating that "racialized research suggests that Blacks are genetically
disposed to a host of chronic diseases, including hypertension, obesity, prostate cancer, low-birth
weight infants, left ventricular dysfunction, nicotine addiction, asthma, and Alzheimer's disease,"
and citing studies).
433. See, e.g., Bloche, supra note 402, at 104-05; Bowser, supra note 5, at 109.
434. See, e.g., Bloche, supra note 402, at 104-05 (describing assumptions as including "expectations and suspicions concerning therapeutic compliance and the presence of such co-morbid factors as substance abuse, poor living conditions, and lack of family and social support [and]
[sluppositions about patients' truthfulness, self-discipline, laziness or industry, level of suffering,
tolerance for pain, and intelligence"); Bowser, supra note 5, at 109.
435. Bowser, supra note 5, at 108-10; Balsa et al., supra note 402, at 212; Crossley, supra note
394, at 204-05.
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These racial profiles, coupled with practitioners' own racial biases,
potentially play a large role in medical decision making. There is no
reason to think that medical professionals are immune to the influence of racial and other group-based stereotypes that affect everyone
else and good reason to believe both that such stereotypes do influence doctors' perceptions of patients and that these stereotypes affect
the quality of care they deliver. 436 Although, consistent with professional ideals, physicians had long denied being influenced by patients'

personal characteristics in their interactions with or treatment decisions for them, 437 several studies over the past few decades have found

that medical professionals do in fact behave differently with different
patients. Studies have found, for example, that physicians, nurses, and
medical students evaluate or treat patients differently based upon
such characteristics as the patient's physical appearance (such as body
weight), perceived "social worth" (such as the extent to which the patient is seen as contributing to society), age, disability, sexual orienta43 8
tion, and perceived deviance (such as alcoholism).

In one recent study, doctors themselves reported having more negative perceptions of their African-American patients than of their
white patients. 439 The doctors in this study (all cardiac care physicians

436. Indeed, it would be unrealistic to assume that physicians would be unaffected by the
stereotypes that affect everyone else. See Michelle van Ryn & Jane Burke, The Effect of Patient
Race and Socio-Economic Status on Physicians' Perceptionsof Patients,50 Soc. ScI. MED. 813,
814 (2000).
437. See John M. Eisenberg, Sociologic Influences on Decision-Making by Clinicians,90 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 957, 957 (1979); Barbara Gerbert, Perceived Likeability and Competence

of Simulated Patients: Influence on Physicians' Management Plans, 18 Soc. SCI. MED. 1053,
1053-54 (1984); Elizabeth M. Hooper et al., Patient CharacteristicsThat Influence Physician Behavior, 20 MED. CARE 630, 630 (1982).

438. See generally Eisenberg, supra note 437, at 959 (discussing studies); Hooper et al., supra
note 437, at 630 (discussing recent acceptance of view that patients' characteristics and behavior
influence physicians' behavior and reporting on study finding differences in physician behavior
that correlated with age, ethnicity, sex, and appearance of patient). See also Crossley, supra note
394, at 231-36 (discussing evidence that "patient characteristics unrelated to a patient's medical
need-such as age, sexual orientation, disability or obesity-may influence physicians' treatment
decisions"); Saif S. Rathone et al., The Effects of Patient Sex and Race on Medical Students'
Ratings of Quality of Life, 108 AM. J. MED. 561 (2000) (reporting on study in which medical
students assessed differently the quality of life and severity of condition of a white male patient
and a black female patient with identical symptoms of angina).
439. See generally van Ryn & Burke, supra note 436. In this study, cardiac care physicians
reported their perceptions of individual patients and their responses were analyzed to determine
separately the effects of patient race and socioeconomic status on physician perceptions, controlling for such variables as (when appropriate) patient age, sex, race, income, education, frailty/
sickness, depression, mastery, social assertiveness, and physician characteristics. Id. at 814-19.
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and most of them white 440 ) reported that they regarded their AfricanAmerican patients as less intelligent, less educated, and less rational
than their white patients. 44 1 They also expected their African-Ameri-

can patients to be less likely than their white patients to participate in
cardiac rehabilitation or to comply with medical advice, but more
likely than the white patients to abuse alcohol or other drugs. 442 In
addition, the doctors expressed lesser feelings of "affiliation" toward

their African-American patients, for they less frequently rated them
as being "very pleasant" or expressed feeling about them that "[t]his
443
patient is the kind of person I can see myself being friends with.

440. Id. at 815 (stating that, of the 618 encounters in the study sample, 84% were with white
physicians, 11% involved Asian physicians, 1% involved African American physicians, 3% involved Hispanic physicians, and 1% involved physicians of other races or ethnicities).
The low numbers of encounters with doctors of color reflects yet another institutional problem, the low minority representation among medical professionals. See infra notes 474-475 and
accompanying text.
441. See van Ryn & Burke, supra note 436, at 818, 821.
442. Id. at 818, 820.
443. Id. The authors speculated that physicians' "lower feelings of affiliation toward Black
patients may be connected to their beliefs about the degree to which patients are rational/intelligent." Id. at 823.
For some patients, physicians' negative race-based expectations merge with similarly negative
perceptions of patients who are poor or not well educated. See van Ryn & Burke, supra note
436, at 824 (noting that "[r]ace is highly correlated with SES [socioeconomic status] ... thus,
physicians' negative attributions towards Blacks and those of lower SES may have a powerful
cumulative effect in the clinical setting"). Cf Whaley, supra note 7, at 48 (discussing studies
whose findings "suggest that white people's stereotypes of blacks in general-and of those who
reside in poor urban areas in particular-are basically negative, and that status or power interacts with race to produce stereotyping and prejudice toward low-status black people"). In the
study of cardiac care physicians' race-based perceptions, the researchers analyzed separately
whether doctors' attitudes were influenced by patients' income and education levels. (In this
part, the researchers controlled for race, among other variables.) See van Ryn & Burke, supra
note 436, at 815-16; see also supra note 439. While results did not differ for patients in the
middle and highest SES groups, patients in the lowest SES group did fare worse in physicians'
assessments: the doctors were more likely to perceive those patients as being dependent, irresponsible, irrational, and unintelligent. They also viewed the lower SES patients as being less
likely to participate in cardiac rehabilitation if it were prescribed. See van Ryn & Burke, supra
note 436, at 821-22. Other studies have found that, in the mental health care setting, lower class
patients are "diagnosed as aberrant more frequently than middle-class patients." Eisenberg,
supra note 437, at 958.
Women, too, are often held in low regard by health care professionals. One study found, for
example, that physicians "like" male patients more than they like female patients. See Judith A.
Hall et al., Physicians' Liking for Their Patients: More Evidence for the Role of Affect in Medical
Care, 12 HEALTH PSYCHOL. 140, 142 (1993) ("liking" was defined to include "warmth, respect,
interest, and enthusiasm for seeing" the patient.). In another study, the vast majority of physicians referred to a woman when they were asked to describe "the typical complaining patient,"
while yet another study found that doctors applied the label "crock" (meaning a patient who is
likely to give unreliable information) more often to women than to men. Linda S. Fidell, Sex
Role Stereotypes and the American Physician, 4 PSYCH. WOMEN Q. 313, 322 (1980). Studies also
have found that "physicians believe women to be more mentally disturbed, to have more social
problems and other vague symptoms, and to be less stoic than men during illness." Id. See also
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Attitudes such as these, whether explicit or implicit, 444 can lead to an
"attenuation of empathy across racial lines" that leads to the "unconscious devaluation of minority patients' hopes, fears, and life
445
prospects."
The clinical context is ripe for the influence of such biases on decision making. 446 The inherent uncertainty of diagnosis and treatment
decisions, 447 the ambiguity of patient symptoms and behavior, 44 8 and
the wide discretion accorded medical professionals 449 all create a situation in which "provider (and patient) presuppositions, attitudes, and
fears that engender racial disparities have wide space to operate. '450
The standard practice of noting a patient's race as part of her case 45 1
exacerbates these tendencies by not only transmitting the idea that
race is a relevant factor but also activating automatic stereotyping
processes. 452 Additional constraints built into the situation-including time pressure, resource limitations, lack of complete and accurate
Crossley, supra note 394, at 230 (noting that expectations of women include "physicians' assumptions that women are less likely to choose aggressive interventions, assumptions that women are
less likely to have demanding social or career roles, attributions of women's physical complaints
to emotional or mental causes, and devaluations of women's contributions to society") (footnotes omitted).
444. See Shin, supra note 11, at 2065 (defining attitudes as "positive or negative dispositions
toward objects in one's social environment" and implicit attitudes as those that "operate outside
of conscious awareness" and "are automatically activated by the mere presence of the attitude
object").
445. Bloche, supra note 402, at 104.
446. See INST. OF MED., supra note 394, at 136. For more detailed discussions of the operation
of unconscious racial bias in medical decision making in recent law reviews, see generally
Bloche, supra note 402, at 103-06; Crossley, supra note 394, at 218-21; and Shin, supra note 11, at
2064-76.
447. See Balsa et al., supra note 402, at 206-07; Crossley, supra note 394, at 204, 206-07. For an
economic analysis of the potential for clinical uncertainty to cause disparity in treatment, see
Balsa & McGuire, supra note 418, at 96-103 (discussing two models of clinical uncertainty the
"miscommunication" model, under which the doctor has greater difficulty interpreting symptoms from different racial groups, and the "racial profiling" model, under which "the doctor
believes that the underlying distribution of severity [of disease] differs across races, and hence is
willing to use the 'category' race as an aid to improve his diagnosis when making an inference
about the underlying severity of the patient").
448. See Shin, supra note 11, at 2074-75.
449. See Bloche, supra note 402, at 99-106.
450. Id. at 97. See also Balsa et al., supra note 402, at 207.
451. See supra note 422 and accompanying text.
452. For discussion of automatic stereotype activation and cognitive busyness, see supra notes
331-334 and accompanying text. A study by Gilbert and Hixon, discussed at supra note 333,
suggests that the timing of this cue might have an effect on whether it results in stereotyping.
Gilbert and Hixon found that, although cognitive busyness promotes the applicationof a stereotype once it is activated, it might actually prevent stereotype activation if the perceiver is occupied with other mental tasks when she comes upon the target. It seems possible, therefore, that
delaying the point at which a patient's race is mentioned during case presentations and conferences until they have already begun thinking about the patient's case could allow doctors the
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information, heavy clinical (and hence cognitive) loads, lack of a preexisting relationship between doctor and patient, rotating staffs, and
physical stresses such as sleeplessness-increase the use of "mental
shortcuts" such as racial stereotypes and profiles and, accordingly, the
probability that physicians will interpret patients' symptoms or prescribe treatment plans differentially based on race. 453 As the Institute
of Medicine explained in its 2002 report, given the situational con4 54
straints under which they function,
[d]octors must depend on inferences about severity based on what
they can see about the illness and on what else they observe about
the patient (e.g., race). The exact same symptom information can
lead the physician to make different clinical decisions depending on
the other characteristics of the patient. Physicians can therefore be
viewed as operating with prior beliefs about the likelihood of their
patients' conditions, "priors" that will be different according to age,
gender, SES, and possibly race/ethnicity. These priors-which are
taught as a cognitive heuristic to medical students-as well as the
information
gained in a clinical encounter both influence medical
455
decisions.
C. Behavioral Confirmation in the Clinical Encounter: Medical
Treatment as a Social Act
Even those clinical encounters, which might seem to present an opportunity to check the influence of race-based assumptions by allowing the patient to provide individualized information, may actually
exacerbate rather than reduce the use of racial stereotypes. The doctor-patient relationship can be an important determinant of the quality of care a patient receives, for the diagnosis and treatment of
456
disease are not just technical processes, but are also social acts.
Studies have shown that the quality of interaction between doctor and
patient can have a significant effect on patients' health. In particular,
opportunity to prevent the activation and application of racial stereotypes. Gilbert & Hixon,
supra note 333.
453. See, e.g., Balsa et al., supra note 402, at 210; Bloche, supra note 402, at 104-05; Shin, supra
note 11, at 2074. See also Joan J. Mathews, The CommunitarianProcess in Clinical Settings, 17
Soc. ScL MED. 1371, 1375 (1983) (describing lack of continuity in professional-patient
relationships).
Balsa and her colleagues also point out that doctors may have greater difficulty communicating with patients from minority racial and ethnic groups, may interpret the "signals" they emit
(such as reports of pain) differently from the signals emitted by white patients, and may make
different decisions about diagnosis and treatment based upon those signals despite having equal
regard for each patient. Balsa et al., supra note 402, at 210.
454. See generally INST. OF MED., supra note 394, at 128, 132 (describing constraints on and
uncertainty of medical decision making).
455. Id. at 132.
456. Eisenberg, supra note 437, at 957.

1092

DEPAUL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53:1013

higher quality care and better medical outcomes have been associated
with a more participatory, team-like style of medical decision making
involving give-and-take between doctor and patient. 45 7 In that ideal

relationship, the doctor involves the patient in treatment decisions by
"providing treatment options, a sense of control over treatment deci'458
sions, and a sense of responsibility for care.
Whether this relationship is achieved depends in large part upon the
doctor's perceptions of and feelings toward the patient. Generally,

physicians' perceptions of patients' "likeability" and competence have
been found to influence their treatment of patients. 459 For example,
physicians tend to give less time, attention, and follow-up care to
those whom they consider deviant or less likeable. 460 In addition, doctors give less information to, seek less information from, and are less

likely to attend to information offered by patients whom they regard
as less intelligent or rational. 461 Furthermore, the same kinds of "immediate" behaviors that have been found to produce more positive

performances in job interviews 462-sitting at the patient's level, maintaining eye contact, having a relaxed posture, nodding, and making

encouraging sounds 463-also

correlate with a better quality of health

457. See, e.g., Jozien Bensing, Doctor-PatientCommunication and the Quality of Care, 32 Soc.
ScI. MED. 1301, 1305-06 (1991) (finding positive relationship between doctor-patient communication and quality of "psychosocial" care as defined by physicians); Sherrie Kaplan et al., Patient
and Visit CharacteristicsRelated to Physicians' ParticipatoryDecision-MakingStyle: Results from
the Medical Outcomes Study, 33 MED. CARE 1176, 1177 (1995) (noting connection between participatory decision making style and health outcomes); Mathews, supra note 453 (noting connection between information giving and quality and outcomes of health care); Howard Waitzkin,
Information Giving in Medical Care, 26 J. HEALTH & Soc. BEHAV. 81 (1985).
458. Kaplan, supra note 457, at 1177 (defining participatory decision making style).
459. See, e.g., Gerbert, supra note 437 (reporting on study that found significant differences on
some (but not all) treatment dimensions studied, such as patient education, frequency of medication, and encouragement of follow-up contact, depending upon patient's perceived likeability or
competence).
460. See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 437, at 962; Gerbert, supra note 437, at 1057 (finding that
patients who were perceived as more likeable and competent "would more frequently be encouraged to contact the office and would be more likely to receive medication"); van Ryn &
Burke, supra note 436, at 823 (collecting and summarizing studies finding treatment differences).
461. See, e.g., Waitzkin, supra note 457, at 93 (finding that doctors tended to give more information to patients with higher levels of education and of higher social class); cf van Ryn and
Burke, supra note 436, at 823 (drawing this conclusion from the results of their study finding that
doctors regard minority and low socioeconomic status patients as less intelligent and rational and
results of studies finding differences in information giving based on patient characteristics).
462. See supra notes 264-278 and accompanying text for description of immediate behaviors
and effect on performance in interviews.
463. These and similar behaviors are identified as positive aspects of physician nonverbal behavior. See, e.g., C. KNIGHT ALDRICH, THE MEDICAL INTERVIEW: GATEWAY TO THE DocrORPATIENT INTERVIEW

21-22 (2d ed. 1999); Bensing, supra note 457, at 1305.

2004]

RACE AS PROXY

1093

care. 464 (Indeed, these nonverbal behaviors may be both more important indicators of a doctor's regard for the patient and harder to fake
than verbal friendliness.) 465 When physicians feel uncomfortable with
or dislike a patient, not only are they less likely to behave in that

immediate, patient-centered fashion, but they may even cut off the
encounter prematurely, before a thorough interview or examination
can be completed.

466

Moreover, patients' satisfaction with their medical care affects their
medical outcomes and is positively related to how much their doctors
like them. 467 As in other social interactions, 468 patient satisfaction and
physician liking appear to have a "mutually reinforcing effect" within
the medical encounter, as the patient and doctor send and respond to

cues that increase their liking for one another. 469 Likewise, feelings of
discomfort or distrust between patient and doctor can be reciprocated
and reinforced through interaction. For example, patients who feel

that their doctors do not respect or are not interested in them may
react by providing the doctor with less information about their symptoms or asking fewer questions about their conditions. 470 Such behavior in turn may reinforce the doctor's perception that the patient is not
intelligent or rational and discourage the doctor from asking questions
of or sharing information with the patient. 471 Similarly, patients who
do not trust or feel affiliation with their doctors may be less inclined to
472
comply with a prescribed treatment plan.
While these studies suggest the operation of a self-fulfilling prophecy in doctor-patient relationships generally, there is good reason to
believe that behavioral confirmation of prior expectations is especially
problematic in interracial clinical encounters. 4 73 It bears emphasizing

that most encounters between patients of color and their physicians
464. See Bensing, supra note 457, at 1307-08 (noting that, in physicians' assessments of the
quality of psychosocial care, affective behavior-especially the nonverbal aspects of affective
behavior, such as "eye-contact and shown interest"-was a powerful factor).
465. See id. at 1308 (noting that "it is much easier to control your verbal behaviour than your
nonverbal behaviour").
466. See Whaley, supra note 7, at 51-52.
467. See Hall et al., supra note 443, at 144.
468. See supra subpart III(B)(1). for discussion of reciprocal relationship between parties'
overtures and responses.
469. Hall et al., supra note 443, at 144.
470. See, e.g., van Ryn & Burke, supra note 436, at 823-24; cf Mathews, supra note 453, at
1374 (suggesting that "patients rely on cues from the physician about the degree of disclosure
which is expected").
471. See van Ryn & Burke, supra note 436, at 822-23 (citing studies).
472. See id. at 823 (citing studies).
473. See, e.g., Shin, supra note 11, at 2074-75 (describing potential for behavioral confirmation
of stereotypes in clinical encounters).
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will be interracial, for the medical profession historically has failed to
achieve a proportionate representation of racial and ethnic minorities
and continues to fall short in this regard. 474 Greater racial and ethnic
diversity among health care providers that reflects the diversity of the
patient population could promote stronger doctor-patient relationships and reduce the influence of stereotypes within clinical encounters for, as the Institute of Medicine report observed, "[r]acial
concordance of patient and provider is associated with greater patient
participation in care processes, higher patient satisfaction, and greater
'475
adherence to treatment.
A number of factors-the kinds of stereotypes and suspicions doctors hold of minority patients, patients' stereotypes of doctors, the
structure and constraints of the interaction, and the institutional context in which it occurs-can all converge in an encounter that convinces both doctor and patient of the accuracy of their negative
expectations and results in the provision of inadequate care. Moreover, because racial expectations can channel and constrain interaction
in a confirmatory direction without providing evidence of their influence, 476 the doctors' decisions or patients' choices that result can often
477
be supported with neutral, nonracial justifications.

First, recent studies based on patient reports and third-party observations suggest a specific connection between doctors' negative views
of racial minorities 478 and a lower quality of interaction with patients
from those groups. Rather than engaging them in the ideal, "participatory" or team-like style of decision making that has been connected to greater patient satisfaction and better health outcomes,
doctors tend to spend less time with, ask fewer questions of, and offer
479
less information to such patients.
474. See generally Stanley S. Bergen, Jr., UnderrepresentedMinorities in Medicine, 284 JAMA
1138 (2000); David M. Carlisle & Jill E. Gardner, The Entry of African American Students into
U.S. Medical Schools: An Evaluation of Recent Trends, 90 J. NAT'L MED. ASS'N 466 (1998).
475. INST. OF MED., supra note 394, at 146 (citing Lisa Cooper-Patrick et al., Race, Gender,
and Partnershipin the Patient-PhysicianRelationship, 282 JAMA 583 (1999)).
476. See supra subpart III(B).
477. See, e.g., Barbara A. Noah, The Invisible Patient,2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 121, 143-44 (reviewing SALLY SATEL, How POLITICAL CORRECTNESS IS CORRUPTING MEDICINE (2000)); cf
Shin, supra note 11, at 2074-75 (discussing effect of stereotypes on physicians' interpretations of
ambiguous information).
478. See supra notes 439-445 and accompanying text.
479. See, e.g., Cooper-Patrick et al., supra note 475 (reporting on study finding that "African
American patients had significantly less participatory visits with their physicians than white patients" and that patients with a graduate school education had more participatory visits than
patients with a high school education or less); Hall et al., supra note 443, at 140 (citing studies
showing that "physicians deliver less information, less supportive talk, and less proficient clinical
performance to Black and Hispanic patients and patients of lower economic class than they do to
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One explanation for this tendency may be the lack of feelings of
affiliation with the patient, for discomfort often leads people to turn
to familiar scripts for their interaction. In examining his own struggle
to overcome feelings of racial prejudice toward his minority patients,
Dr. Neil S. Calman has described the relief with which he has resorted
to "the well-practiced scripts that have become part of [his] standard
doctoring repertoire" 48 0 at times when he has felt distracted or uncomfortable with a patient. Imposition of a script would tend to channel discussion in conformity with the doctor's preconceived notions
48
and discourage the patient from offering individuating information. '
Implicit prejudice may show up in the doctor's nonverbal behavior as

well, even if the doctor does not recognize

it.482

When a patient

senses or suspects that the doctor feels unfavorably toward him or her,
a "chain reaction" may be set off whereby the patient responds disagreeably or unhelpfully to the doctor's overtures-thereby maintaining the poor dynamic and "confirming" the physician's negative
48 3
expectations.
Members of groups with a history or expectation of being treated

poorly by medical professionals may place an especially high value on
camaraderie with and respectful treatment by their doctors, and there-

fore may react especially negatively to physicians whose behavior suggests that they do not like, are not interested in, or do not respect
more advantaged patients, even in the same care settings"; though noting that the path of causation is not clear and that the differences might be explained by either physicians' stereotypes or
minority patients' seeking less information); Kaplan et al., supra note 457, at 1179-80 (reporting
on study finding that minority patients had significantly less participatory visits than nonminority
patients and that and patients with a high school education or less had significantly less participatory visits than patients with post-graduate college education); van Ryn and Burke, supra
note 436, at 823 (finding that cardiac care physicians had significantly shorter post-angiogram
encounters with black than with white patients); Waitzkin, supra note 457, at 93 (reporting on
study finding that patients with less education and from lower-middle or working class backgrounds received less information from and time with physicians).
480. Neil S. Calman, Out of the Shadow: A White Inner-City Doctor Wrestles with Racial
Prejudice,9 HEALTH AFF. 170 (2000).
481. See supra notes 306-307 and 315-316 and accompanying text for discussion of the role of
this dynamic in promoting behavioral confirmation of expectations.
482. See INST. OF MED., supra note 394, at 129 ("Socially conditioned implicit prejudice may
be manifested in healthcare providers' nonverbal behaviors reflecting anxiety (e.g., increased
rate of blinking), aversion (e.g., reduced eye contact) or avoidance (e.g., more closed postures)
when interacting with minority rather than white patients"); Shin, supra note 11, at 2071-72 (discussing research that found that whites' negative implicit attitudes toward African-Americans,
which are "governed by automatic, unintentional processes," tend to be manifested in spontaneous, nonverbal behaviors of which whites are unaware but to which African-Americans are "especially attuned"). For discussion of the importance of nonverbal behavior in clinical
encounters, see supra notes 462-465 and accompanying text.
483. See, e.g., Bloche, supra note 402, at 105; Shin, supra note 11, 2073-75.
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them. 484 Moreover, the operative stereotypes in patient-doctor relationships are not all on one side; patients of color may also hold negative expectations of physicians: "These stereotypes may paint the
physician as an arrogant clinician, or as 'the white man who experiments on minority patients,' or as a person who cannot be trusted to
provide the whole truth. ' '485 In one study using patient focus groups,
African-American patients expressed a greater desire for camaraderie
with their doctors than did white patients, but at the same time-and
unlike white patients-also expressed mistrust of and disdain for the
health care system, based in part on their suspicions of racial and economic discrimination. 486 An earlier study had similarly found that African Americans often are dissatisfied with outpatient care, based
partly on distrust of whites and the perception that physicians are not
warm and friendly. 487 These suspicions can lead patients to misinterpret common medical practices as being intended to insult or degrade
them. For example, African-American patients may become offended
when white health care professionals wear plastic gloves for a physical
examination, believing that they do so because they are unwilling to
4 88
touch a black person's skin.
Furthermore, just as situational constraints on medical decision
making generally promote reflexive reference to racial profiles and
stereotypes, so do the conditions of the typical medical interview promote the behavioral confirmation of such expectations. In addition to
the time and resource limitations and cognitive "busyness" with which
physicians generally must contend, the roles and respective goals of
doctor and patient, the power differential between them, and common
institutional practices and procedures help to create conditions that
are almost ideal for the behavioral confirmation of erroneous
4 89
expectations.
The roles designated for each party, coupled with the power differential that characterizes doctor-patient interactions, compound the effects of physicians' negative stereotypes by placing the doctor firmly
in the position of the situation-defining "perceiver" and the patient in
484. See Jeffrey A. Ferguson et al., Racial Disparity in CardiacDecisionmaking: Results from
Patient Focus Groups, 158 ARCH. INTERN. MED. 1450, 1452 (1998).
485. INST. OF MED., supra note 394, at 128.

486. Ferguson et al., supra note 484, at 1451-53.
487. See id. at 1453 (citing Theodore R. Brooks, Pitfalls in Communication with Hispanic and
African-American Patients: Do Translators Help or Harm?,84 J. NAT'L MED. Ass'N 941 (1992)).
488. See John Hoberman, Culture Watch: A Medical Prescriptionfor More Racial Sensitivity,
NEWSDAY, Jan. 10, 1999, at B6; see also Ferguson et al., supra note 484, at 1451 (quoting patient
who said, "Some doctors don't want to touch you because of the color of your skin").
489. See supra notes 301-337 and accompanying text for discussion of situational constraints
that promote behavioral confirmation of expectations.
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that of the responding "target. '4 90 As the social psychological literature has shown, power differences promote both perceptual and be-

havioral confirmation of the more powerful party's stereotypes of the
other party, because the more powerful party tends to function as the
perceiver in the pair and therefore to have greater influence on the

interaction. 491 Further, a more powerful perceiver often has less incentive to seek disconfirming information at the same time as the less
powerful target feels constrained to accommodate the perceiver's

overtures by following that person's chosen "script" and declining to
492
provide disconfirming information.
The doctor-patient relationship is inherently one of unequal power

and status for the simple reason that the doctor is the party with the
expertise and authority in the interaction, while the patient occupies a
vulnerable position by virtue of coming to the doctor in a less knowledgeable, help-seeking posture. 493 Because "[o]ne person's ignorance
is often the basis of another's power," this "competence gap" between

doctor and patient helps to support the doctor's institutionalized privilege and maintain the "basic asymmetry in the doctor-patient relationship.

' 494

Aggravating this knowledge differential is the tendency of

physicians to believe that patients "are unable to make [medical] ...
decisions in a knowing, competent manner.

'495

Doctors also have the

ability to enlarge their power by limiting the information that they
disclose to the patient 496 or by controlling the patient's access to other
medical resources. 497 Moreover, the patient who is sick is almost by
490. The doctor functions as the perceiver and the patient functions as the target, because the
doctor must assess the patient and make judgments about the patient's condition and care.
Therefore, as Whaley has pointed out, the doctor asks the questions that shape the interaction
and, while the patient must respond to these questions, the doctor's own behavior is comparatively unconstrained. See Whaley, supra note 7, at 51. Cf. Snyder, supra note 317, at 93-94
(describing roles and relative power and status of counselors, employers, and teachers).
491. See supra notes 301-304 and accompanying text.
492. See supra notes 305-329 and accompanying text.
493. See Whaley, supra note 7, at 50.
494. Waitzkin, supra note 457, at 82.
495. Cathy J. Jones, Autonomy and Informed Consent in Medical Decisionmaking: Toward a
New Self-Fulfilling Prophecy, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 379, 407 (1990). This sentiment that has
been traced to the Hippocratic Corpus, which states: "lacking professional training the client is
too ignorant to be able to comprehend what information he gets and ... he is, in any case, too
upset at being ill to be able to use the information he does get in a manner that is rational and
responsible." Mathews, supra note 453, at 1376 (quoting ELIOT FRIEDSON, PROFESSIONAL DOMINANCE: THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF MEDICAL CARE 142 (1970)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
496. See Mathews, supra note 453, at 1375; Waitzkin, supra note 457, at 82-83.
497. Cf Bloche, supra note 402, at 105-06 (describing difficulty minority patients may experience in navigating "clinical bureaucracy"); Calman, supra note 480, at 172-73 (describing his
efforts to help "one of [his] favorite patients," an African American man, to receive the services
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definition cast in the role of a social deviant. 498 As with other kinds of

deviance or stigma, the patient's illness is another basis upon which he
or she may be accorded less respect and a lower status than the
doctor.

499

Institutional norms and practices cement the status and power differential by establishing the organizationally appropriate behavior for
the respective roles of patient and professional. 500 Joan J. Mathews
has described the specific ways in which medical institutions structure
activities and program people to accept their roles, thereby enhancing
the divide between patients and staff. She notes, for example, that the
patient's "freedom of action and decision" is blocked through institutionally legitimate "means of social control,"'5'0 including the staff's
discretion to dispense or deny privileges to or withhold information
from patients while legitimizing their decisions to do so by framing
5' 0 2
them as "medical decisions.
In addition, by defining a "good" patient as one who "is cooperative

and makes few requests of the staff" and a "bad" patient as the opposite, the institution subtly "maintain[s] social distance between the patient and staff. 50 3 As Mathews has noted, even routine procedures to
which a patient is subjected-being assigned and identified by a number rather than a name, providing information that "become[s] part of
a quasi-public patient record," submitting to examinations, being
and care he needed, by interceding with service providers in the hope that his introduction
would "enable them to see [his] patient as [Calman saw] him").
Further, Balsa et al. point out that managed care creates "navigational challenges for patients"
that can contribute to racial and ethnic healthcare disparities. See Balsa et al., supra note 402, at
215.
498. See Eisenberg, supra note 437, at 957.
499. Cf. ERVING GOFFMAN, STIGMA: NoTrs ON THE MANAGEMENT OF SPOILED IDENTITY 7-9

(1963).
Specific contexts may aggravate the power differential. Linda S. Fidell has vividly described
how the gynecological examination-"an almost archetypal occasion for the expression of sexstereotypic behavior"-may incorporate dynamics that compound the status and power differences inherent in the structure of the patient-doctor interaction:
Power differences exist between the individuals not only because the physician is likely
to be a man, but also because he is a high-status person with an advanced education
and plentiful income. The woman comes seeking help or information from an acknowledged expert who is familiar with both the jargon and the routine. Further, during the
examination she will be undressed, touched, and required to assume what is considered
by many to be a humiliating posture. If, in addition, she is referred to as "honey" while
he is addressed by surname and title, the power difference may be increased.
Fidell, supra note 443, at 318-19.
500. Cf. Bowser, supra note 5, at 98.
501. Mathews, supra note 453, at 1372 (quoting ERVING GOFFMAN, ASYLUMS 84 (1961)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

502. Id.
503. Id.
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"prevented from performing simple body functions without the assistance of others"-diminish the patient's sense of self and lower his or
50 4
her status to make it compatible with the institution's interests.
Furthermore, the power differential is often mutually accepted: 50 5
Several studies have found that health care professionals and patients
alike "view the ideal patient as a cooperative, acquiescent person who
506
plays an essentially deferential role."
The goals of the typical medical encounter, combined with the constraints under which they must be met, encourage the individual practitioner to structure interactions in ways that play into the power
differential to further promote behavioral confirmation of the doctor's
expectations. A doctor's functions in a medical interview are similar
to those of other professionals whose goals tend to promote the behavioral confirmation process. Like therapists, counselors, employers,
and teachers, doctors must assess their interaction partners in an attempt to get a "predictable view" of them, so they can evaluate "their
prognosis for improvement in treatment. '507 Given the time pressures
under which they operate, the ambiguity and complexity of their
tasks, and the amount of information they need to manage, 508 doctors
would be expected to adopt approaches to clinical encounters that
both exacerbate the effects of the power differential and increase their
reliance on stereotypes. A doctor who is called upon to make a quick
judgment after only a brief encounter with a patient may be motivated
to structure the interaction and to process the information derived
from it so as to confirm his or her preformed judgments, rather than
to form an accurate impression. The goal of forming a quick impression has been found to cause perceivers to ask leading rather than
open-ended questions, to focus on expectation-consistent information,
and to interpret ambiguous information as confirming expectations. 50 9
Collectively, these situational pressures can affect not just the doctor's behavior, but also the patient's responses to the doctor's overtures and the doctor's interpretation of that response. A doctor may
504. Id. at 1375.
505. See Jones, supra note 495, at 425.
506. Mathews, supra note 453, at 1375 (citing studies).
507. Snyder, supra note 317, at 93-94 (describing functions of therapists and counselors assessing clients, employers assessing job candidates, and teachers assessing students, and how those
functions place them in the role of "knowledge-oriented perceivers" and contribute to the target's behavioral confirmation of the perceiver's expectations). For discussion of how the knowledge function contributes to behavioral confirmation, see supra notes 310-318 and accompanying
text.
508. See supra notes 446-455 and accompanying text.
509. See supra notes 335-336 and accompanying text.
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even elicit from the patient behavior that confirms a stereotypical diagnosis. In the mental health context, for example, Arthur L. Whaley
has described the self-fulfilling process by which a white mental health
professional, feeling uncomfortable with a black patient and expecting
that patient to be aggressive or hostile, behaves in a racially

prejudiced manner, leading the patient to act in conformity with the
stereotype and the clinician to make a more severe diagnosis or to
recommend a more restrictive intervention than might actually be

warranted.5 10 Doctors also can unwittingly encourage patients to
make treatment choices that are consistent with the doctor's racebased expectations, because physicians have great power to shape pa-

tient preferences through their ability to control how options are
presented, as well as how much information is disclosed, 511 and because patients are unlikely to go against doctors' advice due to their
greater knowledge and power.5 12 Finally, a doctor's expectation that

the patient will not comply with a demanding treatment regimen may
produce its own confirmation as well, because the doctor may present

the recommendation in a perfunctory or unassertive way or may convey negative expectations that "dampen" the patient's interest in and
513
compliance with the recommended care.

The expectation that race is relevant is confirmed and reinforced

when the predicted outcomes materialize but doctors fail to see the
role that their race-related expectations played in producing their own
supposed confirmation. The belief that race is relevant is perpetuated
when statistics showing racially disparate medical outcomes provide

510. See Whaley, supra note 7, at 51.
511. See Bloche, supra note 402, at 103; Noah, supra note 477, at 143-44.
512. See, e.g., Jones, supra note 495, at 387 ("[N]either the law nor medicine encourages or
fosters, let alone requires, such [autonomous] decisionmaking by individuals. Instead, both law
and medicine encourage patients to let their doctors make decisions for them."); id. at 402-05
(providing examples from observations from practice, including how physicians slant their
presentations of information to patients based upon what the doctor thinks is best for the patient); Mathews, supra note 453, at 1372 (noting that "[i]n clinical matters patients generally rely
on on [sic] the practitioners' knowledge for decision-making since they lack the medical science
knowledge necessary to judge the accuracy and relevance of information they receive and moreover they may be unable to articulate appropriate questions about their situation").
513. See Bloche, supra note 402, at 105; Shin, supra note 11, at 2075. Cf. Balsa et al., supra
note 402, at 212 (noting that "[s]ome patient behavior associated with disparities, such as lower
rates of compliance, might be a rational response to patients' perceptions of their likelihood of
gain from medical care").
For an economic analysis of how the expectation that black patients "'can't be relied upon to
comply with treatment recommendations'-can become a self-fulfilling prophecy and lead to
disparities in treatment," see Balsa & McGuire, supra note 418, at 103-06.
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"objective," empirical evidence of that fact. As a result,
'514
"[i]nstitutional bias in medicine is an unseen, self-sustaining force.
D. Prescriptionfor Change: Altering the Situation

Racially biased medical treatment is predictable, but we cannot predict exactly when it will occur and "[w]e might not even be able to
identify when ...[it] has occurred. '5 15 As a result, individual adjudication under the currently dominant legal model is simply not suited

to addressing the most common reasons for racially biased medical
decision making. The prevailing intentional discrimination standard 516 would not apply in most cases, because medical decisionmakers are, by and large, unlikely to be motivated by an explicit

desire to deliver inferior care to patients of color. 517 Furthermore, as
the preceding sections have shown, medical decision making is inherently complex and uncertain, and institutional, cognitive, and social

influences interact with that ambiguity to both promote and obscure
racially disparate medical treatment. Racial bias therefore can infect

diagnosis and treatment decisions, not only without the decisionmaker's intending to discriminate on the basis of race, but also
without leaving evidence that it has affected the care delivered. 518 In
deference to medical professionals' expertise and the complexity of
514. Bowser, supra note 426, at 370.
515. Krieger, Civil Rights Perestroika,supra note 16, at 1313.
516. Under the federal laws that potentially create a private cause of action for racial discrimination in medical care, such as the equal protection clause and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2001) (prohibiting any program or activity that receives federal funds
from discriminating based on race, color, or national origin), the plaintiff is required to prove
that the defendant intended to discriminate. See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2000)
(interpreting Title VI disparate treatment provision to prohibit only explicit, intentional discrimination). See also Crossley, supra note 394, at 280-91 (discussing elements of federal claims of
discrimination in medical treatment); Noah, supra note 394, at 163-65 (discussing elements of
equal protection claim in health care context); Shin, supra note 11, at 2076-79 (discussing Title
VI and the requirement of intentional discrimination, and noting that "Sandoval effectively precludes private claims that allege racial disparities in clinical treatment").
Moreover, even these exceedingly narrow avenues for redress might not be available to some
plaintiffs who seek to sue individual practitioners, for Title VI's requirement that the defendant
receive federal financial assistance has been interpreted to exclude Medicare payments from that
category, "put[ting] private physicians out of Title VI's reach," Bloche, supra note 402, at 111,
and an equal protection claim would require the plaintiff to establish "state action"-a difficult
element to prove in a claim that focuses on a practitioner's clinical decisions, see Noah, supra
note 394, at 164.
517. See supra notes 417-418 and accompanying text.
518. Thus, in addition to being unable to prove that the defendant discriminated intentionally,
the plaintiff may be unable to prove another essential element: "that discrimination in fact occurred-that he received different medical treatment because of his race ... and not for some
other reason." Crossley, supra note 394, at 281. See also Noah, supra note 394, at 164 ("Health
care providers making individualized medical decisions ... can always offer a medical justifica-
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their tasks, moreover, courts are reluctant to second-guess the nondiscriminatory reasons defendants offer for their decisions. 519 Therefore,
determining whether race was the "real" reason for a medical decision
may be even more daunting a task than determining the real reason a
520
candidate was not hired or a motorist was pulled over.
Citing the inadequacy of individual adjudication under current legal
standards to identify, redress, and eliminate racial disparities in medical care, legal experts have asserted that real reform will come, instead, through efforts that focus on altering the institutions and
521
systems in which medical decisions are made and care is delivered.
tion for their decision, even if the decision in fact arose from a conscious or unconscious reaction
to the patient's race.").
519. See, e.g., Crossley, supra note 394, at 280-96 (discussing difficulty of proving intentional
discrimination and courts' reluctance to second-guess decisions of medical professionals).
520. See supra notes 184-189 and accompanying text.
In addition, and again because medical decision making is complex and inherently uncertain
and medical decisionmakers are accorded a great deal of discretion, diagnosis and treatment
decisions that have been influenced by racial bias (and therefore that might have come out differently were the patient of a different race) are not likely to be unacceptable under non-civil
rights causes of action that might otherwise apply. In a medical malpractice case, for example,
the patient must establish both causation and the defendant's failure to conform to the applicable standard of care. It is extremely difficult to establish causation because the requisite data
comparing the efficacy of alternative treatments often does not exist. Furthermore, even if a
decision has been influenced by the patient's race and is not ideal for that individual, it is unlikely to fall outside the acceptable limits of clinical discretion. See, e.g., Bloche, supra note 402,
at 109 (pointing out difficulty of proving causation without the proper data and stating, "Disparities in clinical resource use ensuing from physician discretion and the influences [of, inter alia,
unconscious bias and situational constraints] tend to fall within the bounds of tacitly accepted
clinical variation"); Crossley, supra note 394, at 244-48, 261-63 (discussing difficulty of proving
physician's failure to conform to standard of care, causation, and damages); Shin, supra note 11,
at 2079 (noting that "disparities resulting from clinical discretion tend to fall within the bounds
of generally accepted clinical variation" and, further, that plaintiffs may have difficulty "proving
causation-in-fact absent well maintained data concerning the efficiency of alternative approaches
that would resolve racial disparity in clinical outcomes"). See also Crossley, supra note 394, at
248-63 (considering, but also pointing out the difficulty of maintaining and prevailing in, claims
of liability for failure to obtain informed consent and breach of fiduciary duty).
521. This statement is not intended to suggest that commentators advocate abandoning traditional civil rights approaches altogether. They do, however, view traditional civil rights litigation
as inadequate, on its own, to reduce or eliminate racial bias in medical care. Sidney D. Watson,
for example, has stated, "Civil rights litigation, like medical malpractice, can redress some racebased medical errors. However, racial disparities in medical treatment... are often not amenable to the proof format-and blame laying-required by civil rights laws." Watson, supra note
394, at 204. Watson therefore proposes adoption of "a systemic approach." Id. at 205. See also
Bloche, supra note 402, at 117 (pointing out need for intervention at multiple levels and making
suggestions for how "health care institutions and law might respond pragmatically to the problem of racial disparity even as they pursue other important policy goals"); Bowser, supra note 5,
at 125-32 (stating that "the more complex and intangible violations created by racial profiling
present formidable challenges" for civil rights enforcement and proposing systematic data collection and financial incentives as ways of addressing intangible institutional racism); Crossley,
supra note 394, at 296-302 (noting difficulties of maintaining individual claims of liability but
pointing out "the importance of the potential for liability in these areas"; suggesting, in addition,
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Sidney D. Watson, in particular, has made a compelling case for systemic reform as our best hope for achieving racial equality in medical
care. As an example of the power of institutional change to achieve
results, Watson cites the desegregation of American hospitals in the
1960s. 522 He explains that the racial segregation of medical facilities
and care was deeply entrenched in the United States from the days of
slavery through the middle of the twentieth century. 523 Efforts within
the African-American community, such as developing their own hospitals, medical and nursing schools, and having individual physicians
obtain admitting privileges to white hospitals, brought some measure
of improvement, but were not sufficient to address the basic deficiencies in care and stigmatization of black patients that segregation
524
entailed.
An equal protection challenge in 1963, Simkins v. Moses H. Cone
Memorial Hospital,52 5 was the first step in the surprisingly smooth desegregation of hospitals nationwide, an achievement that was realized
in 1966. According to Watson, "Health care desegregation-at least
in hospitals-occurred quickly, quietly and voluntarily" 526 following
that decision, once Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and the Medicare and Medicaid programs of 1965 were adopted. The key to the
accomplishment was not, however, Title VI's mere prohibition against
racial discrimination, but the decision of President Lyndon B. Johnson
to tie a hospital's receipt of Medicare funds (a "substantial infusion of
federal dollars") 527 to its signing "an assurance of Title VI compliance
certifying that it did not discriminate or segregate on the basis of race,
color, or national origin and that the facility was in compliance with

the use of standards, data collection, and financial incentives); Noah, supra note 394, at 169-70
("[P]atient-specific treatment choices are the least amenable to scrutiny under statutory or constitutional standards"). But see Shin, supra note 11, at 2096-100 (predicting that policy-level
actions are "unlikely [to be] sufficient" and suggesting that a liability scheme based on implicit
cognitive bias is "not necessarily ... unworkable").
522. Watson, supra note 394, at 213-16. See also SMITH, supra note 427, at 96-142 (discussing,
in chapter entitled "The Federal Offensive," the history of hospital desegregation).
523. Watson, supra note 394, at 210-13.
524. See id. at 211.

525. 323 F.2d 959 (4th Cir. 1963). Watson describes that case-a ruling that racial segregation
of care in a private hospital that received federal funds violated the equal protection clause-as
"health care's Brown v. Board of Education." Watson, supra note 394, at 212-13 (citing SMITH,
supra note 427, at 82).
526. Id. at 213.
527. Id. at 214. See also SMITH, supra note 427, at 115 (stating that Medicare funds "would
mean the difference for most hospitals between comfortable financial surpluses and
insolvency").
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Title VI guidelines. ' 528 Although President Johnson was warned that
his goal of obtaining Title VI compliance and implementing the Medicare program within one year was "seemingly impossible"5 29 and that
his plan might backfire, "[t]he boldness paid off": within four months,
"over [ninety-two] percent of American hospitals were integrated. ' 530
And, in contrast to the slow and painful process of school desegregation, all of this occurred "without massive resistance, public demon5' 3 1
strations or protests.
Watson identifies several factors that came together to produce this
quick and dramatic result:
First, the financial incentives were clear, strong, and unambiguous.
Federal Medicare dollars began flowing only after hospitals integrated and the federal agency certified compliance with Title VI
guidelines ....
Second, the... effort involved no blaming and no sanctioning. The
effort was entirely forward looking. . . . No questions were asked

about past behavior and no justifications were needed.
Third, all hospitals were subject to the same financial pressure....
White patients would simply have to adapt because
there were few,
532
if any, segregated hospitals to which to flee.

Fourth, the goal, dismantling overt segregation, was a visible one
that was easily verifiable. . . . The goal was obvious. Hospitals un-

derstood what was expected of them .... 533
In other words, the government's use of financial incentives promoted straightforward decisions to integrate while it eliminated factors that might reward or justify decisions to do otherwise. First, the
government created a goal-eliminate racial segregation in order to
get Medicare funds-that directed the hospitals' behavior in the desired direction, and it provided an objective and visible means of measuring a hospital's attainment of that goal. Second, by putting that
528. Watson, supra note 394, at 214. Watson goes on to note, however, that financial incentives in medical care also can-and today often do-give medical institutions and professionals
reason to "avoid minority patients," and thereby "undermine civil rights efforts." Id. at 217-20
(describing ways in which Medicaid programs do so, as well as the inadequacy of Title VI litigation to challenge institutional decisions with disproportionate adverse impact on minorities that
defendants justify on economic grounds).
529. Id. at 214. See also SMITH, supra note 427, at 124 (describing as "mind-boggling" the idea
of attempting to enforce Title VI via Medicare).
530. Watson, supra note 394, at 215. See also SMITH, supra note 427, at 141.
531. Watson, supra note 394, at 215.
532. Id. at 215-16. Watson explains that, had the effort instead relied on individual hospitals
to integrate, the effort would-as it had in the past-have "stalled," because the hospitals would
fear losing white patients to those hospitals that did not integrate. Id. at 216.
533. Id. Watson also notes a fifth factor: "that most hospitals were private entities not subject
to the political pressures that buffeted public schools and colleges during the school desegregation efforts." Id. at 216.
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goal in "clear, strong and unambiguous" terms, 534 it eliminated the
potential for ambiguity that might mask racial disparities. Third, it
offered no "out" or attractive alternative to compliance, because its
incentives were appealing to all hospitals and no hospital stood to gain

by remaining segregated in order "to accommodate white
prejudice. ' 535 Finally, the plan did not rely on determinations of individual "fault" and hence, did not create the need-or, more impor-

tant, provide the opportunity-for past decisions with racially
disparate impact to be justified on some purportedly legitimate
536

ground.
The story of hospital desegregation through Medicare funding in-

centives is, at its most obvious, a story of incentives at the institutional
level altering behavior at the institutional level. Perhaps less obvious

is the potential for change at the highest level to motivate and channel
change at lower levels-even at the levels of the social and cognitive

processes that, as we have seen, join with institutional processes to
produce widespread racial disparities in medical care. As M. Gregg
Bloche has suggested, institutional reform has the potential to "channel clinical discretion in ways that reduce racial disparity. ' 537

Institutional reform, in other words, can alter the direction of medical decision making by altering the context in which medical decisions
are made. Of course, these institutional changes should include examining, redressing, or eliminating practices that teach racially biased
thinking and interaction. Important examples of such changes would

include eliminating the "silent curriculum" by which racial myths are
transmitted and reinforced,5 3 8 recruiting a more diverse group of medical professionals to serve the diverse population of patients,5 3 9 and
534. Id. at 215.
535. See supra note 532.
536. See Watson, supra note 394, at 215-16.
537. Bloche, supra note 402, at 121 (emphasis added).
538. For discussion of the "silent curriculum," see supra notes 423-425 and accompanying text.
Similarly, Barbara A. Noah recommends that medical education include teaching about racial
disparities in the delivery of health care and training in communication skills with a focus on
understanding and communicating with patients from diverse social groups. See Noah, supra
note 394, at 169-70.
539. See, e.g., INST. OF MED., supra note 394, at 12 and 146 (stating, in Recommendation 5-3,
"increase the proportion of underrepresented U.S. racial and ethnic minorities among health
professionals"); Bloche, supra note 402, at 119 (advocating "robust commitment to affirmative
action in medical school admissions, residency recruitment, and professional hiring"); Bowser,
supra note 5, at 122-24 (advocating that medicine "becom[e] more inclusive" by increasing number of minority medical practitioners and researchers); Noah, supra note 394, at 171-72 (advocating efforts to encourage and train "minorities to enter the health care professions in greater
numbers" as a way of helping "to create a culture of trust between the health care system and its
minority patients").
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interrogating the practice of racialized medical research. 540
Institutional reforms need not stop at those, however, for invisible
situational factors could continue to channel medical decision making
in a racially biased direction. To eliminate factors that promote and
mask racial bias, therefore, institutions should follow the example of
hospital desegregation by first creating means to evaluate racial equality in medical treatment and outcomes in the aggregate, rather than
on an individual basis when racial bias might escape notice or be explained away. 541 Second, they should reduce the ambiguity of medical
decision making and limit the potential for seemingly nondiscriminatory factors to provide justification for racially biased care. Finally,
they should alter the goals, structure, and conditions of doctor-patient
interactions in order to disrupt the potential for the behavioral confirmation of both parties' erroneous expectations of one another to influence their care and compliance.
A number of legal scholars have advocated the use of financial and
other institutional incentives 542 based on objective measures of racial
equality in care-a proposal that mirrors the successful hospital desegregation initiative of the 1960s. They have proposed, for example,
that federal funding,5 43 insurance payments, 54 4 or hospital accreditation 545 decisions be tied to an institution's delivery of racially equitable health care, as measured by data on the use of services and choice
of therapeutic alternatives 546 or other performance criteria, "including
patient satisfaction, rates of childhood immunization," and use of
specified procedures.5 47 These suggestions have the potential to both
unmask racial disparity and channel racial equality in care because
they measure racial disparities in the aggregate, making the disparities
visible to both the institution and outside observers, such as regulatory
bodies, patients, and other medical institutions. 548 The result of this
540. For views on this issue, see generally Bowser, supra note 5; and Thomas, supra note 426.
541. See supra notes 182-189 and accompanying text.
542. Such incentives could be positive (e.g., the payment of a "bonus" for achieving desired
results) or negative (e.g., withholding federal funds from an institution that reports statistically
significant racial disparities in treatment or outcomes). See, e.g., Bowser, supra note 5, at 127-28
(suggesting withholding of federal funds as sanction); Crossley, supra note 394, at 299 (noting
health insurer incentive systems that use financial rewards to encourage desired outcomes); Watson, supra note 394, at 223-24 (suggesting use of "bonus" payments as incentive).
543. See Bowser, supra note 5, at 126-28; Crossley, supra note 394, at 298.
544. See id. at 299; Watson, supra note 394, at 223-24.
545. See Crossley, supra note 394, at 299; Noah, supra note 394, at 174-75.
546. Bowser, supra note 5, at 126.
547. Watson, supra note 394, at 222, 223-24.
548. See Bowser, supra note 5, at 130; Crossley, supra note 394, at 299; Noah, supra note 394,
at 173; Watson, supra note 394, at 223.
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openness should, according to its advocates, create internal incentive
and peer pressure for the institution to rethink its policies and practices. As Rend Bowser puts it, data collection would compel institutions to "think about race" and to begin an "internal dialogue"
examining their assumptions and decisions. 549 Similarly, Watson
predicts that data collection would create a climate that "encourages
'550
education, change and improvement.
Making racial equity a goal for the institution, and therefore a goal
for individual professionals within the institution, also should affect
the dynamics of doctor-patient interactions in a way that encourages
doctors to seek individualized information from the patient and
reduces the potential for behavioral confirmation of their stereotypebased expectations. As social psychologists have found, perceivers
tend to pay more attention to individualized information about the
target and to consider how external factors might be affecting their
conduct in situations in which they are motivated to make accurate
judgments (as opposed to confirming their predictions) and when they
5 51
are aware that their decisions will be compared to objective criteria.
Furthermore, monitoring patient satisfaction as well as clinical decisions and outcomes should have a positive effect on clinical encounters and reduce the potential for behavioral confirmation to the
extent that it gives the patient greater power in the interaction and
engages the doctor's "facilitative" or "adjustive" functions-in other
words, encourages the doctor to try to get along with the patient or to
552
make the patient "like" him or her.
In addition to proposing that racial disparities be made more visible
and the achievement of racial equity be rewarded, legal scholars have
advocated altering the situation in which doctors interact with patients
and make decisions. Their suggested reforms would channel those interactions and decisions to reduce racial disparity by limiting the ambiguity of medical decision making and reducing the situational
constraints that promote racially biased decisions. For example, M.
Gregg Bloche and Mary Crossley propose that institutions reduce the
opportunities for undetected bias to infect clinical decisions by limiting the amount of discretion accorded doctors in their treatment
choices. Both Bloche and Crossley recognize that a balance must be
struck between "the goal of reducing racial disparities and the virtues
549.
550.
551.
552.

Bowser, supra note 5, at 128-29.
Watson, supra note 394, at 223.
See supra notes 288-291 and accompanying text.
See supra note 292 and accompanying text.
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of greater clinical flexibility, ' 553 but also point out that variations that
are not based on scientific evidence are the kind most likely to produce unwarranted racial disparity. 554 Therefore, Bloche suggests that
health plans publish clinical practice protocols, "with supporting evidence and argument" that would be "open to professional and con-

sumer review, '555 while Crossley proposes that "professional medical
societies, government bodies, or health care payers" disseminate
"clinical practice guidelines [that] ... give individual practitioners the

'556
ability to practice evidence-based medicine.
Institutions also can adopt measures to alter the conditions of the

doctor-patient interaction, through the use of "more nuanced" financial incentives than they currently employ.55 7 These reforms could be
directed at encouraging participatory decision making between doctor
and patient, as well as at reducing the time pressures and cognitive

load placed on doctors. 558 For example, Bloche proposes that insurers
cover desirable practices, such as using language translation services

or spending more time with patients and their families, or reward
measures of patient satisfaction. 559 In addition, he suggests that government standards for Medicaid managed care plans incorporate re-

quirements for "the stability of patients' assignments to primary care
553. Bloche, supra note 402, at 117. See Crossley, supra note 394, at 301 ("Concededly, because it is impossible for clinical guidelines to account for and address all the possible variations
in the clinical details of specific patients, clinical guidelines will never entirely eliminate physician discretion."). Cf. Balsa et al., supra note 402, at 207 (Clinical discretion "is not inherently
negative. It is, however, a necessary condition for the indulgence of stereotypes and biases by
physicians in a manner that engenders racial and ethnic disparities.").
554. As Crossley writes:
[D]isparities in the medical services rendered to different patient groups are particularly likely when the treatment for a particular condition is discretionary, i.e., when it is
not clear what treatment is appropriate for the condition. Through the development of
guidelines incorporating the best available scientific evidence, however, the number of
conditions for which the choice of treatment is discretionary is reduced, and thus the
opportunities for bias to influence the choice of treatment are similarly decreased.
Crossley, supra note 394, at 301. Cf Bloche, supra note 402, at 117 (pointing out desirability of
detailed rules in connection with the goal of reducing racial disparities in medical care).
555. Bloche, supra note 402, at 117.
556. Crossley, supra note 394, at 300-01.
557. Bloche, supra note 402, at 118. Bloche points out that existing cost control measures
already create financial incentives and disincentives, and that those existing resource allocation
decisions "amplif[y] the social impact of ... stereotypes and failures of empathy." Id. See also
Balsa et al., supra note 402, at 215-16.
558. For discussion of desirability of participatory decision making, see supra notes 456-464
and accompanying text; for discussion of situational constraints that promote operation of unconscious bias, see supra notes 446-455 and accompanying text; and for discussion of situational
constraints that promote the behavioral confirmation of racial stereotypes, see supra notes 489513 and accompanying text.
559. Bloche, supra note 402, at 118.
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providers (and these providers' accessibility), reasonable maximum
patient loads per primary physician, and minimum time allotments for
patient visits."1560 Reforms such as these have the potential to reduce
the small, unnoticed situational factors that, in the aggregate, channel
behavioral confirmation of, as well as the exercise of clinical discretion
based on, racial stereotypes.
As Watson has pointed out, we cannot make substantial progress
toward racial equity in medical care unless we "move from a backward looking focus on blame" 56 1 and adopt multiple, creative approaches to change "old patterns of behavior. '562 The proposed
reforms discussed above have the potential to challenge the "unseen,
self-sustaining force" 563 of racial bias in medical care by disrupting the
processes by which it operates. We must, as Merton wrote, "cut[ ] off
56 5
their sustenance" 564 through "deliberate institutional change.
V.

CONCLUSION:

"By No MEANS INEVITABLE"

566

The initial definition of the situation which has set the circle in motion must be abandoned. Only when the original assumption is
questioned and a new definition of the situation introduced, does
assumption. Only
the consequent flow of events give the lie to the 567
then does the belief no longer father the reality.
The multiple, symbiotic processes by which situations channel racism and stereotypes confirm themselves also serve to obscure and
entrench the use of race as proxy and could justify our despair that
society can ever break out of this "tragic, often vicious, circle. '5 68 But
as Merton wrote in 1948, and as this Article has argued, we can, and
we must, thwart the self-fulfilling prophecy of racial disparity by altering the situations in which and disrupting the processes by which it is
realized.

560. Id. at 119 (footnotes omitted).
561. Watson, supra note 394, at 204.
562. Id. at 224.
563. Bowser, supra note 426, at 370.
564. Merton, supra note 193, at 210.
565. Id. at 209. See also id. at 210 ("The self-fulfilling prophecy, whereby fears are translated
into reality, operates only in the absence of deliberate institutionalcontrols.").
566. Jones, supra note 284, at 46.
567. Merton, supra note 193, at 197.
568. Id.
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